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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis presents a theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between technology and politics, 
and then applies it to the use made of railways by successive British governments in their Irish policies  between 
1835 and 1850. It questions why the Chester and Holyhead Railway was chosen over its rivals in 1844, and what 
political influence government applied to ensure its success against a technically superior alternative. The thesis 
also examines the interaction between politics and technology between 1850 and 1900 in North Wales by 
assessing the political implications of the London and North Western Railway monopoly, including the Holyhead 
line. 
 
Uniquely, the study shows that successive governments between 1835 and 1850 included railways in their Irish 
policies, but did not achieve the required results. Politicians failed to implement the impressive 1839 Irish Railway 
Commission proposals, and then did not focus sufficiently on reducing journey time between London and Dublin. 
Government allowed regional and personal interests in Britain to guide its decision-making, rather than technical 
advice. Railways produced paradoxical political results in North Wales between 1850 and 1900. They assisted 
both Anglicisation and Welsh nationalism, and the thesis adds to knowledge by showing that railways featured on 
the nationalist agenda of the region, particularly after 1867.  
 
By exploring railways and politics in North Wales and Ireland, this thesis enhances knowledge about their role in 
day to day governance, nation-building and larger imperial ambitions. These novel findings are based on a 
thorough review of the literature, an extensive use of primary sources  and a range of research methods, including 
mathematical calculation. The thesis suggests that technological solutions to political problems produce more of 
the intended results when expertise, public priorities and political leadership are aligned so that projects are not, 
in Henry Thoreau’s words, merely: ‘an improved means to an unimproved end.’ 
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Preface 
 
The interface between railways and politics is currently apparent as the case for a high speed 
railway link between London and the north of England is debated and arguments focus on the 
correct route and most important outcomes from the project. This research covers similar ground 
but from over a century and a half ago using the example of the Chester and Holyhead Railway. 
The challenge of using railways to deal with the persistent problem of integrating Ireland into the 
United Kingdom was addressed from the mid-1830s, and railway technology was deployed in 
different ways according to the philosophy of the politicians in charge of the process. There was 
also a significant impact on communities and individuals in the vicinity of the new railway in North 
Wales, even though that was no part of the intention of its creators. The interface between 
technology and politics is explored in this study that demonstrates how both the nature of politics 
and the way technology is used are changed as a result of their interaction. 
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1. London 179 Miles: 85 Miles Holyhead 
 
The old sign shown above appears opposite the Holyhead bound platform on Chester Station to 
this day. Such signs are not usual at railway stations and this thesis will explain why the sign was 
put there. In particular, it explains the 85-mile railway from Chester to Holyhead: why it was built; 
what forces created it; who supported and opposed it; what impact was intended; what impact it 
had, and where that impact was felt most. The answers to these questions shed light on the 
political integrity of the United Kingdom (UK) in the second half of the nineteenth century.1   The 
thesis will examine the role and purpose of the Chester and Holyhead Railway (CHR) in respect of 
both Ireland and North Wales by answering three interlinked research questions: 
 
1. Was the construction of a railway and sea link between London and Dublin part of the 
Whig and Tory governments’ policies towards Ireland in the 1830s and 1840s?   
 
2. Did Sir Robert Peel’s Government of 1841-46 express a preference about the Welsh 
element of a railway route between London and Dublin and if so, did it take any 
political action in support of that preference? 
 
3. What political impact and implications did the experience of the CHR and its branch 
lines have in North Wales between 1850 and 1900 
 
The answers provided to the first two questions will show whether the issue of a rail and sea link 
between London and Dublin was an element of UK government policy towards Ireland from 1835 
until 1850. Successive governments believed that a rapid railway link had the potential to assist in 
                                                             
1  Throughout this thesis the term United Kingdom or UK refers to the product of the Act of Union passed in 
August 1800 and implemented from January 1801 that created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland governed from London. 
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governing Ireland more effectively – although what amounted to effective government of Ireland 
varied according to the policies of the ruling administration in London. The CHR was the railway 
that was eventually chosen to make the link between London and Dublin along the North Wales 
coast instead of the rival route to Porth Dinllaen (PDR) that took a more inland route from the 
West Midlands of England.  The process by which that choice was made was complicated, and it 
reveals much about the profile of the political forces in the UK in the 1830s and 1840s. The CHR, 
as a major addition to the infrastructure of North Wales, had the potential to impact on the 
politics of the region, even though its construction was not intended to address any such issues in 
North Wales.2 It was controlled by the London and North Western Railway (LNWR) which 
absorbed the CHR in 1859, but had operated its trains from the opening of the line in 1848.3  The 
connection of London and Dublin by rail and steamer is an example of how major infrastructure 
projects have an impact beyond the intentions of those who plan and finance them. This thesis 
therefore identifies a paradox: the CHR was intended to strengthen Ireland’s position within the 
UK but that was not achieved; while it had no stated aims for North Wales, but strongly 
influenced the politics of that region in the second half of the nineteenth century.  
 This introduction is divided into four parts. The first considers the interface of technology 
and politics and it thereby provides a theoretical framework for the whole thesis. The second 
section focuses on existing scholarship on the application of technology to the improvement of 
communication between Ireland and London that aimed to strengthen the political connection 
between the two. It places that project within the historical context of the construction of 
railways in the 1830s and 1840s. The third section outlines the sources used and methodology 
adopted in order to answer the three main research questions, while the last section offers a 
breakdown of the following seven chapters.  
 
 
 
                                                             
2  In this study ‘North Wales’ covers the counties of Flintshire, Caernarfonshire, Anglesey and Denbighshire. 
Some aspects of the study stray into Merionethshire but that is not part of the core area. The spelling of 
towns is that used in the current Ordnance Survey maps, though the contemporary spelling is used in 
quotations. 
 
3  In this thesis the terms CHR and LNWR are used interchangeably, apart from the period before 1846 when 
the LNWR was created. Before that time, the CHR was promoted by the London and Birmingham Railway 
that formed the largest part of the LNWR amalgamation. The Manchester and Birmingham Railway and the 
Grand Junction Railway (Liverpool to Birmingham and Manchester) were the other elements of the LNWR in 
its 1846 form. It connected the four named cities that together formed the core of the UK industrial 
economy in the 1840s. 
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1.1 Politics and technology: a theoretical framework.4  
 
Research on the interaction between politics and technology began with Lewis Mumford, whose 
1934 study was ‘alone in its field’.5 According to Mumford, technology had passed through three 
phases: the ‘eotechnic’ that ended around 1750, based on naturally-occurring forces and 
materials – wind and wood for example; the ‘paleotechnic’, from 1750 to 1900 and characterised 
by extractive industries and humanly created power, especially steam; and the ‘neotechnical’ 
period, from 1901 to the present, characterised by the use of electricity.6 For Mumford, these 
periods had contrasting social and political characteristics, with the paleotechnic (industrial 
revolution) being one of: ‘competition, struggle for existence: domination and submission: 
extinction’.7 Considering Mumford’s suggested link between technology and political impact, it is 
understandable that Winner asked in 1980: ‘Do artifacts [sic] have politics?’ 8 At issue was 
whether technology has autonomous force to change society, whether it only did so with political 
direction, or whether the relationship between the two varied according to the context. For 
Winner, technological determinism was untenable.9 He was more sympathetic to the alternative: 
‘social determination […] what matters is not technology itself, but the social or economic system 
in which it is embedded’.10  But Winner went further and argued that a technology can be political 
in itself, and appear to: ‘require, or to be strongly compatible with, particular kinds of political 
relationships’. 11 As an example of the inherent political potential of some technology, he 
                                                             
4  The definition of technology is that used by Headrick: ‘all the ways in which humans use materials and 
energy in the environment for their own ends, beyond what they can do with their bodies.’ Daniel R Headrick, 
Power over Peoples: Technology, Environments and Western Imperialism 1400 to the present day (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010), 3.  
 
Politics is defined in the title of the book by Harold Dwight Lasswell, Who Gets What, When, How (New. York: 
Whittlesey House, 1936). 
 
5  Lewis Mumford, An Appraisal of Lewis Mumford's "Technics and Civilization" (1934), Daedalus , Vol. 88, 
No. 3, Current Work and Controversies (Summer, 1959), pp. 527-536.  
 
6  Thomas Kaiserfeld, Beyond Innovation: Technology, Institution and Change as Categories (London: 
Palgrave, 2015), 97-8. 
 
7  Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization: With a new foreword by Langdon Winner (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2010), 195. 
 
8  Langdon Winner, "Do Artifacts Have Politics?" Daedalus 109, no. 1 (1980): 121-36. 
 
9  Technical determinism: ‘Technical forces determine social and cultural change’. See Merritt Roe Smith 
and Leo Marx, Does Technology Drive History? : The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, 
 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), 102. 
10  Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology  (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 21. 
 
11  Winner, "Do Artifacts Have Politics?"  
12 
 
mentioned the New York bridges that were set too low for the buses carrying black people to 
access certain districts.12  
Joerges did not wholly accept Winner’s argument. According to him, it did not take 
sufficient account of the fact that technology is owned and it is the political processes: ‘by which 
authorizations are built, maintained, contested and changed which are at issue in any social study 
of […] technology’.13 Kaiserfeld’s 2015 study brought many of these issues and questions together 
by suggesting that technology is the: ‘result of social relations and political actions, historically 
developed and used to dominate others [and both] mirrors and strengthens a certain social and 
political order’.14 Kaiserfeld largely echoed Street’s claim that technology is not passive and does 
not have the same results in all contexts. He emphasised the crucial importance of politics in 
determining the results of the application of technology.15 Hecht took this further by identifying a 
specific form of politics based on technology - ‘technopolitics […] the strategic practice of 
designing or using technology to constitute, embody or enact political goals’.16 
As Kaplan has suggested, the issues that arise for the citizen from the relationship 
between technology and politics are political rights and liberties, the regulation and design of 
technology, and how the advantages and disadvantages of technology should be distributed. 17 
Consistent with Kaplan’s approach, Leo Marx has proposed two important questions to analyse 
the interface between technology and politics: 
 
(1) How, and by whom, is the technology controlled? What form of social organization determines 
the use of the apparatus and its product?  
(2) To what ends is that control exercised? What system of belief characteristically shapes the 
goals to which the apparatus is directed?18 
 
                                                             
12  Winner, "Do Artifacts Have Politics?"  
 
13  Bernward Joerges, “Do politics have artifacts?” Social Studies of Science, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Jun., 1999), 411-
431. 
 
14  Kaiserfeld, Beyond Innovation, 105. 
 
15  James Street, Politics and Technology (Guildford: Guildford Press, 1992), 4. 
 
16  Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and national identity after World War II (London: 
MIT Press, 2009), 91. 
 
17  David M. Kaplan (ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Technology (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 
xiv. 
 
18  Leo Marx, "On Heidegger's Conception of ‘Technology’ and Its Historical Validity."  The Massachusetts 
Review 25, no. 4 (1984), 638-52.  
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The answers to these questions may not provide evidence of collusion between politicians and 
the owners of technology, or what Street calls ‘conscious conspiracies or malicious intentions’. 
Major technologies, as Winner argues, have political consequences that: ‘transcend the simple 
categories of "intended" and "unintended" altogether [and] regularly produce results counted as 
wonderful breakthroughs by some social interests and crushing setbacks by others’.19  
Despite these complexities, politicians continue to believe that technology is a useful tool 
for the solution of social and political problems.20 Or, as Barry suggested in 2001, it can at least 
provide a politically neutral means of reducing social and economic tensions.21 However, the 
attractiveness of technical solutions is often superficial because technology may perform in 
unexpected ways in a new environment and politicians must wait until ‘the results are in’ before 
knowing exactly what the consequences are of the deployment of technology.22 The technology 
may: ‘establish new functions and practices, which in turn generate new forms of participation 
and control’ that change the nature of the relationship between government and people. 23 One 
possible result of a major technological change is dependency, so that what was once a promising 
new technology becomes a standard requirement for the population, who react negatively if it is 
withdrawn or the standard of delivery is deemed inadequate.24 Politicians may then need to 
become involved in managing, regulating or even owning the technology in order to ensure 
greater fairness in the distribution of profits and benefits.  
It is clear from the foregoing that technology in its various forms affects the everyday 
operation of government and the relationship between politicians and people. Leo Marx has 
noted that the nineteenth century, which is the focus of this study’s exploration of the interaction 
of technology and politics, was characterised by a different view of technology than had existed in 
the earlier eotechnic (using Mumford’s description) period. Technology during the eotechnic 
period had been widely regarded as useful to assist in the development of a more just and 
democratic society, with no intrinsic value beyond its capacity to serve humanity.25 As the 
nineteenth century progressed, technical improvement acquired greater significance and was 
deemed to be, in itself, a marker of human progress because it was considered by some to 
                                                             
19  Langdon Winner, “Do artifacts have politics?” in David M. Kaplan (ed) Readings in the Philosophy of 
Technology (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 254. 
 
20  Street, Politics and Technology, 27. 
 
21  Andrew Barry, Political Machines: Governing a Technological Society (London: Athlone Press, 2001), 8. 
 
22  Street, Politics and Technology, 118. 
 
23 Street, Politics and Technology, 104. 
 
24  Street, Politics and Technology, 93. 
 
25  Leo Marx, "Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept." Technology and Culture 51, no. 3 
(2010): 561-77.  
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guarantee social advance and economic prosperity.26 This change was not accepted by all 
commentators, Thoreau, for instance, concluded in 1854 that:  ‘Our inventions are wont to be 
pretty toys, which distract our attention from serious things. They are but improved means to an 
unimproved end’.27 Nonetheless, as Michael Adas amongst others has observed, from the end of 
the eighteenth century science and technology were at the forefront of European thought and its 
‘civilizing mission’.28 In other words, the possession of an advanced technology became 
synonymous with having a superior position in the world order.  
Certain technologies were more powerful than others. Marxist economists Baran and 
Sweezy considered that railways were ‘epoch-making’. They argued that from 1830 to 1914 large 
parts of the world had experienced a form of technological determinism that they termed 
‘railwayisation’.29 Lee’s study of the colonial engineer John Whitton suggested more political input 
to such a process and a: ‘right of the strong to dominate the weak’ that was assumed by imperial 
powers and activated by ‘technical and organisational superiority’ - notably railways, steamships 
and the electric telegraph.30 The railway particularly served as an imperial technology. It 
symbolised Western superiority and provided the practical means to enact the presumed 
superiority, being an: ‘essential strategic, defensive, subjugatory and administrative “tool”’.31 
According to Revill, railways were particularly powerful because they were themselves: ‘a state in 
microcosm [and potentially] a “war machine” and […] a tool of imperialism’.32 As already noted, 
this process was not necessarily the result of formal collusion between administrators and 
politicians. For den Otter, the ‘aura of distinctiveness and arrogance’ created by technical 
superiority led Britons to consider that they must share their ‘superior civilisation’ in an unofficial 
                                                             
 
26  Leo Marx, “Technology The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept”.  
 
27  Henry David Thoreau, Walden, or Life in the Woods (New York: Cosimo Books, 2009), 34 [originally 
published in 1854, my emphasis]. 
 
28  Michael Adas, Machines as the measure of man: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western 
Dominance (London: Ithaca, 1989), 3-4. 
 
29  Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital: An essay on the American Economic and Social Order 
(Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1966), 223. 
 
30  Robert Lee, Colonial Engineer: John Whitton 1819-1898 and the Building of Australia’s Railways (Sidney: 
University of New South Wales Press, 2000), 28. 
 
31  Ian Derbyshire, “The Building of India’s Railways: The Application of Western Technology in the Colonial 
Periphery 1850-1920” in Rory Macleod and Deepak Kumar (eds) Technology and the Raj: Western 
Technology and Technical Transfers in India 1700-1947 (London: Sage Publications 1995), 178.  
 
32  Revill, George. 3000 Words On Politics, Technology, Railways, Empire Etc. 2017. E-mail. 
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mission that was a: ‘moral rather than an economic statement’ as part of the creation of empire.33 
And some scholars have suggested that railways were in fact: ‘a synonym for “civilisation” […] in 
the political discourse of colonial legitimacy’.34 
Mattelart and Mattelart argued that the mechanism by which the superiority of the 
owners of technology was to be conveyed to those in need of improvement lay in the ‘science of 
communication’ that developed from the early nineteenth century. Advocates of that view 
considered that society was an organism with separate parts that fulfilled important functions and 
were connected by the improved means of communication to form a whole.35 The railway was a 
“nervous system” that provided a particularly fast and effective connection between the “heart” 
and the “limbs” of this organism and thereby integrated the distinct parts into a single political 
entity that enabled day to day governance of increasingly complex societies and empires. 
Railways were able to do so because of the use to which they were put by politicians and others, 
rather than through their technological power alone.36 Simmons’ suggestion that ‘politics was the 
midwife of railways’ therefore seems rather limited.37 It would be more accurate to argue, as 
Street has done, that the relationship between politics, technology and its owners is dialectical.38  
Considering the various real and potential consequences of the use of a major technology, 
its ownership, became a political issue, particularly in the case of railways in the UK and the 
United States (US) in the nineteenth century, which were privately owned and operated. The 
emergence of large corporations that owned railways in the US aroused suspicion. The prominent 
contemporary commentator Charles Francis Adams saw them as an example of: ‘institutions and 
organisations beyond the control of the community, state or federal nation’ - with a power over 
human thought and experience similar to that of a major religion.39 He stressed that privately-
owned corporations focused on profit and ignored any sense of holding a great technology such 
                                                             
33  A. A. den Otter, The Philosophy of Railways: The transcontinental railway idea in British North America 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 19. 
 
34 Harald Fischer-Tiné and Michael Mann (eds) Colonialism as Civilizing Mission: Cultural Ideology in British 
India (London: Anthem Press, 2004), 96. 
 
35  Armand and Michele Mattelart, Theories of Communication: A short introduction (London: Sage 
Publications, 1998), 5. 
 
36  Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in the Nineteenth 
Century (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1986), xix. 
 
37  Jack Simmons and Gordon Biddle, The Oxford companion to British railway history (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 383. 
 
38  Street, Politics and Technology, 16. The ‘railway age’ in Britain was 1830-1914, Simmons and Biddle, The 
Oxford companion to British railway history, 412. 
 
39  Ben Marsden and Crosbie Smith, Engineering Empires: A cultural history of Technology in nineteenth-
century Britain (London: Palgrave, 2005), 165. 
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as railways ‘in trust’ for the wider community.40 The hesitancy of government to take robust 
action on behalf of the community may not have been a matter of neglect, but rather part of a 
belief that government intervention in technological, as in other issues, was more than likely to 
make matters worse.41 Government engagement in British railways was explored by Parris in 
1965. He showed how politicians struggled initially to cope with the demands of a technology that 
increasingly dominated British life from 1830. But as the franchise extended after 1867 and MPs 
became more dependent upon their constituencies, government was more willing and able to 
challenge the power of the ‘railway interest’.42 Nonetheless, the railway interest was a powerful 
political force in the second half of the nineteenth century, as Alderman has shown.43 
Much work has been done on the relationship between railways and government in the 
context of (formal and informal) empire, leading to the rise of the idea of ‘railway imperialism’. 44 
More recently, Colin Divall has noted six types of railway imperialism, ranging from ‘formal 
control’ in India, through ‘sub imperial/expansive’, for example in Canada and South Africa; to 
‘economic satellite, proto-national integrative’ in Argentina and Brazil; ‘private’, in places like 
Cuba and Chile; ‘penetrating’ in China and Mexico; and finally ‘competitive and strategic’, for 
example in the Ottoman Empire.45  These varying types of ‘railway imperialism’ – even without 
examining them in detail - demonstrate the earlier point that a technology is  open to a variety of 
applications according to economic and political conditions. ‘Railway imperialism’, then, refers to 
both the power of the technology itself and the ability of politicians to use it for political 
purposes. 
                                                             
40  Marsden and Smith, Engineering Empires, 170. British railway corporations also achieved ‘unimaginable 
size’, and there is no reason to suppose that their impact was any less than their American counterparts 
though it has been less studied in the former country. See George Revill, ‘Perception, reception and 
representation: Wolfgang Schivelbusch and the cultural history of travel and transport,’ in: Norton, Peter; 
Mom, Gijs; Milward, Liz and Flonneau, Mathieu eds. Mobility in History: reviews and reflections. Yearbook of 
Transport, Travel and Mobility (T2M).The London and North Western Railway Company was the largest 
industrial corporation in the world, see Malcolm Reed, London and North Western Railway: A History 
(Cornwall: Atlantic 1996), 1. 
 
41  Daniel R. Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-
1940 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 59. 
 
42  Henry Parris, Government and the Railways in nineteenth century  Britain (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1965), 214. 
 
43  Geoffrey Alderman, The Railway Interest (Leicester: University of Leicester Press, 1973). 
 
44  Clarence B. Davis, Kenneth E. Wilburn, Jr., and Ronald E. Robinson, eds., Railway Imperialism (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1991). For Robinson see Andrew S. Thompson, ‘Gallagher, John Andrew(1919–
1980)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Oct 2007 
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The most prominent case study in ‘railway imperialism’ is India, which saw the largest and 
most expensive colonial projects anywhere in the world during the nineteenth century – and they 
were at the heart of the creation of modern India.46 But in the manner already noted, the impact 
of railways was not the same in all places and at all times. As Kerr has shown, the significance of 
railways in any location was determined by who controlled them and for what purpose. In the 
case of India, the impact of railways was: ‘mediated by colonial administrators and their political 
masters’.47 In other words, for Kerr it was politics and technology together that determined the 
outcomes of railways for India and which ensured that those with wealth became even 
wealthier.48  
Divall’s classification suggests that ‘railway imperialism’ only applied to non-European 
countries, but this may over-simplify the concept. For example, Lee has claimed that the line 
through the Semmering Pass from Vienna to Italy, which was built in 1854, was the first imperial 
railway - designed to integrate the provinces of Italy into Austro-Hungarian Empire. While Lee is 
careful to distinguish that railway from later efforts, such as those in India, which aimed : ‘to 
extend the economic and political reach of new and dynamic empires’, his work suggests that 
railways may have had “imperial” purposes before European imperial expansion into other 
continents on a large scale.49 This is in line with Kenny’s argument relating to Ireland that: 
‘European colonialism originated as an internal rather than an external process; only when 
dominion had been established did overseas empires gradually emerge’.50 As such, it is useful to 
examine the role of railways in securing quasi-imperial control in the day to day governance of the 
home territories of the European powers in the nineteenth century, including Ireland, as an early 
example of what happened later in places like India. The next three chapters examine the efforts 
undertaken by the UK government to use railways in association with other technologies to 
strengthen the governance of Ireland as part of the UK. So railways might be said to have been 
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used to ‘assist the infrastructure of political rule’ in Ireland, and because of Ireland’s relationship 
with the rest of the UK, to have ‘served formal empire’.51 
Railways were certainly important in the process of nation-building before imperial 
expansion into Africa and Asia in the late nineteenth century. As Greet de Block has shown, once 
Belgium achieved independence from the Netherlands in 1830, politicians began to use railways 
to create and define their new nation.52  This approach in Belgium worked because it was nation-
building that started with a “clean slate”. There was a sense of purpose and a clear political 
direction so that the application of technology was better equipped to deliver what was required. 
In contrast with Thoreau’s remark about technology at the head of this chapter, the Belgian case 
is an example of both a reformed means (railways) and a reformed end (independence from the 
Netherlands).  
An examination of some other examples of the use of railways in nation or empire-
building further demonstrates the variable results achieved in the application of a technology in 
different political and cultural settings. Bismarck aimed to use railways to integrate the states that 
made up the new German nation created in 1871. He encountered fierce opposition from the 
individual German states who resisted the creation of a publicly-owned railway and its role in 
forging a centralised state.53  This amply demonstrates that technology may provoke a reaction 
and may be used by those affected for ends that are very different from the ones originally 
intended by railway promoters. In India, nationalism grew with the railways, although such 
growth was surely not intended by those who financed railways in the sub-continent.54 And in 
South Africa, railways were used by British imperialists and Boer republicans in their respective, 
competing and aggressive attempts to dominate the region in the late nineteenth century.55 
These apparently contradictory results of railway development are examples of what Kubicek 
noted in respect of technology and empire - that technology: ‘empowered the metropole but also 
to some degree, strengthened the periphery’.56 That notion is present also in Hechter’s analysis of 
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‘internal colonialism’ in which peripheral regions may respond to heightened contact with the 
metropolis by asserting their own identity rather than absorbing the culture of the metropole. 
Hechter applied his concept to the Celtic fringe of the UK, which makes it a potentially relevant 
concept to this study of railways and the increased contact they facilitated between England, 
Ireland and Wales.57 
In North America, Canada provides the clearest example of a specific technological project 
- the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) – being used as a defined act of nation-building by an imperial 
power. The CPR brought together the geographically distant and culturally distinct east and west 
of the British territories in North America to create Canada. This was an act of ‘technological 
nationalism’ but according to den Otter, it showed that technology was an insubstantial basis for 
the creation of a nation because it is difficult to control the impact of technology, especially if that 
technology is also being used by a powerful neighbour such as the US that was ‘culturally 
dominant and technologically more experienced’. 58  The result was that the CPR became as much 
an extension of the US railway network as it was a discreetly Canadian national railway line within 
the British Empire.  
Thus, in the politics of nation-building and imperial relationships, railways were, as Divall 
has suggested: ‘necessary if not sufficient, for both the creation and extension of centralised 
forms of state authority, and of the circulation of goods, ideas, and people needed to develop 
[the] nation to be’.59 Drawing upon Benedict Anderson’s work on nationalism, Revill too has 
argued that railways in and of themselves were not enough for nation-building. Culture, history 
and language were vitally important because nation-building was: ‘about more than institutions 
and infrastructure’.60 For railways to be effective in nation-building, the national identity, the 
means and the ends had to be aligned, as was the case in Belgium.  
Nye’s study of the use of technology as the means of securing a ‘Second Creation’ in the 
US demonstrates that technology also caused outright opposition as well as being used by 
opponents for their own purposes. In that study, Nye shows that pioneers heading west in the US 
in the second half of the nineteenth century thought their ‘Manifest Destiny’ was secured by 
railway technology that was a God-given means to improve on the original creation of the lands 
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that they acquired, often at the expense of native populations.61 Opponents did not try to use the 
railway for their own purposes, as in the examples of India and South Africa, but denounced the 
new technology by creating ‘counter narratives’ that challenged the notion of Manifest Destiny. 
Those counter narratives argued that railways produced: ‘new forms of political power, class 
conflict, accidents, land swindles, pollution, and unfamiliar environmental problems’ and were in 
fact a ‘route of superior desolation’.62 Such opposition was more in the spirit of Thoreau’s critique 
of technology and tended to question the assumptions behind ideas of progress and human 
superiority based on the possession of new technologies.  
This survey of the literature on technology, politics and railways has particularly focused 
on the larger ambitions of railways, such as the creation of nations and the control of empires. Yet 
the notion of the ‘railway age’ to denote the second half of the nineteenth century is suggestive 
of a technological influence that extended far beyond those grander political objectives and 
reached the everyday routine processes of governance. This all-embracing sense of the railways 
and their importance in day to day politics is well summarised by Revill:  
 
If politics is basically a matter of how we decide who gets what, when and where, then railways 
clearly play an important part in the process both within and between nation-states, enabling 
movement and providing access for citizens gathering and distributing the resources, goods and 
services which make modern life possible and represent our material stake in the national 
collectivity.63 
 
Railways, then, provided both the mobility that was essential to the exercise of the greater 
freedoms that replaced feudalism - and the connectivity within which those freedoms were 
exercised. The two questions posed by Leo Marx concerning who controls a technology, and to 
what ends, offer a useful framework for a historical understanding of the intentions of the 
promoters of a railway; and of the politics of those whose lives were, intentionally or 
unintentionally, affected by its construction and operation. Many factors were at work when 
technology was applied to a political issue such as the governance of Ireland. As noted above, the 
intentions, philosophy and ambitions of the politicians and the owners of the technology may not 
be aligned; the people affected by the introduction of a technology may react in a different way 
than expected; the technology may not perform in the way it was designed to; and it may even 
serve ends that directly contradict the priorities of the politicians and the owners of the 
technology.  Guided by Leo Marx’s two overarching questions that cover many of these points, 
and focussing on Ireland and North Wales and the connection between London and Dublin 
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created by the Chester and Holyhead Railway, this study examines the complex relationship 
between technology and politics and the potential for railways to serve purposes that were not 
intended or anticipated by those who authorised, constructed and paid for them.  
1.2 The historical and historiographical context 
 
In the next four chapters this thesis focuses on the attempts of the government in London in the 
1830s to absorb Ireland into the UK following the Act of Union of 1801. The nature of the 
relationship between the UK government and Ireland after 1801 is contested among historians 
but most agree that it was different from the other countries that made up the UK. For Nasson, 
Union with Ireland was ‘annexation with a Parliamentary gloss’ and Ireland was more 
troublesome to the London government than many of its more distant colonies.64 Morgan’s 1991 
comparison with Wales in British politics is clear about the existence of a discrete Irish nation, not 
least because of its physical separation by the Irish Sea. But there was much more that marked 
Ireland out from the rest of the UK: ‘a distinct social structure, a fundamental cleavage in religious 
affiliation, a nationally articulate public opinion, and a tragically insoluble problem of economic 
subsistence’.65  Its remoteness from London was an important reason why governing Ireland was 
particularly difficult in the nineteenth century and required a separate administration at Dublin 
Castle. That administration was headed by the Lord Lieutenant, supported by the chief secretary - 
a senior politician who spent much time in London - and an under-secretary, a civil servant who 
was, in practice, often the face of UK government in Ireland.66  The need for local control was 
seen to depend in part on the speed of communication between London and Dublin: the faster 
the communication, the more power could be exercised from London; a very clear example of the 
interface of politics and technology.  
Estimations of Ireland’s position within the UK in the nineteenth century often miss the 
point that it was time not distance that was the issue. Kenny, for example, focused on the issue of 
distance in his pertinent assessment of Ireland’s status:  
 
Ireland was too near England to be left alone, but this very proximity helps explain why the 
country's status within the Empire has been so frequently ignored, questioned, or at best 
defensively asserted. The term 'colony' brings to mind far-flung 'exotic' possessions, often marked 
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by extreme racial subjugation. Although the Irish were frequently cast as racially inferior, they 
lacked the requisite quality of distance.67  
 
The socially volatile situation of Ireland, as evidenced amongst other examples by the Terry Alt 
movement in the late 1820s, required a more rapid connection between the capitals than could 
be obtained by the available means of communication, even after Telford’s highly efficient 
London to Holyhead Road was completed in 1826. It reduced the journey time between London 
and Dublin via stagecoach significantly - but not enough to enable direct rule from London.68 It 
belonged to Mumford’s eotechnic era when speed on land could not exceed the biological power 
of the horse. Thus, the ultimate aim of abolishing the Dublin Castle administration that was 
expressed by people like Henry Parnell (the Irish MP, who had pioneered the new road) could not 
be accomplished.69 Telford’s achievement simply did not have sufficient impact on the issue of 
time.70  
In her study of Irish newspapers, McDonald has shown that the ambitions of politicians to 
improve transit time to Ireland had subtler objectives than simply opening the prospect of direct 
administrative rule from London. By analysing the period before the Union of 1801, she has 
illustrated that the speed of communication could affect the value of news, and thereby the 
potential Anglicising influence of newspapers in Dublin.71 That point is reinforced in Street’s 
examination of the interface between technology and news in which speed proves influential in 
establishing the required message because urgency (speed) tends to limit analysis and reduce 
accuracy.72 Communication time was clearly an issue for policy-makers in London, who were 
frustrated at the failure to change the relationship of Ireland within the UK and saw the example 
of Scottish integration as a model for Ireland.73  In practice, the comparison with Scotland was not 
a useful one for the reasons outlined by Morgan above. Scotland’s relationship within the UK was 
much less complex than that of Ireland. It was not Roman Catholic, it was not separated by a sea 
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crossing, and it had integrated into the UK both politically and economically by the nineteenth 
century. 
Thus, the problem of Ireland was a ‘central theme in British political life’ in the nineteenth 
century for the British government. 74 The arrival of railways from 1830 was considered by 
politicians to have the potential to transform the neighbouring island’s governance, as it had 
transformed much else in the social, economic and political life of the UK in that period. 75  For 
Schivelbusch, railways were more than just another technological development: ’every history of 
the nineteenth century presents it as the central character – a kind of technological “Napoleon” – 
in the epic of early industrialization’.76 It was no surprise therefore that this ‘Napoleon’ was 
deployed to tackle the ‘central theme in British political life’ - Ireland.  Schivelbusch also showed 
how the railway might achieve that political change by cutting distance by one-third.77  That 
meant that the 267 miles from London to Holyhead effectively became 89 miles by steam railway 
and boat – and brought the Welsh port as close to London as Rugby was before the railway age. 
But as the works discussed in the previous section have suggested, faster transit did not 
guarantee a change in a political relationship – the technology was bound to be mediated by 
politics.78  Various issues put Dublin in a different relationship with London from that of other 
major UK cities and it needed a political decision to deploy railways to tackle those issues.   
The relationship between Britain and Ireland was so different from others in the UK that it 
is considered by some historians to have been imperial in nature. As such, the use of a railway to 
secure Ireland within the UK might be considered in the same way as railways in India from the 
1850s - as an example of “railway imperialism”.  Railways were a technology that was available to 
government in London at a time when it was politically important to secure greater integration of 
Ireland within the UK. Yet Ireland cannot be considered in the same way as India or British activity 
in Africa. As Kenny has noted: ‘If India represented one form of colony, Nigeria a second, and 
Australia a third, then Ireland represented yet another, combining some aspects of these three 
with highly particular characteristics of its own’.79 And he also stressed that Ireland tended to be 
excluded from discourses on imperialism because it was too close to London.80 But despite the 
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absence of Ireland from the work of major commentators on imperialism, such as Robinson and 
Gallagher, there is sufficient consensus about its imperial status for it to have a chapter dedicated 
to it within the Oxford History of the British Empire.81 In that chapter Fitzpatrick argues that the 
administrative arrangements in Ireland were:  
 
Distinctively colonial in both form and function, despite the legislative Union […] Irish unrest 
provoked measures of repression and coercion unthinkable in Britain; Irish poverty justified 
welfare experiments and state intervention to a degree shocking to orthodox political economists. 
In these respects Ireland was not only exceptional within the United Kingdom but akin to a colony, 
efficiency in government being valued above liberty and the sanctity of property…82  
 
It was precisely the ‘efficiency of government’ that the political use of railways was designed to 
address and this may be seen, in Fitzpatrick’s terms, as contributing to Ireland’s status as a colony. 
Whether the regime in Ireland was coercive or sympathetic, those who administered it, according 
to Fitzpatrick, regarded the Irish as: ‘a separate and subject native population rather than an 
integrated element of a united people’.83  
This dissertation, then, will examine how the arrival of railways and associated 
technologies, such as the steamship and electric telegraph, provided a new opportunity for 
government in London to attempt to answer the persistent Irish question by the creation of a 
greater ‘efficiency in government’ through improved communication between London and Dublin 
provided. In the Mattelarts’ terms, it was an attempt to create a whole body from a series of 
separate organs. So the Irish question can be regarded as a quasi-imperial issue but a distinctly 
different issue from other examples such as India, Nigeria and Australia. 
So far few studies on the governance of Ireland in the early nineteenth century have 
suggested that technology had a role to play in either reinforcing or changing the relationship 
between Ireland and the rest of the UK. In a book that directly addresses the question of whether 
Ireland was a colony, Gray has suggested that Sir Robert Peel supported the abolition of the Lord 
Lieutenancy in 1850 because of ‘the communications revolution’ - but by then Peel was out of 
office.84 Gray does not specify the CHR as part of that revolution and does not suggest that 
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Russell’s Government that succeeded Peel’s administration in 1846 agreed with him.85  Similarly, 
few studies on the CHR have pointed to its political intentions or impact. Baughen’s 1972 study is 
the only extensive history of the CHR, though it only takes that history up to 1880.86 He makes 
many useful points about the origin of the line, but not all of those are referenced, and there is no 
core argument in the book about the purpose of the railway. It belongs to the older type of 
railway history that has been slowly superseded by a more analytical approach that places 
railways at the centre of social, economic and political change in nineteenth-century Britain. 
Nonetheless, even the detailed work of Casson presents the CHR in terms of the transport of MPs 
and troops between the UK and Ireland, rather than influencing the actual governance of Ireland 
from London as this study will do.87 
The application of railways to improve communication with Ireland began soon after the 
railway age commenced with the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway in 1830. 88 The 
reduced journey time from London to Liverpool that resulted from the opening of the Grand 
Junction and London and Birmingham Railways in 1837-38 resulted in the main route of 
communications between Britain and Ireland switching from road to rail via Liverpool, so that the 
role of places like Holyhead (and its state-funded road) began to decline.89 The shift from road to 
rail was not just a change in the mode of transport, it was also one of ownership – and as noted in 
the questions posed by Leo Marx in the previous section, the ownership of a technology is a vital 
factor in its application and the impact that it makes. The London to Holyhead Road was funded 
by the state, and the steamers that sailed to Dublin from Liverpool, Holyhead and Milford Haven 
were also owned by the state, so the communication between London and Dublin in 1830 was a 
state-owned and operated system.90 The emerging railway system was developed privately, but 
its role in carrying the vital communication between London and Dublin required the owners of 
private capital and the state to forge a relationship that was of mutual benefit. Such a change 
meant that senior politicians, such as Sir Robert Peel, had to modify their commitment to laissez-
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faire economics in order to apply private capital to a public purpose. This was part of the wider 
struggle between the state and private railway companies over the ownership and regulation of 
the most powerful and rapid form of communication that had ever been known, as analysed by 
Parris in 1965.91 More recently, Casson has explored the extent to which that struggle in the 
1830s and 1840s produced an irrational rail system. This was in part due to the competition 
between towns and cities to gain access to the rail system in order to sustain or create their own 
economic advantage over rivals - without much concern for the operation of railways as an overall 
system.92 This competition between towns also played an important role in the development of 
the CHR because it distorted some of the debate about the communication between London and 
Dublin into an argument about the route of that communication, alongside its ultimate objective 
of connecting the two cities as rapidly as possible.  
The engineering and other technical aspects of the proposed routes of the railway lines 
from London towards Dublin have been extensively studied and generally recorded in a manner 
that suggests that the CHR was the only serious contender.93 This consensus reflects the fact that 
existing studies of the CHR tend to look at history from the perspective of the victor – the CHR – 
rather than working from 1835 onwards and examining what happened at the time to produce 
the CHR’s success. Much analysis of the CHR has produced a classic Whig-style narrative of an: 
‘overtly optimistic [account] of the role of progress in the history of science’.94 The CHR has been 
portrayed as an example of scientific triumph over an unfriendly environment by the forces of 
progress that led to a successful project delivered by the heroic figures of George Stephenson and 
his son Robert.95 Such a reading of history has the potential to deliver wrong conclusions, 
particularly in railway development, where there is the danger of committing the classic error 
noted by Fleming in respect of near contemporary Argentinian railways: ‘taking the results of 
complicated historical events and imposing pursuit of the results on those who acted to invest in, 
build, and operate the lines’.96  
Railway history has progressed from such Whiggish approaches to show that the impact 
of railway developments did not fit into an unbroken process of improvement. The impact was 
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immense, often unplanned and generally unconcerned with the consequences for poor and 
powerless people. That emerges clearly in more recent analyses, such as those of Simmons, 
Schivelbusch, Casson and Revill, which have demonstrated that railways cannot be viewed in 
isolation as technical developments but must be seen as both products of the industrial age and 
creators of that age within the framework of laissez-faire politics and economics. Simmons was 
one of the first to show the full extent of the impact of railways, Schivelbusch demonstrated that 
impact at an individual level, Casson showed how laissez-faire economics and politics delivered an 
almost chaotic form of railway implementation, while Revill demonstrated how railways provided 
both the model and the means to achieve the creation and integration of the nation state.97 All 
those approaches are relevant to this study of the CHR’s role in British Irish policy from 1835-60, 
and its largely unplanned political impact and implications in North Wales in the period from 1835 
to 1900.  
 Few historians have departed from the account of the CHR typified by Baughen, whose 
history of the line up to 1880 assumes that the eventual success of the CHR was inevitable. But 
Dodd echoed the doubts about the CHR expressed by contemporaries such as Charles Vignoles, 
who surveyed the PDR in 1836 and again in 1846.98 Vignoles thought the CHR was risky, expensive 
and offered few benefits to North Wales. Based in part on that view, Dodd has drawn an unusual, 
important and damning conclusion about early railway development – effectively the CHR - in 
North Wales: ‘The railway, which elsewhere brought with it a period of feverish expansion, in 
North Wales helped to nip the Industrial Revolution in the bud’.99 While Dodd has given us a Welsh 
perspective on the CHR, there is no similar account of the Irish view. That omission is corrected by 
this study, which explores the role of Daniel O’Connell, the leader of Irish nationalism from the 
later 1820s until his death in 1847, in the issue of railway communication within Ireland and 
between Dublin and London.100 
The lack of rapid communication between London and Dublin, combined with Ireland’s 
distinctiveness, ensured that the administration in Ireland differed from that of Scotland or Wales. 
Dublin’s remoteness from London enabled the relatively radical Whig regime at Dublin Castle to 
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implement significant change. That was in line with the 1835 Lichfield House Compact with 
O’Connell, which aimed to equalize the treatment of Ireland with that of the rest of the UK.101 The 
role of the under-secretary at Dublin Castle was vital, and the appointment of Thomas Drummond 
to the post in 1835 delivered governance that was the most sympathetic to the Irish Catholic 
majority of any administration since 1801. Drummond challenged the protestant ascendancy in an 
approach that is best summarised by his most famous phrase: ‘Property has its duties as well as 
its rights’.102 Drummond was a thoroughly modern administrator who understood that railways 
were at the heart of social and economic change. He led the Irish Railway Commission (IRC) that 
produced a report in 1838 on the potential for railways in Ireland, which this study will examine in 
detail. The analysis places the IRC report within a wider context of the attempt to use railway 
technology to redefine Ireland’s political relationship with the rest of the UK in the 1830s and 
1840s.  
In practice, the IRC’s achievements are difficult to assess because its proposed lines were 
not built in 1840 as it had hoped, largely because of the opposition of Sir Robert Peel. He 
represented the forces that favoured laissez-faire economics and a view of Union with Ireland 
that differed from that of Drummond and the Whig Government that left office in August 1841. 103  
Peel had sacrificed ‘express’ communication between London and Dublin in 1817 as part of 
budget savings in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars when he was chief secretary in Ireland. 104  
This study will consider whether his later opposition to the IRC was because he objected to its 
philosophy on the development of the Irish economy and railways rather than the use of 
technology for faster communication between London and Dublin.105 Peel was not consistently 
opposed to Irish interests; he promoted Catholic Emancipation in 1829, which demonstrated a 
pragmatic approach to the governance of Ireland and a conciliatory stance in the light of political 
circumstances, as he did later in relation to the CHR. 106  He failed to back that railway in 1840 but 
by 1842 supported the project to connect London and Dublin via Holyhead using steam 
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technology.107  The study considers whether Peel’s later change of stance on faster 
communication reflected a shift in political events in Ireland, which caused Peel to deploy railways 
and steam ships to increase government efficiency in Ireland after the period of relative calm in 
Irish affairs between 1841 and 1843, had ended.108  
Peel’s administration made the CHR into a political railway once it was directly involved in 
the decisions about the route towards Dublin by rail – an occasional departure from Peel’s general 
commitment to laissez-faire economics, particularly as they applied to railways.109  Baughen has 
shown that government took the unusual step of appointing a minister to the committee 
considering the CHR’s private bill - a clear indication that the CHR was sufficiently important to 
Peel to warrant a departure from his insistence on minimal state intervention.110 The contest with 
the alternative route was not over once the CHR’s private Bill was passed by parliament. Baughen 
mentioned the revival of an amended PDR in 1845, which he regarded as far from a viable 
proposition. According to him, the PDR had inadequate financial backing and was eventually 
frustrated by the creation of the London and North Western Railway (LNWR) and the 
Government’s decision to restrict the spread of the wider gauge lines of the Great Western 
Railway (GWR) – which sponsored the PDR in 1846 - as far north as Porth Dinllaen.111  The 
influential railway scholar Jack Simmons has similarly dismissed the PDR in its 1845 form.112 
Neither Baughen nor Simmons made any connection between the creation of the LNWR, the 
restriction of the GWR broad gauge, and the defeat of the PDR – all of which occurred in quick 
succession in 1846. This thesis will argue that those events represent an important interface of 
politics and technology that influenced the use of railways within the British government’s Irish 
policy. 
There is evidence from other studies that suggests that the decision on the preferred 
gauge of railway was a political as much as a technical one. Alborn for example, argues that the 
broad gauge attracted hostility because it represented a different view of the future of the British 
economy from the one offered by its opponents.113 The broad gauge was centred on Bristol – a 
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city that aimed to revive its fortunes to what they had been in the late eighteenth century. 114 The 
decisions made in 1846 on the gauge and railway company amalgamation handed a clear 
advantage to  economic interests based on Manchester (and served by the LNWR) because they 
favoured their railway gauge, unified their lines under one management and gave them a 
monopoly of rapid access to Dublin via the CHR. That places the decision between the CHR and 
the PDR in a very different light – as much a choice between two regional economies and political 
philosophies as one between two geographical routes.  
The LNWR was the largest industrial enterprise in the world and has therefore received some 
attention in terms to its political significance.115 Gourvish has analysed the LNWR as an early 
example of the creation of a large corporation with more modern methods of management, 
typified by its first operational manager Captain Mark Huish.116 And it has also been considered in 
detail by Alborn in his study of how joint stock companies engaged with the politics of the 
Victorian era.117  As the LNWR was a major player in the Victorian economy it had a serious 
interest in the route to Ireland. But it also deserves attention because, as a company based in the 
English industrial core, it was not culturally neutral.118 This also relates to the questions raised by 
Leo Marx in considering the relationship between politics and technology, and particularly his 
argument that the culture of the owners of a technology is important to its political impact. The 
LNWR ensured that it built or acquired every line in North Wales that connected to the CHR in 
order to protect its route to Dublin, and thereby created a monopoly of rapid transport in the 
wider region, which Simmons considered had benefited North Wales.119 Such monopolies were 
powerful actors in the economics and politics of regions such as North Wales, where they 
dominated rapid transport, as Freeman has argued.120 Railways were a complex economic 
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organisation requiring significant resources that affected all levels of society from landowner to 
labourer. Headrick shows that it is difficult to see where a railway starts and ends, so extensive is 
its impact on the areas through which it travels. 121 A railway was a significant feature of a local 
economy and therefore the local political landscape, particularly one in the early stages of 
political and economic development such as North Wales.  
While the British state aimed to tighten its control of Ireland, it had no specific intentions for 
North Wales from the creation of the CHR. Vernon points out in his discussion on unintended 
consequences that: ‘new uses arise for practices originally intended for simpler and more limited 
purposes’.122 And this was true in the case of the CHR in North Wales. North Wales was a region 
unlike any other that had acquired a main line railway with a direct link to London by 1850, and a 
comprehensive network of branch lines by 1880, not least because it was a region in which two 
out of three people spoke only Welsh.123 The priorities of the LNWR were to connect London with 
Dublin by the CHR, and to build or buy branch lines to the CHR to prevent other railway 
companies from sharing that Irish traffic; it was not initially concerned with North Wales itself.124  
Historians of Wales are clear about the major impact that railways had in the country by enabling 
extractive industries to develop and by creating opportunities for its religious, cultural and 
political activities to flourish.  125 So railways simultaneously exposed Wales to external influence 
and strengthened the sense of national identity of the Welsh people, demonstrating that 
technology is capable of supporting apparently conflicting political movements.  This study is 
different from many others concerning aspects of Welsh history as it focuses on North Wales, 
which was distinct from South Wales in its profile and importance in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Those differences grew as the nineteenth century progressed and may have been exacerbated by 
railway developments.126  
The major milestones of existing railway history in North Wales in the nineteenth century 
were the construction between 1848 and 1850 of the bridges that span the River Conwy and the 
Menai Straits, the catastrophic railway accident at Abergele in 1868, and the creation of the vast 
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breakwater at Holyhead, completed in 1880.127 More recently, Jones has opened up a different 
area of interest with her consideration of railways and the Welsh language that has highlighted a 
dispute between the LNWR and its Welsh employees in North Wales in 1894-95, which became an 
overtly political dispute. Her study has illuminated the tense relationship between the LNWR and 
the people of North Wales, and she has shown that local politicians and national figures such as 
David Lloyd George became involved, and that other major UK politicians were engaged as the 
issue moved from North Wales to the Houses of Parliament.128 But that was not the full extent of 
political involvement in railway matters in North Wales in the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century, as this study will demonstrate. Diane Drummond has shown that the LNWR was in 
dispute with staff at Crewe in the 1880s – a town that was largely controlled by the LNWR and 
where employees were subjected to paternalistic and even bullying behaviour. She suggests that 
the LNWR had an metropolitan profile – English, Conservative, Church of England and brewing 
industry - that contrasted with many of its workforce – Liberal, non-conformist and teetotal in 
Crewe. This study considers whether there was a similar political and religious identity in North 
Wales as in Crewe - which might provide more background to the tensions between the region 
and the LNWR discussed by Jones and noted above.  The cultural difference between the LNWR 
and North Wales in terms of religious affiliation and metropolitan character certainly led to 
tension between them as shown by Jones and by Grigg in his study of Lloyd George.129 That 
analysis is extended by this study that examines the levels of tension between the LNWR and the 
people of North Wales from the inception of the CHR, and puts the findings of other scholars in a 
wider context that includes the politics of local government. 
As noted in the previous section, large railway corporations had a tendency to promote a 
metropolitan uniformity at the expense of regional identity, even if that was not their intention.  
Large railway corporations did not just act within a society, town or geographical region; they 
acted upon it with a tendency to: ‘promote national unity and degrade local diversity’.130 This 
study will consider whether the presence of the LNWR and its operation of a major technology in 
North Wales produced similarly dramatic impact on the politics of the region. Informed by the 
earlier analysis of the relationship between politics and technology, through a careful examination 
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of the work of Diane Drummond and Jones, and by considering the most relevant primary source 
material, this study will provide further evidence on how the interface of politics and technology 
affected Britain’s Irish policy. It will also examine whether railways were at the centre of political 
developments in North Wales alongside issues such as the Welsh language, religion, land and 
education. 
  
1.3.  Methodology 
 
This thesis is based on a wide range of primary sources such as newspapers, parliamentary 
papers, and private letters of leading politicians and officials engaged in the important debates 
that it covers. It deploys an equally wide range of methods in using these sources, including 
mathematical analysis, and visual representations in the form of tables and maps.  
The thesis makes significant use of local and national newspapers as primary sources. The 
national papers offer important economic or political perspectives; The Times tended to support 
London city investors; the Manchester Guardian was a free trade paper; the Morning Post was 
Conservative, and the Morning Chronicle backed the Whigs. The local papers, on the other hand, 
offered crucial regional political perspectives. The Chester papers favoured the CHR, while papers 
from Shrewsbury or Worcester supported the PDR. The Chester Chronicle was a Liberal/Whig 
voice while the North Wales Chronicle was a Conservative/Tory one. The local papers have the 
advantage of including detailed and often verbatim accounts of debates, which provide a good 
insight into people’s views. Welsh language papers were not consulted for the study - not only 
because of the author’s lack of knowledge of the language, but also because of the comparative 
sparsity of Welsh language papers in early years covered by the study. Extensive analysis of the 
speeches and papers of senior Welsh politicians such as David Lloyd George, a radical Welsh 
speaker, have remedied this deficit to some degree.  
Parliamentary reports and debates were also important as primary sources for this thesis. 
As the online record of Hansard is incomplete, newspapers were used to discover the detail of 
missing debates. The official reports of the issues covered in the thesis are characterised by a lack 
of consensus. Even apparently technical issues, such as the best harbour or choice of railway 
route or gauge, were subject to controversy. Technical and scientific material was used to support 
political perspectives and was ignored by politicians when it did not fit with the view that a person 
wished to present. It is the politicians’ views of the technical reports -rather than the reports 
themselves - that were more important in this political analysis. 
Chapter 3 uses mathematical analysis to test whether the work of the Irish Railway 
Commission was advanced in its approach to railway development. This is important because the 
struggle between the two rival routes towards Dublin was also about two different approaches to 
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how railways should develop; how Ireland should be governed; whether the interests of North 
Wales should be considered, and which UK region should have priority access to Ireland. Chapters 
5 and 7 also employ mathematical methods, both to measure the performance of the CHR in 
speeding communication with Ireland, and to analyse the LNWR as a landowner in North Wales. 
The data from the latter analysis is at Appendix A.  
Private papers have also been used extensively, in particular the papers of Peel and 
Gladstone at the British Library and those of Gladstone at the Flintshire Record Office. This 
material offers a view that the writers of letters did not expect to become public, and which may 
be more reliable than their public statements. The National Archives (TNA) also provided much 
original material, particularly the minutes of meetings of significant railway companies. And 
finally, this thesis has also benefited from fieldwork, particularly from walking much of the route 
of the railway from Chester to Holyhead in order to understand the logistical issues and 
particularly the scale of the project (such as the bridges and immense breakwater at Holyhead) 
and the nature of the towns through which it passed. A most useful discovery was the old mileage 
sign at Chester that heads this chapter.  
 
1.4 Overview 
 
This thesis moves beyond the existing historiography by considering the extent to which the CHR 
functioned as a tool in Irish policy between 1835 and 1850. The thesis engages with multiple sets 
of overlapping historiography, such as the history of science and technology; the relationship 
between politics and technology; railway history; Irish and Welsh political history, and the wider 
political (and economic) history of Britain and its empire.  It adopts a broadly chronological 
approach but the focus moves from a UK national and strategic perspective in Ireland in Chapters 
2 – 5 (covering the period from 1835 to 1860) to regional and local political issues in North Wales 
in Chapters 6 and 7 (spanning the period from 1845 to 1880). It returns to a UK perspective in 
Chapter 8 to reflect the greater political importance of North Wales in UK politics in the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century.  
 Chapter 2 discusses the origins of the scheme for a rail and sea route to Dublin via Porth 
Dinllaen to compete with the one established at Liverpool in the early 1830s, and the subsequent 
emergence of another scheme via Chester to Holyhead. It focuses on powerful landowners in the 
region who supported the competing schemes according to their own interests, and shows the 
developing relationship between the politicians of North Wales and the owners of Irish capital 
and their political representatives in Dublin. This underlines the importance of the issue of the 
ownership of technology and the political philosophy of its owners, as outlined by Leo Marx in 
chapter 1. It demonstrates that politicians made a connection between the speed of 
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communication and the efficiency of governance in Ireland in the aftermath of the Union of 1801, 
and that issue became part of the Irish policies that flowed from the agreement between 
Melbourne’s Government and the Irish leader Daniel O’Connell in 1835 that was sustained until 
1841.  
The creation of the Irish Railway Commission (IRC) in 1836, whose work included the 
London and Dublin link, is the subject of Chapter 3. The detailed examination of its report and 
important work places it more clearly within Irish and railway historiography and as a good 
example of the relationship between politics and technology. The chapter demonstrates that the 
IRC report gave priority to the economic and social needs of Ireland and showed how they were 
capable of being met by railways. It made clear that those railways had to be connected to the UK 
rail network and be operated in the interests of the Irish people and economy rather than for 
private profit. The chapter considers whether the IRC’s pro-Irish stance and its political naivety 
contributed to its failure, and how far the very different laissez-faire philosophy of Sir Robert Peel 
and those he represented was crucial to the defeat of the IRC. In doing so, it adds to the extensive 
historiography of Peel’s career. 
Chapter 4 shows how the CHR used the political vacuum created by the collapse of the 
IRC report to build technical and political support for its own route in 1840.  Peel favoured the 
CHR so the chapter considers whether it was an example of the use of technology for a political 
purpose within Peel’s Irish policy from 1843 – and how different it was to that of the IRC. The 
chapter also explores how Peel modified his laissez-faire principles in the case of the CHR, and 
assesses whether the CHR was so important to Peel that he made an exception to his usual stance 
on the role of the state in railway development.  
 Chapter 5 examines the attempt to change the governance of Ireland within the UK, 
based on the completion of the CHR – an important issue that is given little coverage in existing 
scholarship. The chapter also adds to the work of those who have shown how technology and 
politics are related – as considered in the earlier section of this chapter. It examines whether the 
CHR delivered improved communication times between London and Dublin by 1850, and explores 
whether the Great Famine 1845-47 had so alienated Ireland within the UK that technology was 
seen by some as part of the problem rather than part of the solution – a possible ‘counter 
narrative’ similar to those developed by opponents of Manifest Destiny, analysed by Nye in the US 
and discussed in section 1.1 of this chapter. 
Chapter 6 concentrates on the question of the ownership of technology which Leo Marx 
identified as a factor in its relationship with politics. The chapter shows that railways were under 
the monopoly ownership of the LNWR in North Wales – a company that protected its route to 
Dublin by purchasing and operating most of the lines that connected to it in North Wales. The 
manner in which it did so is also relevant to its political relationship with the region. The chapter 
36 
 
considers the political implications of this monopoly for North Wales, and it adds to the 
historiography of the region by exploring the extent to which the attitude and intentions of 
Victorian modernisers, such as the Education Commission for Wales of 1847, were expressed 
through railway development. It sets that approach in a wider context by considering whether 
that approach to Welsh society was similar to the findings of Headrick and others, in which 
owners of modern technology often regarded those without it as inherently inferior. The attitudes 
of both the creators and owners of railways in North Wales were clearly relevant to how they 
interacted with local people and how their political relationship developed. 
 While chapter 6 concentrates on the railway side of the politics/technology equation, 
chapter 7 considers the political context of North Wales. The chapter shows, through an 
innovative study of land ownership patterns, how significant the LNWR was as a landowner in 
North Wales. Its land ownership incurred the need for the LNWR to pay poor rates to local bodies 
and so engaged it directly in the emerging politics of the region at the same time as more men 
were given the vote. So the potential for local opposition to the LNWR was increased. These, and 
the charges that the railway in turn imposed on the local population, were important components 
in the political relationship between the LNWR and the people and politicians of North Wales 
between 1850 and 1880. The study examines the extent to which local people felt that the LNWR 
was abusing the power of its technology, both in its interactions with the population to achieve 
profit and in its failure to address the needs of the region.  The response of the population is 
analysed, including the way people reacted to railway power in a quasi-political manner. The 
chapter shows that the political balance between the railway and the region began to shift by 
1880, as the franchise was extended and powerful, locally-based, figures such as William 
Gladstone joined the challenge to the LNWR monopoly. Gladstone was a senior figure in in the UK 
state, had personal financial interests in North Wales and needed to secure the support of the 
large intake of Welsh Liberal MPs. Such factors had the potential to enhance the political status of 
railways in North Wales in a manner that Gladstone could use for his own purposes from the 
1860s onwards.  
Chapter 8 analyses the growing challenge to the LNWR from local MPs such as David Lloyd 
George, whose group of Welsh Liberal MPs was supported by nationalist MPs from Ireland in a 
joint attack on the LNWR that went much further than Gladstone’s efforts. The chapter examines 
how far those Irish and Welsh nationalist MPs considered the LNWR to be an extension of the 
state, and whether local Welsh politicians aimed to use railways in support of a nationalist 
political agenda. In doing so, the study extends the work of Jones on railways and politics in North 
Wales. In response to this challenge, the LNWR slowly changed its stance, secured a greater 
understanding between itself and the people and politicians of North Wales and finally resolved 
some of the tension between the use of technology for private profit and the need to adapt to the 
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aspirations of the host community – evidence of the dialectical nature of the relationship 
between politics and technology. The chapter concludes by assessing the status of the LNWR as 
an informal political power in the region alongside landowners, educators and the established 
church – and one with whom local politicians had to negotiate. 
38 
 
2. The origins of faster communication in Britain’s Irish policies 1801-36 
 
‘…so let us now overcome these few intervening miles of sea, and make the islands one land’. 1   
 
The decision of the British Government to incorporate Ireland into the United Kingdom (UK) in 
1801 was a controversial one. Arguments continue about whether the decision was a response to 
a particular set of circumstances at the time, a considered decision made on the balance of 
interests of all parties - or a cynical act of sabotage of a rival economy.2 There is also debate about 
whether or not the aim was for Ireland to become an equal member within the 1801 UK.3 There 
were clearly strategic considerations for the UK governments in the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century because an independent Ireland could have compromised UK security, given the hostility 
of both France and the United States.4 That explains the process that began after 1801 that aimed 
to create Ireland as a country with the same relationship to London that Scotland had within the 
UK.5 In practice, Ireland was a very different proposition to Scotland because it had a distinct 
religion, a large and growing rural population that mostly subsisted on a single crop, and it was 
fiercely aware of its separate nationality.6 It was also separated from the British mainland by the 
Irish Sea. That ensured that improved communication had a place in Irish policy.  
This chapter therefore explores the interest expressed by the British governments in 
improved communication with Dublin as part of its policy to deal with the political, economic and 
social challenges that Ireland presented to UK politicians in the nineteenth century. The 
improvement of communication between London and Dublin remained a concern even after the 
completion in 1826 of the state-funded road from London to Holyhead that had reduced the time 
taken by road and sea from around six days to under four days. It was hoped that the road would 
provide sufficiently rapid communication to enable direct rule from London, the abolition of the 
administrative and political structure based on Dublin Castle, and particularly the office of Lord 
Lieutenant. But even the reduced journey time from London to Dublin was not fast enough to 
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achieve that change.7 The railways that were built from 1830 were not designed to address 
particular political issues like Irish rule, but rather to meet the needs of private capital. 
Nonetheless, early schemes provided the prospect of shorter journey time between London and 
Dublin so that postal communication was soon switched from road to rail via Liverpool as 
described in Baughen’s 1972 study of the Chester and Holyhead Railway (CHR).8 That had the 
potential to disadvantage landowners and communities that had benefited from the road route 
from London to Holyhead. Major towns and cities competed for new rail routes and this chapter 
examines whether civic rivalry was demonstrated in the various proposals to shorten the time 
taken for the post to travel between London and Dublin. Rail competition was at an early stage in 
the mid-1830s but Irish traffic was bound to be considered lucrative and likely to spark rivalry 
between potential carriers. Irish political and economic interests were also likely to follow closely 
any proposals to improve communication with Dublin with a view to ensuring that such 
communication benefited them as well as the mainland UK. Overall control of the communication 
between London and Dublin was of vital interest to government as demonstrated by its 
willingness to fund the London to Holyhead road and the steamships that plied between Holyhead 
and Dublin. It raised the question of whether a railway link should be vested in private individuals 
and companies or in the state.  That in turn made the issue part of wider public concerns about 
government’s role in the development and regulation of railways in the 1830s, and how that 
related to the predominant laissez-faire economics in Britain.  
The debate about a more direct rail route to Dublin emerged in the 1830s when Irish 
politicians at Westminster were exercising significant authority because of the extension of the 
vote to Catholics in 1829 that was secured by the effective leadership of Irish nationalism by 
Daniel O’Connell. If railway communication was an important component in Anglo-Irish relations 
at that time, it is reasonable to suppose that it would be a feature of the work of senior Irish 
political figures like O’Connell. This chapter explores a range of contemporary sources including 
newspapers, government reports and parliamentary proceedings to explore whether improved 
communication between London and Dublin was an issue that interested him.  That is an 
important point in assessing the role of railways in Irish policy, and particularly its relevance to the 
Lichfield House Compact that was concluded in 1835 between the Whig Government of 
Melbourne and the Irish nationalists led by O’Connell.  9 The compact offered Ireland equal social, 
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economic and political treatment within the UK in return for O’Connell agreeing to cease 
campaigning to repeal the Union between the two countries, and to support government in 
parliament against the Tory opposition led by Sir Robert Peel.10  
 
2.1  Improvements in communications between Britain and Ireland before 1840 
 
Having brought Ireland into the Union in 1801, the Government in London had to give practical 
effect to the decision - and particularly the element that abolished the Irish Parliament and 
required Irish MPs and Lords to attend parliament in London. That required better transport 
between London and Dublin, as did directing the devolved administration at Dublin Castle that 
was headed by the Lord Lieutenant and supported by a chief secretary and an under-secretary. 
The only form of communication between London and that administration was the Royal Mail so 
government was alert to any potential to increase its speed. A report in 1810 stated that the 
roads through Wales from Dublin to London were unsuitable for rapid travel because of the 
terrain and the need to cross the Menai Straits – the short but difficult crossing from mainland 
Wales to the Isle of Anglesey and its port of Holyhead. It also considered that whatever the cost of 
dealing with these difficulties, it was a sound investment in securing: ‘the freedom of intercourse 
between the two islands of the United Kingdom’.11 A subsequent committee went further and 
articulated the likely benefits of a rapid road to Holyhead that included improved links between 
government in London and Dublin; better attendance by Irish MPs in London; improved 
jurisdiction over Irish courts; benefits to British industry, and less tangibly; improvement in the: 
‘intimate acquaintance between inhabitants of both countries’12 All those benefits favoured 
mainland Britain and presented a rather subtle ambition towards Ireland that appeared more 
concerned with assimilation than military conquest.13 That was confirmed in 1823 during a debate 
about the ending of the direct government of Ireland from London and how it related to the 
speed of communication: 
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The difficulty of communication between this country and Ireland might, formerly, have been a 
reason for continuing the vice-regal government, but that reason can no longer be urged, as the 
time of communication between London and Dublin was shorter than between London and 
Edinburgh.14 
 
 
Sir Robert Peel, the Home Secretary, was clear in his support for continued separate government 
in Ireland  in 1823 because: ‘a local executive was an essential and necessary check upon a 
country so remote, which was an ancient kingdom, and till the last twenty years, had a separate 
legislature’.15  His conclusion indicated that he was not against the principle of direct rule from 
London but rather that it was not appropriate, ‘in the present circumstances’ – a phrase that he 
used twice in his response.16 That suggested that there might be circumstances in which he would 
support a change, and subsequently he would be very well placed to do so.  
It was the arrival of railways from 1830 that reopened the debate about the speed of 
communication with Ireland. An 1832 select committee commented in similar terms to its 
predecessors in respect of the importance of rapid communication and the value of a large 
investment by the state in improving it.17 Its report did not suggest that railways could necessarily 
take over the role of the stagecoach immediately because they regarded the investment in 
Holyhead and its road as: ‘scientifically and well expended’.18 One of the first discussions of 
railways to communicate more rapidly with Ireland occurred in June 1830, even before the 
Liverpool to Manchester railway had opened. George Stephenson, the foremost engineer of the 
early railway age, was at a meeting in the Mansion House in Dublin.19 Attendees expressed great 
dissatisfaction with communication between London and Dublin and urged the authorities at 
Dublin Castle to secure an improvement. 20 Soon afterwards there was a more concrete proposal 
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for a railway bridge across the narrowest point between Scotland and Ireland, giving a rather long 
overall distance from London to Dublin of 480 miles. The author’s proposal may have been 
unrealistic, but he articulated the strategic value of establishing a railway connection: 
 
 
Allowing […] that Ireland is a separate land, with sufficient territory, trade, and population, to form 
a right to an independent stand amongst the nations, still it is placed by nature too contiguous to 
England for a separate government, with different foreign alliances, and another religion […]. To 
divide is to destroy, and as we possess similar languages, natural productions, and channels of 
trade, so let us now overcome these few intervening miles of sea, and make the islands one land. 21   
 
 
Soon afterwards there were reports of a shorter connecting railway between Ireland and London 
via Waterford and South Wales in 1833.22  By then, the Cambrian Quarterly had already identified 
the strategic positon of Wales in linking London and Dublin by railway. In 1832, it looked ahead to 
the construction of the London and Birmingham Railway (LBR) and its role as a spine for the whole 
British railway network, including the creation of a branch from it through Wales to Aberystwyth. 
The journal considered that such a branch would counter the generally low priority of Wales in 
national politics: ‘half representation, half administration of justice compensated for by double 
abuse of church patronage – anything will do for us’.23 The matter was an urgent one for Welsh 
political and economic interests because the Cambrian Quarterly also noted that if a railway was 
not built in Wales, it would soon be disadvantaged by the proposed railway link between London 
and Liverpool that potentially rendered Telford’s Holyhead Road obsolete.24 There was also a risk 
to Wales from Bristol as a possible rail gateway to Ireland. It was in that context that Daniel 
O’Connell, the effective leader of the Catholic Irish, made his first appearance within debates 
about railway connections between Britain and Ireland.25 He identified the need for cheap food in 
Britain and he thought that Ireland could supply it via Bristol to London on the proposed Great 
Western Railway (GWR).26  
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Despite these larger projects, the first practical response to the issue of a railway 
connection between Britain and Ireland through Wales was in north-west Wales, where railways 
were being developed to improve the transport of slate. The Ffestiniog Railway (FR) from 
Porthmadog to Blaenau Ffestiniog (see Figure 2.1 below) was envisaged as part of a potential link 
between Dublin and London. Although it was based in Wales, the FR was funded by Irish capital, 
and Henry Archer from Dublin eventually ensured its success. The plans to build the FR had the 
approval of Robert Stephenson (son of George) a railway engineer whose influence and status its 
owners welcomed in 1832 - but would regret later when Stephenson was involved in the rival 
Chester and Holyhead Railway.27 The opening of the FR in April 1836 was given relatively little 
coverage because by then the debate about railways in North Wales and the link to Ireland had 
moved on - and larger schemes attracted Robert Stephenson. 28 Just two months after the visit to 
Porthmadog, the London and Birmingham Railway (LBR) Bill – that was to be engineered by 
Robert Stephenson - was rejected by the House of Lords after objections from landowners.29 Its 
intended traffic extended beyond the two cities it connected and included Ireland.30 The 
assumption at that early stage was that Liverpool would be the port for faster rail communication 
with Dublin. The LBR was able to reach that port from London via the Liverpool and Manchester 
Railway (LMR), the Grand Junction Railway from Liverpool to Birmingham (GJR) that opened in 
1838, and its own line, which had also opened by 1838.31 There did not then appear any need to 
tackle the difficulties presented by building a railway through the centre of Wales, and there was 
no financial incentive to do so. But the route via Liverpool was longer than the road journey to 
Holyhead, and the Mersey was notoriously difficult for shipping because of its tides and 
sandbanks. A partial solution was to open up the port of Birkenhead, across the Mersey from 
Liverpool, which provided a shorter rail route from London via Crewe on the GJR - and by 1841 
the Chester and Birkenhead Railway (CBR) and the Crewe and Chester Railway (CCR) completed 
the connection between Birkenhead and London.32 But even though that shortened the route 
from London to the Mersey, it did not tackle the long and difficult voyage from there to Dublin. 
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North Wales still offered the opportunity of a shorter sea route that avoided the Mersey if there 
was the will and the money to create a scheme that tackled the Welsh mountains to reach a new 
port, or crossed of the Menai Straits to Holyhead. 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of early railway developments that were relevant to improved communications 
with Ireland from 1830 
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2.2 The Porth Dinllaen Railway (PDR) 
 
Irish interests were active in the thriving North Wales slate towns and especially at Porthmadog, 
through the development of the FR as noted earlier.33 The notion of Ireland as a market for slate 
was clear, and a port closer to Ireland than Porthmadog with a railway connection was attractive 
to landed interests in the north-west of North Wales. But that was a limited objective compared 
to making a connection from Dublin to London via Porthmadog. Henry Archer overcame the 
obstacles to establishing the FR, and it appears from evidence that he gave at a select committee 
in 1840 that it was he who then considered making Porthmadog the centre of a much larger 
project to connect London and Dublin.34 His proposed project connected Porth Dinllaen, a west 
facing bay on the north-west coast of Wales (Figure 2.1 above), to the main line from Liverpool to 
London via Shrewsbury and Wolverhampton. In doing so, it revived an older notion of putting 
Porthmadog on the main road from London towards Dublin that had been defeated when 
Holyhead was chosen as the departure port for Dublin at the terminus of Telford’s road.35 
Archer’s proposal provided a direct challenge to the supremacy of Liverpool in the early ra ilway 
age, as he outlined in a pamphlet in December 1835 that marked the formal launch of the 
competition to operate a rail and sea link between London to Dublin through North Wales rather 
than Liverpool. Archer recalled the process to the 1840 select committee when he told its 
members that he had been concerned about the lack of a railway in North Wales to compete with 
Liverpool in 1835 - the same concerns noted earlier in the Cambrian Quarterly.  He confirmed 
those concerns in his conversations with Post Office officials in Dublin and concluded that North 
Wales needed a rival proposal to Liverpool and Birkenhead.  Archer recorded his initial progress in 
securing support in Dublin and Caernarfonshire and that of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Thomas Spring Rice.  The meeting with Spring Rice thereby established the London to Dublin 
connection by rail as a possible element of UK state policy towards Ireland and one that it was 
willing to fund. 36  
One of Archer’s priorities was securing a main line railway for Wales as well as benefiting 
Ireland - a commitment to Welsh economic interests that marked out his proposal from its rivals. 
Archer’s meeting with Spring Rice appeared to include the offer of government money from the 
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latter for railway building on the British mainland, which was an unusual development but one 
that was consistent with state support for construction of the Holyhead Road, which had had a 
similar objective. It is important to evaluate Archer’s recollections because he had a vested 
interest in the outcome of the select committee in 1840, and may have slanted his answers 
accordingly. However, reference to other sources does tend to validate much of his evidence to 
the select committee. The report of 1832 that he relied on did note that: ‘superior vessels and 
superior Accommodation [are] gradually inducing the public to abandon the Holyhead Line ’.37 
Archer was also correct in reporting the meetings in Wales and Dublin and the support given for 
his proposals.38 Records also show that Spring Rice appeared to offer financial support for 
Archer’s proposal as the latter had claimed.39  
The Caernarfonshire meeting mentioned by Archer took place soon after the issue of his 
pamphlet early in 1836. It involved people with a clear interest in the development of a railway in 
North Wales, though not necessarily Archer’s line. For example, Lord Newborough and Lloyd-
Edwards, with widespread landed interests in North Wales, were likely to consider which part of 
their estates would benefit most from a railway before offering support to any particular 
scheme.40  Others such as Lord Mostyn, had interests further east between Chester and Conwy 
and were unlikely to sustain support for the PDR if there was an alternative route closer to their 
estates.41 The key to their allegiance was the viability of a railway across the Menai Straits 
towards Holyhead.42 If that were possible then it opened up the prospect of a line from Chester 
and along the north coast of Wales, rather than via Shrewsbury or Worcester and the 
mountainous interior of North Wales – and that was more attractive to landowners in Anglesey 
and east of Bangor – see Figure 2.1 above. Other members of the group were solidly behind the 
line to PDR - Assheton Smith was one of the largest slate owners (and a considerable landowner) 
in North Wales, and the location of his quarries, adjacent to north-west coast of Caernarfonshire, 
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ensured that he continued to advocate strongly for the PDR.43 William Ormsby Gore had 
particular reason to support the PDR, being a landowner at either end of the proposed line, and 
he also had estates in Ireland.  44 He remained a strong advocate of the PDR even in the most 
unpromising circumstances. Griffiths Wynn completed a local triumvirate of Tory politicians, with 
his cousin Assheton Smith and with Ormsby Gore.  45 In the absence of those two in parliament, 
Wynn had taken the lead in ensuring that the Ffestiniog Railway Bill received parliamentary 
approval in 1832.46 Together, they formed the political and landowning core of the PDR bid. 
Though local interests were at the fore, the Caernarfon meeting was aware of the need to relate 
the project to national concerns if it was to attract state funding. Great claims were made for it - 
notably that: ‘any part of Ireland may be communicated with from London […] within twenty-four 
hours […] introducing into Ireland what Ireland wants […] the capital and enterprise [and] the 
mind of England’.47 Local papers did not report the presence of Daniel O’Connell at the meeting – 
reflecting a desire not to tarnish the image of the project in local eyes, given his high profile 
challenges to government before his agreement with the Whigs in 1835.48 But he was present 
according to reports in Sheffield and: ‘strongly enforced the necessity and utility of the project’ to 
connect London and Dublin.49 Thus, it is clear that O’Connell, the acknowledged leader of Irish 
nationalism in the 1830s, was directly involved in the campaign to create a railway link between 
London and Dublin via a suitable port in North Wales from the outset. That made the project into 
a political one and also a potential item on the joint agenda of the British government and 
O’Connell’s Irish nationalists under the Lichfield House Compact.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
43 G. C. Boase, ‘Smith, Thomas Assheton (1776–1858)’, rev. Jean Lindsay, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/25915, [accessed 6 Sept 
2015] 
 
44  History of Parliament on line “William Ormsby Gore” [accessed 4 March 2014] 
http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/Volume/1820-1832/member/ormsby-gore-william-1779-1860  
 
45  History of Parliament on line “Griffiths Wynne” [accessed 11 March 2014] 
http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/Volume/1820-1832/member/griffith-wynne-charles-1780-1865  
 
46  History of Parliament on line “William Ormsby Gore” [Accessed 4.3.2014]  
 
47  “Carnarvon”, Chester Chronicle, 15 January 1836, 3. 
 
48  A. H. Graham, “Lichfield House Compact”, Irish Historical Studies (1961) Vol. 12, No. 47, 209-225. 
 
49  “Carnarvon Railroad”, Sheffield Independent, 30 January 1836, 4. 
 
48 
 
2.3  The organisation of the Irish political and economic interests 
 
The Irish counterpart of the meeting at Caernarfon that is discussed above involved rather 
different interests including merchants and bankers rather than landowners. 
 
Table 2.1: Profile of key people known to have attended the Dublin meeting about the London 
to Dublin railway link, 22 January 1836 
 
Name Designation Nature of Interest 
*John Barton
50
 Gov. of Bank of Ireland, Board of D&K Rly and Grand Canal Co 
*Leland Crosthwaite Merchant, philanthropist. Financial supporter of O’Connell  
*James Ferrier MP Direct Dublin Steamship Co. 
Arthur Guinness
51
 Brewer, bank director Banker 
*Arthur Hume Civil servant The Exchequer, Dublin Castle 
*James Jameson Distiller Bank director, also Dublin Steamship Co 
Daniel O’Connell M.P. Leader of Irish Nationalism 
E.S. Ruthven
52
 M.P. O’Connell supporter 
W Ponsonby
53
 M.P. Whig with links to power and also a 
later pro-Irish Viceroy in 1846 
MP. In 1835 Sec of State for Woods and 
Forests- a key dept. for railway development. 
*J. Perry Quaker, Railway Director Banker, did much to establish Irish railways 
*James Pim Quaker, Director DKR Rly Banker, major figure in Irish railways 
*Henry Roe Secretary to the Committee Banker, railway director 
Lalor Sheil
54
 M.P. Linked to O’Connell and to Whigs 
Arthur Morrison
55
 Lord Mayor Dublin Philanthropist 
  
Data from “Direct Communication between London and Dublin”, North Wales Chronicle, 2 February 1836, 3 
*those marked with asterisk are Members of the Royal Dublin Society; details on their website as per the first marked member. 
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By far the most significant member of this group, just as in Caernarfon, was Daniel O’ Connell. His 
attendance at both meetings was a measure of his personal political transformation in support of 
railways compared to what he had said in 1830: 
 
 
The times are big with mighty events, […] this is the age of improvements and invention, but not in 
arts and mechanics; it is not in making roads through the ocean, or constructing rail-ways, on 
which the passenger may travel with expedition […] ‘tis not in such […] that people are becoming 
most skilled, but in the art of resistance to oppression, and in learning how to burst asunder the 
trammels of power and oppression…56 
 
 
By the time of the meeting in Dublin in February 1836, O’Connell supported railways and the 
Whig regime at Dublin Castle that was: ‘alive with the mission of bringing good government to 
Ireland’.  The Irish administration most notably involved Thomas Drummond, under-secretary for 
Ireland from 1835 to 1840.57 O’Connell’s perceived power was sufficient for The Times to refer to 
the: ‘Government of which O’Connell is the head’.58 The presence of a large number of members 
of the Royal Dublin Society (RDS), a society: ‘for the promotion of literature and science, and the 
encouragement of agriculture, manufactures, and the arts’ is of particular interest. It was a source 
of both strength and weakness for the consortium.59 It brought together the banking and business 
community, but it had caused some political embarrassment to government by refusing 
membership to O’Connell and to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Dublin, while receiving state 
funding.60  Despite that problem with the RDS, O’Connell and his supporters were notable 
attendees at the Dublin meeting to discuss the railway link to accelerate communication between 
London and the Irish capital.  
While the Welsh attendees provided the land, the Irish contingent was clearly linked to 
the financial and political support of the project and may be regarded as an influential gathering 
of Irish economic and political interests. The degree of banking support suggests that O’Connell’s 
later claim that the PDR consortium could commence work on the link at once with some 
guarantee of government underwriting was sustainable - though the link to the RDS presented a 
possible problem in securing state funding. The priority of the Dublin meeting was railways for 
Ireland and a link to London. The exact route through the British mainland to the capital was likely 
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to matter less to them than to their Caernarfon counterparts, who had a distinct landed interest. 
O’Connell was well aware of the potential power of the opposition, and pointed out that at 
Holyhead: ‘a very considerable quantity of property belonging to individuals is vested in 
facilitating the conveyance from one country to the other [and each owner of this property] 
would not wish his interest to be meddled with lightly’.61 While he considered that Holyhead was 
not suitable for a railway, he confirmed that the Irish contingent was not wedded solely to the 
PDR: ‘if there was speculation to make a railroad to Holyhead, and another to Portdynllaen, so 
much the better for Ireland’.62 However, O’Connell’s earlier support for the GWR suggests that his 
sympathies may have been with the PDR that travelled towards its territory between Bristol and 
London, rather than a rival that linked to Birmingham and north-west England. The opposing 
forces at Holyhead identified by O’Connell soon gathered - attracted by the issue of government 
funding, and concerned about the impact of the PDR on their own financial interests in Anglesey 
as O’Connell had warned. In the same issue of the newspaper in which the Dublin meeting was 
reported, a correspondent noted that: ‘the Station of Holyhead is already adapted for a vast 
additional intercourse without the outlay of a single penny’.63 That was not the last word in 
defence of Holyhead. 
However, with a high level and variety of support on both sides of the Irish Sea, the 
prospect of government funding and a head start over the opposition, the PDR seemed well 
placed to win the lucrative mail contract between London and Dublin that would guarantee its 
financial viability. It was with that support that the PDR supporters met the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Thomas Spring Rice, in March 1836 in order to put their case to government. 
O’Connell introduced the project to Spring Rice, and noted that the object of the meeting was to 
brief the chancellor on the means of reducing London to Dublin communications to twelve hours. 
He suggested that Holyhead should be abandoned as the port of departure for Dublin and 
superseded by Porth Dinllaen, where the ‘largest class of vessels’ could be accommodated. He 
dealt with the financing of the new project by pointing out that the cost of the mail contract on 
the PDR could be met from savings on the several routes to Ireland then in use by the Royal Mail 
that were funded by government, and asserted that important parties in Dublin would fund the 
project if those savings were committed to meeting its running costs.64  In his response, the 
Chancellor confirmed that he regarded the project to connect London and Dublin more rapidly as 
one of great national importance that might be considered for state support to the extent that: 
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‘even so large a sum as two millions, [might not] be considered excessive’.65 Further, in a passage 
that anticipated the Whig Government’s thinking in respect of Irish railways, Spring Rice urged the 
delegation to take a wider view of the project and include the development of railways within 
Ireland as part of their project. He had in mind something that had not been attempted in England 
- a railway system in which:  
 
 
leading lines of railway should if possible, be laid out at once, the whole progress of which be 
carefully considered, and the extreme termini fixed on in the first instance [so that] towns and 
places adjacent could, by forming branch lines, not only communicate directly with [Dublin] but 
also with every other place along the line [thereby providing] an immense amount of public 
accommodation […] at a comparatively small cost…66 
 
 
That response suggested that government was interested in the scheme as part of a policy to 
tackle Ireland’s economy and pacify its politics – in addition to the benefits for Wales that Henry 
Archer had articulated, and that were noted earlier. 
There were important points in the exchange between Spring Rice and the PDR that 
became more significant as time progressed. O’Connell emphasised the largest class of vessels in 
his presentation and that issue featured in the later debates about the harbour because of the 
limitations of Holyhead that had already weakened its ability to compete with Liverpool. 
O’Connell also established the foundation of funding for the railway by government through the 
concentration of all postal traffic into one port, so that the savings could be used to fund a railway 
connection by enhancing the contract to carry the mail on the line. The exchanges show that it 
was Spring Rice who made the connection between the PDR and the development of railways 
within Ireland. Later critics claimed that the Irish Railway Commission (IRC) exceeded its brief by 
considering the line between London and Dublin alongside railway developments in Ireland. It is 
clear from this exchange that the Government itself made that connection initially – even if it did 
not follow it up so clearly. 
 
2.4 The Chester and Holyhead Railway (CHR) 
 
O’Connell had suggested that the PDR supporters should expect a strong response from economic 
and political interests at Holyhead, and he was correct in that assessment. Within two weeks of 
the PDR gathering at Caernarfon (but before its meeting with Spring Rice) a meeting was called in 
the North Wales city of Bangor that was chaired by Sir Richard Bulkeley, an MP and a major 
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landowner in Anglesey, and a man who will feature regularly in the analysis of the CHR.67 Sir 
Richard was blunt in his assessment and determined about the response. He suggested that the 
main objection to the PDR was that it had sought funding from the state, and he was certain that 
government would not repeat the example of the Holyhead Road by funding the PDR.  But he was 
concerned at O’Connell’s hold on government and felt that the best way to counter the PDR was 
to present a scheme to government that was: ‘more feasible and superior in every respect’.68 He 
then outlined the coastal route from Chester through Conwy and Bangor to Holyhead as an 
alternative to the PDR. He also pointed out that a large part of that route would be completed for 
them by the proposals of the George’s Harbour and Railway Company (GHR) whose 
representative was present.69 Bulkeley’s position was backed by other Anglesey landowners, for 
example W.O. Stanley MP, who had substantial land at Holyhead.70 However, Mr Pym’s presence 
on behalf of the GHR was challenged, as one attendee suggested that he should not consider that 
the meeting supported the idea of his railway and a new harbour at Llandudno that challenged 
Holyhead. Pym retreated immediately and indicated that the GHR foresaw its project only as a 
coal station.71 The Bangor meeting did not appear to be as influential as the earlier ones in 
Caernarfon and Dublin described above but it was called at short notice, and it was only a starting 
point for landed interests in Anglesey. The group had a common interest in significant land 
ownership - among prominent landowners was the Paget family of Plas Newydd in Anglesey, 
headed by the Marquis of Anglesey, who had been one of Wellington’s most senior officers at the 
Battle of Waterloo in 1815.72 He was well connected nationally, as the Duke had served as Prime 
Minister between 1828 and 1830 and briefly in 1834.73 The Bangor group needed to build up its 
support in order to challenge its opponents effectively but it had members with formidable 
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political status. Given the potentially fragile nature of some of the support for the PDR as noted 
earlier, there was plenty of potential for additional growth in the power of the supporters of the 
Chester and Holyhead Railway (CHR) consortium. That consortium was backed immediately by the 
Bangor-based and Tory North Wales Chronicle, which wanted the railway to pass through its 
home city and called upon the PDR to see the: ‘impracticability of that undertaking [i.e. the PDR] 
give up with good grace, and unite their acknowledged ability and industry with the influence now 
about to be exerted in favour of the further improvement of the old established channel and line 
of communication’ - Holyhead.74  
 
Table 2.2: Significant attendees at the Bangor meeting about the London to Dublin railway link, 
12 February 1836 
 
Name Home Area Designation Nature of Interest 
Sir Richard Bulkeley
75
 Anglesey Landowner AC, Politician  Land 
W. O. Stanley
76
 Anglesey/Chester Landowner A/Politician  Land 
Capt. Evans Holyhead Harbourmaster Holyhead  
J Pym Not Known Agent for railway company St George’s Harbour  
Capt. Carden RN
77
 Not Known Royal Navy senior officer Shipping 
Captain Paget
78
 Anglesey,  Brother of Marquis of Anglesey. 
A/Politician  
Land 
T P Williams
79
 Craig y Don, Anglesey A/Landowner Land 
 
Landowner in C= Caernarfonshire; A=Anglesey; M=Merionethshire; F=Flintshire; D-Denbighshire 
Data on attendees taken from North Wales Chronicle, 16 February 1836, 3. 
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2.5  St. Georges Harbour and Railway (GHR) 
 
The struggle for the London to Dublin railway route was complicated by the presence of the GHR, 
whose representative attended the Bangor meeting discussed above and offered Llandudno as a 
rival port for ships to Ireland, alongside the alternatives of Holyhead and Porth Dinllaen. The 
origins of the GHR scheme show that the railway was not the primary consideration. There had 
been government concern about high shipping losses in the Irish Sea, especially ships to and from 
Liverpool. There was a perceived need for better harbour facilities for larger vessels than 
Holyhead could accommodate, and an asylum harbour in which ships could shelter in a storm. It 
was a logical progression from this to connect any such a harbour to the railway system and use it 
as a port to Ireland. The GHR apparently had powerful support - its advertised patrons being four 
Admirals, the Lord Mayor of London and three of the largest landowners in North Wales, 
including two who had already shown, directly or indirectly, support for the rival schemes - 
Thomas Assheton Smith for the PDR and the Marquis of Anglesey for the CHR. The third 
landowner mentioned in the GHR prospectus was the largest in the whole of Wales – Sir Watkins 
Williams Wynn, a Tory MP.80  These apparently inconsistent patterns of support for competing 
schemes can be explained by the uncertainty over exactly which railways parliament would 
endorse and which would be built. There was a particular concern for Anglesey’s landowners that 
it might not be possible or affordable for a railway to cross the Menai Straits.  
There was also good reason to doubt the credibility and honesty of the GHR consortium. 
Pym’s statement to the meeting at Bangor that the GHR terminus at Llandudno was a coal port 
was duplicitous and was contradicted in the GHR prospectus that suggested the GHR would be an 
asylum harbour.81 Llandudno had more significant support in the form of the Select Committee on 
Harbours and Refuges that sat a few months after the debate about routes had opened and 
concluded that Llandudno was a credible option for an asylum harbour.82 The GHR prospectus 
dismissed the CHR and PDR and mocked their respective claims that it was practical to cross the 
Menai Straits or the interior of Wales by rail. The alleged impracticality of the rival schemes 
formed the foundation of the GHR case for a line from Chester to Llandudno with a port for 
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Ireland at the latter place.83 The prospectus presented a confident argument from a consortium 
that appeared to have strong support for an affordable project. The directors of the GHR 
anticipated a favourable outcome from an enquiry into the best route between London and 
Dublin undertaken by a select committee chaired by Daniel O’Connell, and so they invited 
subscribers to deposit £2 per share to their scheme in October 1836.84 Thus, by the end of 1836, 
there were three proposals for railways towards Dublin – two via Chester and one via Shrewsbury 
as seen in Figure 2.2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Map showing location of counties and railways proposed for North Wales 
section of the London – Dublin railway link by October 1836 
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The GHR was given a positive reception in Chester, even if it had suffered a rebuff in Bangor. In 
January 1837 the Chester Chronicle maintained that Holyhead harbour was not capable of 
improvement, while the PDR would have no local traffic from the sparse countryside through 
which it passed.85  
The GHR was a more difficult target or CHR supporters to attack than the PDR because it 
followed the route of the CHR without the complication and cost of crossing the Menai Straits. 
One approach to counter those apparent advantages of the GHR was to suggest that a railway 
across the Menai Straits was not actually necessary because the quality of Telford’s road meant 
that only an extra two hours would be needed to get to Holyhead by road from a railway terminus 
near to the road bridge. The GHR was also vulnerable to attack because the time saved in getting 
to Llandudno as compared to Holyhead was lost by the extra time and cost of the longer sea 
crossing to Dublin from Llandudno compared to Holyhead. Unperturbed, GHR notices appeared 
early in 1837 outlining its intention to introduce a Bill.86   
 
2.6 The United Kingdom government response to the competing schemes  
 
By the end of 1836 it had become difficult for government to avoid political involvement in the 
future direction of the project to reduce journey time between London and Dublin by expressing a 
preference for one of the three rival schemes. Spring Rice had indicated that government was 
interested in a scheme to accelerate communication between London and Dublin, while 
O’Connell’s interest suggested that a rail link could be part of government’s agreement with the 
Irish leader. The task of selecting which scheme was one for which government was apparently ill-
suited in the period before the Railway Department was established in 1840.  Prime Minister Lord 
Melbourne, for example, demonstrated distaste for the modernity that railways brought and 
indicated to Queen Victoria that he simply disliked them.87 The novelty of the issues presented by 
railways, such as their ownership and regulation, also led to uncertainty in the minds of the 
politicians who had to oversee them, and could not decide between control of railways and 
laissez-faire economics. In practice that meant that government had no railway policy proposals 
until the report of the Irish Railway Commission in 1838.88 
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O’Connell’s select committee, mentioned in relation to the GHR above, had secured 
agreement by the House of Commons for its request for a survey of harbours at Liverpool, Porth 
Dinllaen and Holyhead via a Treasury Minute of 14 October 1836.89 That showed an early success 
for the CHR because Thomas Spring Rice endorsed what Bulkeley had told the Bangor meeting 
when he made clear that there would be no government money forthcoming, even for a survey of 
railway lines and outlined its philosophical objection to such an approach. The Whig Government 
was by: ‘no means prepared to recommend any survey of a line of railroad […] any interposition 
on the part of the State, even if limited to the single object of a survey, would have a tendency of 
interfering with private enterprise’ – but government did agree to pay for a survey of the 
harbours. 90  That was a remarkable change in position by the Chancellor who, just a few months 
earlier, had suggested that an outlay of £2 million was not excessive to secure faster access to 
Dublin from London. Some significant words in the Minute suggested that the progress of railway 
building, from London towards Birmingham and Liverpool, was sufficient for government to be 
confident that private capital was interested in funding a connection with Dublin, unaided by the 
state.91 The political change of mind appeared to be an early victory for railway lobby in 
parliament that opposed government involvement in railway network development.92  It is also 
possible that Spring Rice acted without authority in mentioning the possibility of state funding in 
the earlier meeting - he was not a strong or particularly competent minister, on his own 
admission.93  
Despite this government stance, the survey of harbours for which it paid was likely to 
determine the fate of the rival railway schemes because, as O’Connell had observed, the choice of 
harbour effectively decided the line of railway that served it.94 When the answer from the 
appointed experts came back to the Lords of the Treasury on 21 February 1837, it contained an 
unequivocal statement in favour of Porth Dinllaen as the packet station - i.e. a port that handled 
the mail - and noted that its conclusion was reached without the need for further survey.95 The 
authority of the report could not have been higher, as it was written by Sir Francis Beaufort, a 
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naval hero whose achievement as a hydrographer was later ‘remembered with awe’.96 He noted 
that Holyhead was the best option so long as the mails were carried by road. However, if the mail 
switched to rail, as seemed bound to happen, then Holyhead was excluded because Beaufort 
thought it was impossible to take a line over the Menai Straits at a reasonable cost. Beaufort then 
compared Porth Dinllaen and Llandudno, both of which he thought could be reached by a railway 
- and concluded that the former was the better of the two.97 Although no further survey was 
suggested, the Government did order one on the narrower point of Holyhead’s fitness as an 
asylum harbour - i.e. a harbour to provide shelter for ships in a storm - as it wished to provide that 
as well as a packet station. The answer to that question added further weight to the case against 
Holyhead as Lieutenant Sheringham from the Royal Navy reported that Holyhead could never be 
considered suitable as an asylum harbour.98 
Those judgements from Beaufort and Sheringham realised the worst fears of the 
Holyhead supporters. The GHR was discounted because it did not deliver sufficient advantage 
over Liverpool to warrant the additional investment in a packet station. If there was a problem for 
the PDR it lay in the notion that its line had to connect to: ‘the great trunk railroad now 
constructing from London to Liverpool’. The routes of the CHR and GHR involved a more direct 
connection to that trunk line (via Chester and Crewe) and thereby fulfilled a requirement of the 
Treasury Minute that the route should aim for railways in ‘contemplation’ or ‘already 
undertaken’.99 The reports also seemed to suggest that if a railway were possible to Holyhead, 
then that was the best harbour. The Government did not act immediately on these harbour 
proposals but opted instead to subsume the decision under the wider policy issue of a railway 
system for Ireland, as Spring Rice had hinted that they might when he met the PDR delegation in 
March 1836. In November 1836, the Treasury ministers had produced another official minute that 
established the Irish Railway Commission (IRC). That minute re-emphasised the role of private 
capital as outlined in the earlier Treasury Minute, and absolutely discounted Spring Rice’s 
suggestion of public funding. It was the: 
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Duty of Government to guard against any inference that it is their intention to interfere with 
private enterprize, [sic] in its legitimate application to the purposes either of local or general 
improvement; they also feel that it should be distinctly understood that […] no intention or pledge 
is either expressed or implied that works of this description should be undertaken at the public 
expense…100 
 
 
The Minute did not specify that a route from London to a port with a direct route to Ireland would 
be part of the remit of the Irish Railway Commission (IRC), although one section did give some 
grounds for pursuing this line of enquiry as it suggested that the commission should examine the 
means of: ‘cheap, rapid and certain intercourse between Great Britain and Ireland’. 101 However, 
as noted earlier, Spring Rice had urged Irish Members to work together to agree on the best lines 
in Ireland and avoid as much expense as possible in legal and surveying costs. He had done that in 
the context of his discussion with the PDR in 1835 and so had effectively put the choice of route 
from London to Dublin, including the choice of port, into the hands of the IRC.  He had thereby 
made these items in the Government’s Irish policy.  The Government had used expert opinion to 
avoid a difficult decision at a time of political vulnerability because of its uncertain majority in the 
House of Commons and the complexity of the coalition of interests that kept it in power.102 
Government handed the immediate future of the aspects of Irish policy concerned with railways, 
harbours and their connection to mainland Britain to the IRC, in the hope that it could chart a way 
forward for railways in Ireland and for the Irish economy more generally, including connecting it 
to mainland Britain by a rapid railway link, without creating a political storm. It was an approach 
that was consistent with Barry’s description in chapter 1 of how government sometimes uses 
technical expertise to avoid difficult political decisions.103 
The apparent weakness of the Melbourne Government that replaced a brief Tory Ministry 
under Sir Robert Peel in 1835 turned out to be its strength. The major political groups in 
parliament in the years 1835-41 were Radicals to Melbourne’s left, Tories to his right and the 
overall threat of the newly enfranchised Irish led by O’Connell. To all of these, Melbourne was 
‘the alternative to something worse’- a status that kept him in power until 1841.104 The support of 
the Irish contingent was crucial to the survival of the Whig Government. O’Connell had pressed 
for repeal of the Union with Ireland between 1831 and 1834 but after the Lichfield House 
Compact of 1835 he agreed to suspend that campaign if steps were taken to produce: ‘an identity 
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of laws, an identity of institutions, and an identity of liberties [and] no distinction between 
Yorkshire and Carlow’.105  The integration of Ireland into the UK depended in part upon the ability 
of Irish MPs to attend parliament regularly and deliver their votes for the Government, which 
generally they could not afford to do.106 This may underline the interest on both sides of the Irish 
Sea to improve communications in 1836 that was noted earlier in this chapter. In order to meet 
the ambition of O’Connell in the shorter term it was possible to work through the administration 
at Dublin Castle and avoid the blocking power of Tories in the House of Lords. That was the 
approach of Lord John Russell, the Whig leader in the House of Commons, in order to secure his 
relationship with the O’Connell.107 In particular, he appointed Thomas Drummond as Irish under-
secretary to Lord Normanby. The impact was such that, for the first time, UK membership became 
acceptable to the Catholic population of Ireland.108 The Government’s policy on Ireland was not 
just for the benefit of the Irish, as Chancellor Spring Rice told a meeting in Cambridge in 1837: ‘If 
there was a danger [to] this mighty empire it was to be looked to from that quarter. It was for the 
benefit, not of the people of Ireland alone but likewise for the people of England […] that the 
Government had adopted the policy.109 The creation of the IRC showed that the policy included 
railways as a link with Ireland and within Ireland for its economic and social development, and 
crucially for its political pacification. 
The IRC was led by Drummond who was an engineer by background. He supported and 
promoted administrative and political reforms but also wanted pragmatic and practical measures 
to develop Ireland and tie it more closely to the UK in support of Russell’s policy of: ‘integration 
and assimilation into the mainstream of English life’.110 Drummond particularly emphasised the 
lack of railway development in Ireland and believed that railways provided the key to the full 
integration of Ireland into the Union as an equal partner. He had applied his mathematical skills 
previously to causes such as the decisions to disenfranchise rotten boroughs in the period before 
the Great Reform Act of 1832 – an endeavour in which he had been extensively supported by Sir 
                                                             
105  Peter Jupp, "8: Government, Parliament and Politics in Ireland, 1801–41," in Parliaments, Nations, and 
Identities in Britain and Ireland, 1660-1850, ed. Julian Hoppit, Ucl/Neale Series on British History 
(Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2003), 151. 
 
106  Jupp, Government, Parliament and Politics in Ireland, 152. 
 
107  Donal A. Kerr, A Nation of Beggars? Priests, People, and Politics in Famine Ireland, 1846-1852 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998), 11. 
 
108  Kerr, A Nation of Beggars, 11. 
 
109  “Great Reform Dinner at Cambridge”, Freeman’s Journal, 28 December 1837, 4. 
 
110  Kerr, A Nation of Beggars, 12. 
 
61 
 
Francis Beaufort whose involvement in the choice of harbour is discussed above.111 In 1836, 
Drummond wished to ensure a similarly rational approach to the application of railway 
technology to Ireland to prevent it being ‘handed over to private railway companies’.112  
The Irish policy of the Tory opposition led by Sir Robert Peel was complex. Peel had been 
chief secretary to Ireland for six years from 1812, when he relied: ‘upon penal laws and the 
protestant ascendancy [and] opposed every proposal for relief’.113 Nonetheless, when O’Connell 
was elected to the reformed House of Commons but unable to take his place because of his 
religion, both Peel and the Duke of Wellington reluctantly used their status to secure Catholic 
Emancipation in 1829.114 Thus, Peel’s approach was generally antagonistic towards Ireland and 
the Irish but tempered by pragmatism. The contrasting approaches to Ireland represented by 
Russell and Peel were tested by the work of Drummond and the IRC, whose job it was to 
implement the Treasury Minute of 3 November 1836.  
The issue of rapid communication between London and Dublin had thus developed 
quickly just ten years after Telford’s state-funded road seemed to have brought it to its best 
possible solution. The potential of rail travel was bound to be applied to such a strategically 
significant route, but the decision as to exactly which route was not straightforward. The interests 
of landowners, major towns and cities, and of Ireland itself, were at stake and ensured that the 
issue was contested. Additionally, the emerging power of the railway companies was a factor to 
be taken into account. This chapter has examined the emergence of rivals to Liverpool as the 
focus of government communication with Ireland from London in the early railway age. The 
establishment of the IRC provided a mechanism to gather evidence on the value of railways in the 
development of Ireland, but it also ventured into the issue of how those railways might best 
connect to the network as it emerged in England and Wales. In doing so, it energised political 
advocacy of rival schemes, as government struggled towards its decisions. It is that process that is 
examined in the next chapter. 
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3. The Irish Railway Commission 1836-39 
   
‘These are imperial works, and worthy kings!’1 
 
This chapter focuses on the work of the Irish Railway Commission (IRC) as an element of the Irish 
policy of the Whig Government of 1835-41. Railways had the potential to provide a tangible 
expression of the political connection between Ireland and the rest of the UK because they were 
faster and had more capacity than the road completed by Telford in 1826. But railways had not 
developed to any extent in Ireland by 1836 - so the IRC had the opportunity to learn from 
experience in England and create a system without the high costs and extensive legislative 
process that had featured there. The tension between the economic and social needs of Ireland 
identified by the IRC and the vested interests that supported the traditional method of 
constructing railways (and governing Ireland) in 1836, provide the context for the work of the IRC, 
and for the political contest that its proposals created that is explored in this chapter. 
Nineteenth-century Irish railways have received relatively little coverage among railway 
historians.  Freeman concentrated on English railways in 1999: ‘at the expense of Wales, Scotland 
and even more especially, Ireland’.2 In 2009, Simmons made passing reference to Ireland in The 
Victorian Railway, but only in the context of the rail link to Ireland.3  Casson’s study of railway 
development in 2009 excluded Ireland because it is geographically separate and because he 
considers that the: ‘factors that impinged on railway development there were very different’.4 An 
earlier study by Alderman in 1973 suggested the opposite in the example of the possible state 
purchase of railways in Ireland in 1873, which was opposed by British railway companies because 
it might establish a principle that could be applied to the whole UK network.5  That suggests that 
there were connections between British and Irish railways in the nineteenth century. Biddle and 
Doyle’s contribution to the Oxford Companion to British Railway History in 1997 confirmed that by 
noting the extent of investment by larger English railway companies in their Irish counterparts.6  
In a much earlier and more comprehensive 1968 study, Lee was quite specific in his assertion that 
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being part of the English investment cycle made Irish railways: ‘an integral part of the English 
railway world’.7 This chapter will consider whether Casson or Lee is correct in their assessment of 
whether Irish railway developments were quite separate, or were an integral part of the overall 
UK rail network. That is an important point because it highlights whether the aim of the IRC was 
to connect London to Dublin via a rapid rail and sea link for political purposes, and to connect 
Ireland to the mainland railway network for the economic and social benefits it could deliver as 
part of the constructive Irish policy of Lord Melbourne’s Whig Government of 1835-41. 
There seems to have been little examination of the work of the IRC, even though Lee 
suggested that its main findings were ‘too well known to need recounting’; and there does not 
seem to be a consensus about what happened to its work. 8  Simmons and Doyle noted that its 
findings were ‘rejected by Westminster’.9 Could suggested in 1990 that the IRC report was 
accepted by the House of Commons but rejected by the Lords.10 Casserley’s 1974 outline history 
of Irish railways has no index entry at all for the IRC.11 Collison Black regarded it in 1960 as a: 
‘valuable survey of the whole Irish economy’ – which provides an important reason for analysing 
the IRC report in the context of the Irish policy of the Melbourne’s Government, as does 
Vaughan’s assertion that the IRC report was a ‘stupendous attainment’.12 That might also explain 
why Sir Robert Peel was so determined to defeat the IRC in line with his opposition to the Whig 
Government policy towards Ireland and: ‘in the interests of Irish self-reliance and British capital’ 
as noted by Vignoles in 1982.13 This chapter analyses the IRC’s report and the comments about it 
in the newspapers and parliamentary debates in order to consider how potentially threatening it 
was to contemporary laissez-faire economic interests and their political advocates, who objected 
to government interference such as that proposed by the IRC.  
 In the previous chapter it was noted that the Whig Government reached an agreement 
with O’Connell in return for a more constructive approach to the governance of Ireland. O’Connell 
was aiming for something very different than had been experienced, for example when Sir Robert 
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Peel was Irish secretary as noted in chapter 2. The IRC report shows that railways and the 
government of Ireland were intertwined within a few years of the opening of the Liverpool and 
Manchester Railway in 1830 that marked the start of the nineteenth century railway age. The 
reasons for the rejection of the IRC report were also important. The analysis will show that 
powerful economic and political interests combined to defeat the IRC report, and thereby shaped 
the eventual form of the London to Dublin railway link, and the nature of the connection between 
Ireland and the rest of the UK. Its defeat frustrated supporters of the railway to Porth Dinllaen 
(PDR) and encouraged those who favoured the Chester and Holyhead Railway (CHR). That was not 
just a choice of route - the nature of support for the competing railway links broadly reflected 
rival views about Ireland’s relationship with London, and who should benefit most from that 
relationship. 
3.1  The work of the Irish Railway Commission (IRC) 
 
Thomas Drummond, Irish under-secretary from 1835, was an important figure in the IRC, and was 
the face of Whig policy in Ireland between 1835 and 1840. He wanted the railway system in 
Ireland to serve a number of purposes that included immediate employment for the peasantry on 
railways to promote social order, and private investment that created employment for those 
eventually released from construction of the lines.14 The ultimate aim was to sever the connection 
between a significant proportion of Irish labour and the land they occupied for subsistence 
farming. As will become clear, the IRC identified population congestion and underemployment as 
vital social and economic issues in the west of Ireland seven years before those areas were struck 
by famine, and it offered a scheme to resolve those problems using railways.  The IRC approach to 
railway building was similar to near contemporary developments in Belgium.15 Between 1834 and 
1837 the work of state engineers Pierre Simons and Gustave De Ridder delivered the twin goals 
of: ‘facilitating regional industrialization and positioning Belgium economically and politically 
within Europe’.16  The twin aims of the IRC were similar - industrial development of Ireland and 
securing its economic and political position within the UK. As in Belgium, the IRC was a political 
initiative to use railways within government policy – which was not consistent with how railways 
developed within the UK in the 1830s. That explains why it was challenged by the Tory opposition, 
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which had reluctantly granted greater political equality to Ireland when in government in 1829 
through Catholic Emancipation - but remained antagonistic to those like O’Connell, who 
promoted Irish interests and even repeal of the Union of 1801.  
The Irish Railway Commissioners were Colonel John Fox Burgoyne of the Royal 
Engineers17, the mathematician Peter Barlow18 and Sir Richard Griffiths19 - but the driving force 
was Drummond himself. Its first appointment was Charles Vignoles as engineer, which was not an 
impartial selection because Vignoles had well-developed railway interests, including the Dublin 
and Kingstown Railway (DKR) and the Porth Dinllaen Railway (PDR) noted in Chapter 2. 
Unsurprisingly, his appointment was not well received by those competing with him for the right 
to build railways in Ireland.  One furious commentator remarked that the appointment was a 
‘daring indiscretion’ that cast doubt on the impartiality of the IRC.20 The IRC therefore began its 
work with a strong sense that it was not sympathetic to existing railway interests and practices in 
England, and might be predisposed to support the PDR rather than the CHR. However, given the 
clear support for the PDR from Beaufort’s report noted in Chapter 2, it was reasonable that the 
IRC should then ask its engineer to join the commission. If the Treasury Minute of 3 November 
1836 had been followed to the letter by the IRC, it may not have considered the PDR at all. The 
appointment of Vignoles was a sign that it would, and that it would prove favourable to that 
London to Dublin rail route.  
The IRC report was both radical and thorough. The opening sections gave a quantitative 
overview of Ireland - distribution of population, employment profile, and an account of imports 
and exports – the comprehensive survey of the whole Irish economy noted earlier by Collison 
Black. In order to determine its railway proposals, it gave detailed statistics on road and canal use 
and the amount of post carried. The IRC report used detailed data to determine the relative 
importance of various large towns in Ireland that might warrant connection by railway. Its 
approach was historical, financial, sociological, topographical, geological, scientific, mathematical 
and above all, political. The IRC’s overall objective was to drive a government policy that would 
generate the process of industrialisation which it perceived had transformed the rest of the UK. 
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By contrast, it considered that the lack of industrialisation had made Ireland socially vulnerable, 
politically dangerous and expensive to manage. The IRC’s conclusions are supported in more 
modern analysis of Ireland’s circumstances in the 1830s and 1840s. For example, in 1972 Lane 
suggested that the Irish economy in the pre-famine years faced no greater problem than the 
large-scale redundancy of its agricultural workforce.21 The IRC aimed to tackle that problem by 
replacing the pauperised rural peasantry with a modern industrial workforce, dependent upon 
wages rather than subsistence crops. The IRC recorded what it saw as the urgency of the problem 
and argued that in the interests of national security alone, the solution could not be delayed.22 It 
demonstrated that the cause of pauperisation was the explosion in the Irish population which had 
risen from 4.2 million in 1791 to an estimated 8.5 million in 1838.23 For the IRC, this was: 
‘perpetually and powerfully acting to depress [wages]’.24 It did not blame the Irish people for that 
and exhibited a positive view of Irish labour and Irish produce, noted an increase in the quality 
and quantity of the latter - and that the centres of investment, production and distribution 
beyond Dublin were Cork, Waterford, Limerick and Belfast.  25  It calculated that the area bounded 
by Dublin and the first three named cities enclosed a third of the Irish population.26 For that 
reason the IRC considered that the main line in the new system of railways should pass through 
the centre of that district, with an additional line between Dublin and Belfast for passenger 
traffic.27 Its report provided a mass of evidence on the growth of both imports and exports and 
observed that Irish agricultural products flowed east and British cotton, wool, tea and coffee were 
the main imports to Ireland from mainland Britain. Poor Irish people apparently had little access 
to those products that were consumed by: ‘the superior class of landholders, and the inhabitants 
of the towns’.28  
The IRC’s work represented a wholly new approach to railway development in the 1830s 
as it deployed railways as part of an explicit government policy – a direct challenge to the laissez-
faire approach to railways in England. For example, the IRC opposed the private proposal for a line 
                                                             
21  Padraig G. Lane, “The General Impact of the Encumbered Estates Act of 1849 on Counties Galway and 
Mayo” Journal of the Galway Archaeological and Historical Society (1972), No. 33, 44–74. 
 
22  Second Report Minor Edition, 118. 
 
23  Second Report Minor Edition, 115. 
 
24  Second Report Minor Edition, 9. 
 
25  Second Report Minor Edition, 7. 
 
26  Second Report Minor Edition, 17. 
 
27  Second Report Minor Edition, 17. 
 
28  Second Report Minor Edition, 21. 
 
67 
 
from Dublin to Galway at £20,000 per mile that included grandiose plans for a transatlantic 
harbour and a total outlay of £2 million.29 It demonstrated that such a line was unnecessary as it 
duplicated previous government investments in canals, and would not pay. The IRC also showed 
that the notion of replacing Liverpool and Bristol as the main ports of departure for transatlantic 
travel and trade was chimerical.30 The IRC challenged a powerful collection of interests - 
landlords, lawyers, engineers and politicians - whom it felt had benefited most from railways in 
England - and were attempting to do so in Ireland.31 
  The IRC avoided advocating the expensive methods used by private investors to build 
railways in the 1830s in the UK, for example it accepted slightly steeper gradients that reduced 
construction costs.32 It thought railways should be built to integrate with existing road and canal 
facilities and thereby avoid the waste of previous investment, and be built on a scale that 
reflected the modest levels of traffic to be expected within a developing economy.33 As an 
example, the IRC differed from privately promoted proposals by suggesting that Killarney did not 
warrant its own railway line in 1838. It considered that passengers could travel by road from the 
new railway to Killarney because the IRC line to Cork passed so close to the town. 34  At the heart 
of this ‘combined system’ was the use of branch lines rather than separate direct lines, and the 
IRC illustrated the difference by providing a table that compared its work to that of the ‘Kilkenny 
system’ for south-east Ireland as offered by private promoters. The IRC adopted an approach that 
was systematic, logical, and focused on gaining the best results for Ireland rather than the best 
returns for shareholders of individual companies. That was a radical approach in 1838 and a 
serious challenge to those developing railways in the rest of the UK. The IRC promoted a policy for 
railway building in part of the UK that could be applied more widely - which suggests that Parris’s 
1965 view that the Whigs had no railway policy in the 1830s should be modified.35 The impact of 
applying this rational approach to railway construction may be seen by the reduction in the total 
length of railway lines that would have resulted from the IRC’s approach. 
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Table 3.1:  Comparison of the IRC route mileages and those of lines proposed by joint stock 
companies in Ireland 1838 
 
IRC System Distances common to more 
than one place (miles. 
furlongs) 
Miles of railway required to 
be made (miles. furlongs) 
Dublin by Maryborough to Cork 166. 5 166. 5 
Dublin to Limerick 125. 4 35. 6 
Dublin to Waterford 141. 2 37 
Dublin to Kilkenny 79 26. 4 
Limerick to Waterford 73 13 
Totals 585. 3 278. 7 
Kilkenny System   
Dublin to Kilkenny 73. 4 73. 4 
Dublin by Kilkenny to Cork 170. 5 97. 1 
Dublin by Sallins and Roscrea to 
Limerick 
112 94 
Dublin to Waterford 139 32 
Limerick to Waterford 73 41 
Totals 568. 7 337. 5 
 
Source: Second Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the manner in which Railway Communications can be most 
advantageously promoted in Ireland. Minor Edition (London: Clowes and Sons, 1838), 59. 
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Figure 3.1 Proposals of the Irish Railway Commissioners and lines as built in Ireland 
 
 
 
Map copied from Michael Henry Could, “The Effect of Government Policy on Railway Building in Ireland” Transactions of the 
Newcomen Society, Volume 62, Issue 1, 1990, 81-96. 
 
The IRC admitted that its lines required an extra 16.5 miles travel to reach all the destinations on 
the Kilkenny system when compared to the use of the privately promoted lines.  However, its 
approach involved the construction of around 58 fewer miles of railway which, at the earlier 
Galway line estimate of £20,000 per mile saved £1 million.36 The point is well illustrated in Figure 
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3.1 by noting how much longer the Dublin to Kilkenny line is when compared to the short branch 
from the IRC’s main Dublin to Cork line. The respective amounts of railway building to connect 
Kilkenny to Dublin are 26.4 miles under the IRC proposals and 73.4 miles under the private 
proposal (Table 3.1). The IRC summarised its approach in the report, indicating that they wished 
to achieve: ‘the greatest amount of accommodation at the least expense of construction and 
maintenance’.37 The IRC proposals are similar to the ‘main line with branches’ approach suggested 
by Casson as the ‘general solution’ in his model of a rational British railway system.38 Drummond’s 
approach, though logical, challenged railway practice that was to connect each place separately 
by the most direct route. The latter practice had high level support, most notably from Sir Robert 
Peel, who continued to advocate ‘direct lines’.39 Peel and other advocates of laissez-faire 
economics constituted a powerful source of opposition to the work of the IRC – which if 
established in Ireland might have threatened the freedom of private capital investment in 
railways in the rest of the UK. 
The IRC report addressed and calculated almost every aspect of railway operation and no 
evidence emerged in the course of this research that any other person or group with a senior role 
in railway development had done anything similar in the 1830s. Parris suggests that there was ‘no 
systematic public enquiry’ before the creation of the Railway Department in 1845, which appears 
to ignore the work of the IRC.40 The IRC provided a blueprint for extending railways beyond the 
largest conurbations in a manner that enabled them to develop local economies without imposing 
costs associated with what the IRC called the practice of: ‘aiming at a degree of perfection [which] 
can only be repaid on a line of very extensive traffic’.41 The IRC proposals were in stark contrast to 
the: ‘monuments to empire and testaments to personal engineering skill’ on the English system 
noted by Casson.42 
The Commission reserved its most damning criticism for the promoters, financiers, 
lawyers, landowners and parliamentarians associated with railway development, whom it 
considered had hampered railway development in Ireland. According to the IRC, those interests 
were the greatest source of unnecessary cost.  It was particularly critical of over-optimistic cost 
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estimates - and singled out the powerful London and Birmingham Railway (LBR) for having far 
exceeded its estimated costs of construction.43 The IRC seemed remarkably unconcerned about 
vested economic and political interests when it attacked existing railway construction practice in 
the UK.44 It did not consider that the approach to railway development in England, driven by the 
private sector, could be applied in Ireland if the latter was to have a viable railway network: ‘We 
have no hesitation in stating that if these great and absorbing expenses cannot be avoided in 
Ireland, there is but little prospect of a general Railway system being attended with either private 
or national advantage.45 A reasonable conclusion from analysing its report is that the IRC was 
more concerned with the latter advantage for Ireland than the former. 
 
3.2 The IRC approach to railway management and regulation 
 
The most controversial and challenging policy suggestion of the IRC was that oversight of the Irish 
railway system should be a responsibility of the state. The IRC went further and threatened 
private railway investment by its suggestion that its methods in Ireland should apply generally in 
the UK because:  
 
The essential difference between railways and any other description of public works has been 
overlooked, and that power and privileges have been conceded to private companies, which 
should be exercised only under the direct authority of the State or under regulations enforced by 
effective superintendence and control…46 
 
There had been concern about the economic power of railways in 1836 when James Morrison, a 
prominent critic, spoke in parliament on the subject and received support from others - including 
the Duke of Wellington - although Sir Robert Peel opposed them and no effective action was 
taken.47 No evidence was found that showed that any other official case was made to parliament 
for the exercise of state control over railways as early as 1838. The IRC proposal for such a scheme 
in Ireland suggested an effective approach to many of the known abuses of power by railway 
companies at that time. The IRC went further, and proposed state funding and the potential for 
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powerful local control by authorities within Ireland. 48 That was a direct challenge to the principles 
of laissez-faire economics that left railway development to private capital and allowed that capital 
to reap its rewards. It also had echoes of the scheme to build railways in Belgium as part of a 
nation-building exercise noted earlier. The IRC opposition to private control of railways was such 
that in Ireland it considered that even railways built with private capital should be managed by 
the state.49 Behind that approach was the radical notion that railways should be created and 
managed as a single system in Ireland - not as a series of independent operations as applied in 
England.50  The IRC proposed railways as: ‘one interest, and under one management and control, 
[and] treated according to the same principle, and considered as one concern’.51 Casson ascribes a 
similar but less radical approach to the later Board of Trade Railway Committee in 1845. 52 Bagwell 
maintained in 1988 that viewing railway developments in the context of the whole system was a 
notion that originated with Gladstone in 1844.53 Neither of them acknowledges that the IRC had 
reached that conclusion by 1838 as part of a radical policy for railways to deliver economic 
advance in Ireland - and to transform railway policy in the rest of the UK. The IRC was clear that 
whoever funded the system, it should be relieved of major development and construction costs. 
The act of parliament should be free, land compensation charges should be fixed, legal costs 
should be remitted and a competent body should be created to manage changes to railway acts 
without further expensive recourse to parliament whose committees, when faced with a complex 
railway issue were not: ‘competent to examine or decide upon it’ in the opinion of the IRC.54  In 
the 1830s parliament had acted as an umpire in a contest between private parties rather than 
being ‘the guardian of the public interest’.55 That assessment of this period by Parris would have 
been even stronger with an acknowledgement of the detailed work of the IRC and its proposals to 
address many of the weaknesses in railway administration and development that he identified. In 
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its conclusion the IRC assessed the future consequences of ignoring its suggestions for a 
wholesale change in railway policy in the UK:  
 
 
We believe that railway travelling will continue to maintain a superiority over that which it has 
superseded; but there is reason to fear that it will be far below what the country might have 
derived under better regulations; when this is perceived and understood, the satisfaction which is 
now felt will give way to discontent and complaint, and retrospective legislation will supply but a 
partial and imperfect remedy…56 
 
 
The IRC report challenged many of the practices and assumptions that had emerged in the early 
years of railway building. Its report offered a radical railway policy to be applied to a country 
whose rule had caused many problems to the London government. The IRC had taken the initial 
interest in a London to Dublin railway and sea link and developed it into comprehensive proposal 
that took railways beyond Dublin so that they served the Irish economy – tackling the economic 
under-development and over-population that were the portents of a serious social and economic 
problem in Ireland. In doing so, the IRC presented a challenge to powerful political and economic 
interests, which then ensured that its work was challenged very strongly.  
However, the IRC itself did not strengthen its cause by some of its own actions. For 
example, the decision to include details of the Porth Dinllaen Railway (PDR) from London towards 
Dublin in the IRC report provided political ammunition for its opponents. The Treasury Minute of 
November 1836 had specified that the work of the IRC covered railways in Ireland rather than 
railways between Ireland and London.57 However, the Minute had arisen in part from the need to 
resolve the controversy over the best route towards Dublin from London. Chancellor Spring Rice 
had given some scope to extend that remit in his comments to the delegation in 1836 when he 
made a connection between the link with Dublin and a system of railways for the whole of 
Ireland, as discussed in chapter 2.58  
There is evidence that Vignoles attempted to apply some of the philosophy of the IRC to 
the PDR route to London that was included as an appendix in the IRC report.59 He suggested that 
if public money was to be spent on the line then there was some requirement to provide benefits 
to areas such as the remote parts of North Wales that would not otherwise be served by 
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railways.60 Similarly, he adopted the approach of the IRC to North Wales by limiting expense 
through accepting steeper gradients, suggesting a single line with passing points initially and 
thereby reckoning to save £5000 per mile on the connecting line from Porth Dinllaen to London.61 
He was; however, clear that the main purpose of the PDR was to enable rapid communication 
between London and Dublin, and he calculated that it would save an hour in the overall time of 
the journey compared to the CHR. That enabled letters to be answered on the same day they 
were received, which he considered to be the main purpose of the PDR and its rival. If that could 
not be accomplished: ‘the packets might as well sail from Liverpool’ in Vignoles’ view.62  The 
inclusion of Vignoles’ proposals for the PDR within the IRC report ensured that the IRC approach 
was comprehensive - because Ireland needed both an internal system of railways and an external 
connection to the emerging railway network of the UK. Without that, the IRC proposals would not 
have provided maximum benefit to Ireland, or supported Irish political and economic integration 
within the UK. It was an approach that was entirely consistent with the Whig Government policy 
for Ireland of making Ireland indistinct from other parts of the UK. 
Although the IRC attempted to be even-handed in its comments, the fact that its report 
included extensive details of the PDR but relatively little on the CHR, showed probable support for 
the PDR. It is no surprise that an opponent of the IRC, George Lewis Smyth, published material 
that pointed out, in colourful language and with some justification, the ‘pertinacious contumacy’ 
of the way the IRC had drifted from its remit so that: ‘Commissioners appointed to report how 
Railway communications might best be promoted in Ireland, also allowed themselves to report 
how Railways may best be carried across Wales’.63 The IRC did have Beaufort’s unequivocal 
support for the PDR as an argument against Smyth’s comments, but the IRC was still tainted by a 
sense that it had not been even-handed. Vignoles did partially contradict those assertions when 
he declined to give any opinion on the relative merits of the PDR and its rivals – noting that the: 
‘reflections which arise are of the highest order but are to be embodied in language by the 
statesman, rather than by the engineer’ – in other word it was a political rather than a 
technological judgement. But the fact remained that there were details of his scheme to link to 
London in the IRC report and not as much on those of his rivals.64   
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The IRC logic was clear - Ireland should be an integral part of the UK and its proposed 
railway system needed the best possible connection to the UK and its capital. The purpose of such 
a connection was entirely in line with the policy endorsed by O’Connell and the Whigs of 
removing all difference between Ireland and the rest of the UK. The report showed that larger 
purpose clearly in an important passage:  
 
 
Connected as they are by the same laws and identified in interests, any proposal to cement this 
union, by drawing their inhabitants closer together […] claims general attention, and if it is 
calculated to promote that end, should command general support.65  
 
 
The elements of the report that prevented ‘general support’ were its challenges to powerful 
economic interests that supported a laissez-faire approach to railway construction and to the 
development of the Irish economy, and to political supporters of that approach who also resented 
the Whigs’ more generous treatment of Ireland in the years 1835-41. 
 
3.3  The Irish Railway Commission report in the press and parliament 1838-39 
 
The IRC report was a significant contribution to the debate about railways which Parris shows 
were in ‘crisis’ in 1836 when the IRC was established.66  Morrison had delivered a measured and 
incisive speech that identified the issue that the IRC later addressed in its report - the danger of 
conferring:  
 
Peculiar power and privileges on the subscribers to the joint stock companies that owned the 
railways [that allowed an] incommunicable privilege and a substantial monopoly [to railway 
owners, while the measures to control them were] singularly ill-fitted for the attainment of their 
professed object.67  
 
 
That language reflected Drummond’s later assertion that: ‘property has its duties as well as its 
rights’.68 Morrison proposed regulation, while the IRC proposed state ownership and 
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management, as parliament sought to resolve the: ‘dilemma of finding some formula which would 
curb the abuse of commercial power without disturbing the sanctity of private property’, 
identified by Dyos and Aldcroft.69 The suggestion from the IRC appeared to have been the first 
official advocacy of state control of railways in the UK and it is significant because the IRC actually 
induced government to propose legislation to that effect for the first time. The Railway 
Department prepared reports in 1845 that took into account commercial, industrial and landed 
interests and were much praised by Casson as already noted. However, those reports took rather 
less account of the needs of the wider populace, and especially the poor, compared to those of 
the IRC.70 An exception is the Railway Department report on the South of Ireland, which admitted 
to a heavy dependence on the work of the IRC.71 Those reports did not go so far, and were not so 
comprehensive, as that of the IRC. The IRC report challenges Simmons’ 1978 assertion that in 
railway policy ‘no Whig’ made any mark in that field.72  Arguably, the Whig IRC made too much of 
a mark too early in the debate on railway policy, and created such f ierce opposition that the 
railway policy that it proposed was rejected. 
Drummond’s wife anticipated the extent and the source of opposition to the IRC report in 
an undated letter to her mother-in-Iaw about the ‘horrid Railroad Report’. She feared that its 
authors: ‘will be assailed with all sorts of abuse, as they bear rather hard on the private railroad 
companies’ - and she was right.73 Some of the initial criticism was unexpected, such as that of 
Daniel O’Connell, who took particular exception to: ‘half a page of puff – plain and palpable puff – 
on the Provincial Bank’, perhaps for its strong links to government and its competition with his 
own Irish bank.74 O’Connell may also have thought that any support from him for the IRC might 
inhibit the report’s acceptance by Peel and the opposition, as it might be seen as another example 
of government trying to placate him.75 By March 1839, O’Connell was more concerned that any 
negative comments from him could harm the overall prospects for Irish railways, so he retracted 
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his initial criticisms.76 The nationalist Freeman’s Journal also considered that the IRC report 
contained ‘many suggestions well worthy of adoption’.77  Not all Irish papers supported the IRC, 
and the Tory Dublin Evening Mail preferred to focus on what it considered to be a corrupt 
arrangement to give all the work on the proposed lines to Mr Pierce Mahoney, a Whig supporter 
in Ireland. It discovered an early copy of the IRC report that had mistakenly included his name as 
the contractor - even before the schemes were approved.78  There was considerable 
embarrassment in government when this point was raised in parliament.79 It was another 
example of the political indiscretions of the IRC that tended to undermine its good work and give 
its opponents ample material to weaken its powerful focus on the needs of Ireland.  
Those weaknesses were exploited by opponents of the IRC approach such as The Times, 
which maintained its opposition throughout the last quarter of 1838. The paper particularly 
objected to state funding of railways to create a system rather than a collection of privately -
funded lines.80 The Times did not confine its criticism to the reports proposals but also attacked its 
principal author Thomas Drummond personally.81 That was a continuation of its resentment of the 
approach the Whigs had taken in Ireland and particularly the work of Drummond, who had 
refused the use of the police to collect tithes, taxes paid to the official Anglican Church which the 
majority did not attend.82 Thus, the attacks on the IRC were part of a more general opposition to 
the Whig approach to government in Ireland from 1835, which had challenged the Irish 
landowners and the established Irish church. In December 1838, The Times continued its 
objection to government investment in Irish railways but found the IRC comments on the need for 
general regulation of railways useful and interesting.  The paper couldn’t help noting with 
satisfaction that the problems of railway coordination at Birmingham (highlighted by the IRC) 
were resolved - to show how responsive private railways could be. But the paper stayed firm in its 
anti–Irish conclusion that the IRC report was: ‘the most barefaced attempt at an unprincipled job 
ever perpetrated, even in Ireland’.83 The Times stance seemed to reflect a wider view from 
powerful economic interests such as those in Manchester, the capital of English manufacturing 
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districts and home of laissez-faire economics, where the Manchester Guardian noted its 
‘unqualified dissent and opposition’ to the proposals of the IRC.84  
Supporters of the IRC and the Whigs’ Irish policies responded on its behalf. The Morning 
Chronicle was favourable, and particularly emphasised the political context of the report and its 
generous references to Ireland. Nonetheless, opposition to the IRC report increased steadily so 
that in December 1838 there was a meeting between Lord Morpeth, the Secretary for Ireland (to 
whom Drummond reported) and the General Railway Committee of Ireland (GRC), an association 
of private railway interests.85 Among its members were Thomas Bermingham (promoter of the 
Galway line which the IRC had rejected) and G. A. Hamilton, who had stood against Daniel 
O’Connell at the Dublin election of 1835 – so its opposition to the IRC was no surprise.86. The GRC 
considered that its members had invested in schemes that had been dismissed by the IRC and 
they argued that private investment should prevail against the logic of the IRC report and 
especially its advocacy of state funding for railways.87 However, closer examination of the GRC 
report revealed that this group, like the IRC, wanted public funding for its projects.  The GRC 
thought there was ‘every reason in justice and policy’ to extend public aid to private Irish railways 
and offered £1 million of additional private investment in return.88 In spite of that offer, the 
meeting with Lord Morpeth was not successful for the GRC, and the deputation concluded that 
the scheme for building railways in Ireland at public expense had been abandoned.89 The 
Government responded slowly to the IRC report, which suggested some discomfort on its part 
with its proposals. It was also concerned about how the scheme might be funded, and briefly 
considered a suggestion from Drummond that money from the tithes charged by the established 
church in Ireland, a tax that was hated by the Catholic majority, might be used. That was too 
radical a proposal and was eventually rejected by government.90 However, having also rejected 
                                                             
84  “Second Report of the Irish Railway Commissioners”, Manchester Guardian, 8 August 1838, 3. 
 
85  The General Railway Committee (GRC), First Report and Proceedings (Dublin: William Warren, 1838). For 
Morpeth see Ian Machin, ‘Howard, George William Frederick, seventh earl of Carlisle (1802–1864)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/13902, accessed 12 Sept 2016] 
 
86  G. C. Boase, “Hamilton, George Alexander (1802–1871),” rev. David W. Miller, in Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence 
Goldman, May 2009, [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/12071 accessed May 14, 2014]. He lost the 
vote, but subsequently removed O’Connell on a petition to parliament. 
 
87  GRC, Report and Proceedings, 6. 
 
88  GRC, Report and Proceedings, 20. [£81.2M at 2015 prices] 
 
89  The Times, “Irish Railways”, 12 December 1838, 5. 
 
90  R.D. Collison Black, Economic Thought and the Irish Question (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1960), 192. 
 
79 
 
the offer from the GRC to take forward railways in Ireland by conventional methods, the 
Government needed to resolve the continuing uncertainty and maintain the support of Irish 
members - and especially Daniel O’Connell - on which it depended. 
Morpeth eventually committed government to support Drummond and the IRC and early 
in 1839 gave notice of his intention to request £2.5 million from parliament to implement part of 
the IRC report - the line from Dublin to Cork that formed the spine of the IRC system.91 The debate 
about the report divided opinion on important issues of Irish policy and the overall management 
and regulation of railways.  Thus, the parliamentary debate of 1 March 1839, though unremarked 
by historians of railway regulation such as Parris, was an important test of principle that attracted 
contributions from senior political figures. The debate on the IRC report was also a test of the 
Government’s Irish policy because it faced accusations that its approach was driven by Daniel 
O’Connell, and was: ‘one species of justice to this country, and another […] for Ireland’.92 
O’Connell insisted rather unconvincingly that he had not been consulted in any way by 
government.93 That was not an easy case for him to make because Drummond worked so closely 
with O’Connell and was reported in 1835 as spending: ‘two or three hours daily in close 
conference with Mr Drummond’.94 Lord John Russell - home secretary with overall responsibility 
for the government of Ireland 95 - then defended the Government’s approach, the integrity of the 
IRC and especially of Drummond: ‘whose scientific attainments, whatever might be his politics, 
would not be denied’.96 That comment suggested that Russell thought that Drummond’s political 
approach to the IRC report made the government vulnerable to accusations of malpractice. 
Another MP reinforced the attack on Drummond when he queried why the role of private 
enterprise had been emphasised in the original remit of the IRC, but was then omitted when IRC 
was renewed after the death of the king in 1837 – a point that embarrassed Russell who 
confessed that he could not answer that question.97 It was a further example of the way the IRC 
had tended to follow its own agenda without much reference to the wishes of government in 
London, an approach that gave opponents the opportunity to taint them with allegations of 
favouritism towards Ireland. 
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There was also a sense that the Government was rather half-hearted about its support for 
the IRC, as when Morpeth admitted that he had only been able to grant ‘the gleanings of scanty 
leisure’ to reading the IRC report.98 With regard to O’Connell, Morpeth noted the latter’s initial 
opposition to the report, which he considered to be an adequate answer to claims that the report 
was done at O’Connell’s bidding.  He suggested rather optimistically that the report had become 
more popular since its publication, and particularly noted the support of the Irish peers who 
submitted a Loyal Address to the Queen in support of the IRC. For Morpeth, there was sufficient 
cause for the Government to accept the IRC report as: ‘sound and just, and proper and politic’, 
though he seemed uncomfortably aware that the IRC had drifted a long way from the principles of 
laissez-faire economics.99  He took comfort from the way railways had developed in Europe and 
especially in Belgium, where a similar approach to that of the IRC had been taken. 100 That was a 
potentially controversial comparison in the eyes of supporters of Union with Ireland, given that 
Belgium had acquired independence from Holland in 1830 - and had used railways to show that 
they could survive without Dutch oversight and finance, as noted by Revill.101 Morpeth then 
committed government to constructing the Dublin to Cork line with branches to Limerick and 
Clonmel, and a state investment of £2.5 million.  Morpeth appeared to warm in his support for 
the IRC as his speech concluded, so that he closed with an indictment of the self-interested 
motives of private companies as stated by the IRC.102 Morpeth also hinted at a wider Irish policy of 
pacification of Ireland and its integration within the UK of which the proposals of the IRC were an 
important part. In doing so he quoted the poet Alexander Pope’s words in support of munificent 
public spending for a good cause: 
 
 
Back to his bounds, the subject sea command, 
And roll obedient rivers through the land, 
These honours peace to happy Britain brings; 
These are imperial works, and worthy kings!103 
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In contrast to the rather ambiguous support for the IRC offered by the Government, Sir Robert 
Peel, the Leader of the Opposition, delivered an understated but destructive speech that reflected 
a clear ideology in respect of railway development in Ireland. He avoided direct personal attacks 
or suggestions of favouritism, but objected to the IRC proposals because he believed that they 
exposed government to uncontrollable demands for additional lines that it could not fulfil. He 
cited the examples of the west of Ireland and Ulster as areas likely to have such a complaint; and 
he also questioned whether such areas should bear the cost of railways for the rest of Ireland.104 
But his main criticism was that the IRC had provided much useful technical information but 
ignored the fact that there were profitable railways in Ireland for which private capital was 
available - and where the state had no business to interfere. Peel simply could not support such a 
direct contradiction of the principle of laissez-faire. As a supporter of direct lines, he ignored the 
notion of the proposals as a whole system and argued instead that private capital should be given 
its chance on those lines where entrepreneurs were willing to invest - and he wondered: ‘why […] 
should not Irish gentlemen and capitalists undertake their own works and trust to their own 
intelligence and enterprise for their natural reward’ – rather than rely on the state? He thus 
underlined his support for laissez-faire and dismissed the idea that a systematic overall approach 
was needed and that railways were a special form of industrial development, totally contradicting 
the views of the IRC. In support of this point he suggested that all the IRC report arguments for a 
state system of railways applied equally to the creation of cotton mills in Ireland.  105 Finally, he 
mocked the Government for underrating the capacity of the Irish people. It had offered increased 
independence through local government reform, and yet through the measure on railways it was: 
‘proceeding on the old assumption, much deprecated on the other side of the House, that the 
inhabitants of Ireland are […] inferior’.106 In short, he suggested an entirely laissez-faire approach 
to railway building in Ireland – as he had advocated in the rest of Britain. 
Peel’s position was sharply attacked by Daniel O’Connell who insisted that a railway could 
not be compared to a cotton factory.107 When another MP questioned the likelihood of 
repayment of any loan to build railways in Ireland, O’Connell used his ultimate threat of a 
campaign for the repeal of the Union by pledging to make repayment a: ‘clause [in] the Repeal Bill 
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– making it a debt on the Irish nation’.108 That certainly demonstrated his belief in the centrality of 
railways in Irish politics. The Whig Government was very weak at this time and briefly lost power 
to Peel during the Bedchamber Crisis of May 1839, just a few weeks after this debate, so Peel’s 
opposition was critical to the progress of the IRC report. 109 Lord John Russell – who led the 
Government in the House of Commons - wanted to avoid a division on party lines and hoped the 
measure would be supported because it improved the social and economic conditions of Ireland. 
Sir Edward Knatchbull closed for the Opposition and denied that there was any party feeling. But 
he would not offer support as it might commit his side to backing any future measure on Irish 
railways.110 The House divided and the measure was agreed by 144 votes to 100. Thus, despite the 
claims of scholars such as Parris that the Whigs had no railway policy, the Whig Government 
actually secured a successful vote allowing the state to run railways in a large part of the UK in 
1839. It was an important moment in railway history in the UK and in the use of railways as a 
policy instrument in Ireland. But despite winning the vote, the Government was still a long way 
from actually implementing the IRC report. 
 
3.4 The end of the IRC initiative 1839-40 
 
Drummond was satisfied with the vote but feared: ‘there has been a great cabal formed against it, 
and [he dreaded] defeat’. 111  The politically-sophisticated O’Connell was in no doubt that Peel’s 
opposition to the measure would prove fatal to it, as he noted only ten days after the debate in a 
letter to the Irish people, when he suggested that: ‘the Government scheme will be abandoned as 
hopeless’.112 Peel reacted quickly after the debate with a question to Morpeth about the future of 
the IRC report and received an evasive answer that suggested a lack of government 
commitment.113 The Times agreed with this analysis by noting: ‘the evident signs of the coming 
discomfiture’ of the IRC and its report.114 The newspaper celebrated the defeat of the potentially 
open-ended notion of state management of railways and its implications for wider railway policy: 
‘once recognise such a principle and it will be impossible to limit its application’.115 Two days later, 
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The Times exhibited the full extent of its opposition by likening the IRC proposals to some road 
measures in Canada as a scheme to: ‘vest large expenditure in Republican commissioners for 
revolutionary purposes’.116 While that may appear to be a rather overstated sentiment, there was 
some sense in the notion that the IRC’s proposals had the potential to weaken the Union – even if 
that was not the intention. Drummond made overt reference to Belgium, where railways were 
clearly linked to creating an identifiable and independent political entity – a new nation - after its 
separation from the Netherlands in 1830.  
There was fury in Ireland at O’Connell’s prediction of the loss of the IRC proposals. The 
Freeman’s Journal was hardly surprised by the Tory opposition, but it was still moved to denounce 
Peel and his party as ‘crawling and venomous things’.117 But Irish nationalists seemed genuinely 
puzzled by the opposition of some Whig radicals. Competing loyalties explained some of that 
opposition, for example Sir John Jervis was a radical Chester MP and supported the CHR, a 
scheme that would not have benefited from the IRC proposals.118 The journal was not; however, 
surprised to publish a letter from Sir Robert Peel to the ‘Commercial Buildings Committee’ (an 
alternative name for the GRC whose views were noted earlier) that had sought his support in 
opposition to the IRC.119 Peel reconfirmed the principle at the centre of his rejection of the IRC 
report when he noted that there was no: ‘better test of what is required, or what is likely to 
become useful, than the prospect of remuneration’.120 In other words, laissez-faire economics 
must prevail. 
The formal end of the IRC report was noted on 30 May 1839, when it was listed among 
the ‘dropped orders’ that the Government could not pursue in its weakened state.121 Thus, the 
measure was not lost in the House of Lords as suggested by Could in 1990, it was lost because 
government simply did not have sufficient political support to drive the measure through 
parliament.122 On 28 June, Morpeth explained the IRC failure when he told an MP that: ‘if he had 
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been allowed to prosecute the measure, he was sure he could have [shown] that any notion of 
patronage was […] unfounded’.123 That suggested that government had found it difficult to 
counter the allegation that Pierce Mahoney was already identified as the contractor for the state-
funded work of the IRC as noted earlier. Despite the loss of the IRC proposals, the Government 
maintained an interest in developing the Irish railway system. In July 1839, Irish landowners 
initiated a debate in support of the IRC and Morpeth showed how much he had conceded to 
opponents when he admitted that private funding was then the preferred option for Irish railway 
development.124 In 1841, Morpeth also requested leave to introduce a bill for general public 
information with a view to longer term action on railways in Ireland and suggested that opinion 
had shifted towards the original proposals of the IRC and: ‘his late excellent and lamented friend, 
Mr. Drummond’.125 Sir Robert Peel thought Morpeth’s proposal was mere electioneering.126 The 
defeat of the Government at the polls in August 1841 effectively ended the IRC initiative, while 
Peel’s victory gave him the opportunity to shift the policy on the development of railways in 
Ireland (and the London to Dublin link) in a direction that was less favourable to Irish interests.  
The IRC provided a blueprint six years before Gladstone: ‘evolved a set of principles [to] 
guide railway policy’ as noted by Casson.127 That later example is probably explained by the fact 
that Rawson, a civil servant who later assisted Gladstone at the Board of Trade, had written very 
positively about the IRC at the time of its report and appeared to build on its work in the 1844 
Railway Act.128 However, Gladstone himself had followed Peel’s lead and voted against the IRC in 
the 1839 division on the Government’s Irish railway policy.129 If that policy had passed, the IRC 
proposals may have paved the way for the more general approach to railways articulated in its: 
‘Suggestions on the powers to be given to the Railway Companies and the restrictions to which 
they should be subjected’ - which amounted to a comprehensive reform of railways and the 
system for developing and regulating them in the whole of the UK.130  
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The IRC was systematic, scientific and even holistic in its selection of railways routes - and it used 
an imaginative range of sources and types of information to support its conclusions.  It proposed a 
railway system for Ireland that challenged the plans of private enterprise over 150 years before 
Casson did the same for the rest of the UK - including the same mathematical approach to the 
subject as he adopted 171 years later. Casson praised the later reporting on railway schemes by 
the Railway Department for its logical approach, but those reports were distinctly limited 
compared to the IRC report. The notion of a system was central to the IRC – every line should be 
built as part of a whole system, not simply to serve the various towns through which it passed and 
the profit motives of its investors. 
Ultimately, this well-argued report failed to deliver the changes that it advocated and its 
achievements were largely ignored by historians - and especially railway historians. That is 
because the IRC report had significant weaknesses that prevented its adoption. Above all, the 
document undermined its mathematical, scientific, sociological and economic arguments by its 
ideological approach and political bias.  It addressed and attacked the laissez-faire economic 
policies of the age and the impact that those policies had delivered in Ireland, without regard for 
the power of the political and economic forces that supported laissez-faire.  The IRC also attacked 
the attitudes and behaviour of the Irish landowners that reflected an older form of economic 
relationship between labour and capital than laissez-faire, but were powerful nevertheless. In any 
political context those weaknesses in the report and the attitudes of its authors would have 
presented problems; at a time when the Whig Government was very weak and the Opposition 
was so well led by Sir Robert Peel, the shortcomings in the report were fatal. Peel’s success in 
wrecking the IRC report marked the end of the effort instigated by Henry Archer in 1836 to create 
a scheme that was designed to deliver benefits to Ireland and (to a lesser extent) North Wales. 
That initiative was adopted by government and developed by the IRC into a comprehensive plan 
to regenerate Ireland’s economy.  
The defeat of the IRC hampered the reform agenda in Ireland and contributed to 
O’Connell disillusionment with the Lichfield House compact. It was a factor mentioned by 
O’Connell in his return to a campaign for repeal of the Union, as he despaired of securing lasting 
reform of the relationship with the rest of the UK. It was more important, and certainly so in the 
context of this study, that the defeat of the IRC was also a defeat for a possible new philosophy of 
railway building – a different relationship between a new technology and the politics of the state. 
That philosophy emphasised the connection between building railways and delivering benefits to 
the whole population, rather than just narrower industrial and commercial interests. It 
emphasised economy in  railway construction, integration with existing infrastructure and centres 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
86 
 
of population, construction based on evidence rather than assertion and speculation; and above 
all, strong regulation - even state control - to ensure that benefits were shared fairly.  
Despite its radical approach, the IRC members were not ‘Republican commissioners [with] 
revolutionary purposes’ as The Times had asserted131. The IRC aimed to deal with population 
congestion by encouraging people to move from the land to work on railways and other public 
works, and ultimately gain employment in the factories and extractive industries that the IRC 
believed would emerge after the railways were built. The IRC aimed to modernise Ireland through 
the power of railways as the best means to deal with its social, economic and political issues and 
cement its place in the UK. Although the proposed lines were to be managed and owned by the 
state that was hardly republicanism. Rather, it was part of an overall policy to build better 
governance of Ireland within the UK by ensuring that the Irish economy delivered wealth and 
opportunity to its population, and was connected to the rest of the UK by the most powerful 
communication technology ever known. The aim of the government in using the IRC to guide its 
Irish policy in 1839 was to integrate Ireland within the UK and to secure equality for the former. 
Peel led the successful attack on that approach and was aided by the claims of patronage and 
partiality that tainted the work of the IRC. Once in government in 1841, Peel had the opportunity 
to apply a very different approach to the London – Dublin railway route - and its use in the 
government of Ireland that is analysed in the next chapter. 
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4. The final decision on the London to Dublin railway link 1840-46 
 
‘…a line which affects significant public interests in respect of the communication between England 
[sic] and Ireland. …’1 
 
This chapter addresses the progress of the quest by government for a railway line towards Dublin 
from London after the collapse of the Irish Railway Commission (IRC) proposals in 1839. It 
analyses the period 1840-46, during which decisions by government assisted the Chester and 
Holyhead Railway (CHR) to secure its Act of Parliament, public financial aid and the prospect of a 
virtual monopoly of Dublin rail traffic. Baughen’s study of the CHR in 1972 covered this period and 
concluded that: ‘during the previous Whig administration there had been much talk and no 
action; [Peel] felt that it was time to move’.2  Baughen also noted that Peel had voted against the 
proposal to build the CHR in 1840, so it is difficult to see how his estimate of Peel’s involvement 
could be justified. The evidence of Chapter 3 of this study is that Peel was the architect of the 
failure of the Whigs to make progress with the IRC report (that included a London-Dublin railway 
link) in 1839 as part of its Irish policy. Some 12 years after Baughen, Ellis-Williams offered a 
different view when he suggested that the Whig government had given ‘veiled support’ for the 
CHR in 1840.3 Through an examination of Parliamentary debates, select committee and 
newspapers reports this thesis will provide a more detailed analysis than either Baughen or Ellis-
Williams. It will show that Peel rejected the IRC’s approach to railways in Ireland and the London 
to Dublin rail and sea link but incorporated the latter into his government’s Irish policy primarily in 
the interests of sustaining the UK as a political entity, and he did so without the support O’Connell 
on whom the previous Whig Government had relied. The difference was that Peel backed the CHR 
while the IRC had supported the alternative route to Porth Dinllaen, the PDR. 
Ireland was not a priority for Peel for the first two years of his administration from 1841 as 
Gash makes clear.4 Chartist unrest on mainland Britain consumed most of his domestic attention 
until 1843.5 However, from that year Daniel O’Connell took his campaign for repeal of the Union 
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to the streets.6 In order to assess whether the railway was specifically part of Peel’s Irish policy in 
response to O’Connell, the chronology of the railway development is analysed in this chapter 
alongside events in Ireland. Gash’s account of Peel’s response to that upsurge does not suggest 
any direct connection between O’Connell’s campaign and the revival of the CHR in 1843.7 It was 
established in previous chapters that Peel had a clear view that railways should be built and 
funded independently of the state; and that was underlined in 2016 by Hodgkin’s estimate of 
Peel’s relationship with railways in which he suggested that Peel took no interest in national 
railway policy and did not favour state intervention.8 If Peel departed from that latter approach in 
respect of the CHR, it would tend to show that the CHR was an item of government policy that 
was more important than Peel’s ideological commitment to laissez-faire economics. Having 
agreed to fund the CHR, government had to deal with an unexpected re-emergence of a rival in 
the form of a broad gauge line to Porth Dinllaen proposed by the Great Western Railway (GWR): a 
project that Simmons thought was not credible.9 However, the seriousness of the challenge to the 
CHR in 1846 is worthy of reconsideration in this chapter because the revived PDR passed through 
Porthmadog, which was identified by Dodd as the centre of a ‘regional development scheme’; and 
the new PDR was also sponsored by a large railway company unlike the original proposal from 
Henry Archer.10 The chapter explores how Peel’s Government reached its decision, taking into 
account Ellis-Williams’ 1984 conclusion on the contest between Holyhead and Porth Dinllaen that: 
‘there is nothing more striking than the flat contradictions in the professional evidence’ about 
which port was superior as a packet station and refuge harbour.11  The study will examine the 
influences that were brought to bear in the process of creating the railway link towards Dublin 
and compare the part that professional advice and technical evidence played in the decision, and 
whether it was as influential as the political and economic power of those who contested the 
argument about the best rail and sea route. This chapter explores official reports to show that the 
decisions that were made by government in 1846 effectively prevented the GWR from competing 
with the CHR, and guaranteed the latter’s monopoly of the rail route towards Dublin. 
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4.1 Establishing the credibility of the Chester and Holyhead Railway 1838-40 
 
The IRC was critical of the whole direction of railway policy in England and resistant to its 
adoption in Ireland as noted in the previous chapter – so the defeat of the IRC in March 1839 gave 
heart to those who supported the laissez-faire approach to railway building that was rejected by 
the IRC. In the period before the debate on the IRC proposals, the CHR endeavoured to 
strengthen its position and criticised the PDR for its request for state funding. Once the IRC was 
defeated, the initiative to revive the CHR gathered pace through the Chester and Crewe Railway 
(CCR) which formed a link from the main Liverpool to London line towards Chester, and provided 
the starting point for a railway along the North Wales coast to Holyhead. The CCR was optimistic 
about the project because it perceived that it was potentially an important item in the UK 
government policy towards Ireland – or as it rather elaborately called it: ‘a measure so 
imperiously called for to facilitate intercourse between England and Ireland’.12 The CCR board met 
the engineer Francis Giles in November 1838, and he outlined a scheme for a route from Chester 
to Holyhead that followed the northern North Wales coast and crossed the Menai Straits to 
Anglesey - the main obstacle to its progress.13 He planned to tackle the crossing by use of a 
stationary engine to haul carriages over Telford’s 1826 road bridge.14 
In order to boost the political credentials of the CHR, the CCR then commissioned a report 
from George Stephenson on the relative merits of Vignoles’ PDR route and the CHR.15  The CCR 
had powerful connections - Stephenson’s assistant was Murray Gladstone, a member of a 
prominent family of Liverpool merchants, who had been strong advocates (and financial backers) 
of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway. (LMR)16 The chairman of the CCR was John Uniacke, 
Mayor of Chester, who reflected the importance to the city of connecting with the main line 
between London and Liverpool. Chester Town Council was reluctant to see its link with Irish traffic 
lost to the PDR, which aimed to secure a shorter sea crossing to Dublin than the one from 
Birkenhead which was accessed by rail through its city. George Stephenson was the most 
prominent railway engineer in 1838, and it was his status rather than his judgement that was 
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needed because of the problems the CHR had in showing that it could take a railway over the 
Menai Straits to Holyhead.  Beaufort’s 1836 report, as noted in the last chapter, was sceptical 
about that possibility, and he had rejected the CHR because it also had to cross a wide river at 
Conwy and pass the large rocky promontory at Penmaenmawr before even reaching the Menai 
Straits.  The CHR promoters needed a new report that made light of such problems, restored 
confidence in the CHR and galvanised supporters, financiers and the political powers in London. 
George Stephenson provided exactly what was needed in December 1838, just as the IRC report 
was being considered by politicians in London. Stephenson made the CHR appear easy and 
inexpensive; he proposed to cross the River Dee at Chester with a wooden bridge; regarded the 
threat from the sea along the coast as insignificant; considered the crossing of the rivers at Rhyl 
and Conwy as minor matters, and dismissed the idea that a tunnel was needed to take the line 
beyond the rocky headland at Penmaenmawr. He also agreed with Giles that Telford’s road bridge 
was adequate to carry a railway over the Menai Straits to Anglesey. Crucially, he dismissed the 
rival PDR by observing that the mountainous terrain through which it travelled made it 
‘impracticable for a line of railway’.17 The value of Stephenson’s report in engineering terms may 
be evaluated by subsequent events.  The bridge at Chester (iron rather than wood as he originally 
suggested) collapsed a few weeks after opening in 1847, killing 5 occupants of a train.18 The line 
between Chester and Abergele was breached by the sea.19 Extensive works, including a tunnel, 
were needed at Penmaenmawr - and even these were destroyed by waves soon after opening.20 
Above all, crossing the Conwy River and the Menai Straits required expensive tubular bridges.  
Those difficulties were fully understood in 1839 when Stephenson was writing his report. The 
Railway Magazine, for example, described the plan to use Telford’s suspension bridge for trains 
as: ‘perfectly absurd; in fact, it is monstrous’.21  
The political impact of Stephenson’s report was impressive, even though it was a privately 
commissioned report that would hardly dash the hopes of those who ordered it. The Chester 
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Chronicle had advocated the St George’s Harbour Railway (GHR) from Chester to Llandudno until 
it failed to gain substantial financial or political support in 1839 and was discredited by 1841.22 
With the advent of Stephenson’s report, the Chester Chronicle switched support to the CHR and 
argued for its importance as ‘the great imperial line’. 23 In January 1839, the CHR supporters met 
in Chester and were led by the Marquis of Westminster, head of one of the richest families in 
England and very influential both locally and nationally.24 The meeting was adamant that 
Stephenson’s judgement on the utility of the Menai Bridge was entirely credible and they 
resolved to take the project forward.25  
Irish views were also important to the CHR lobby, especially the influential merchants and 
bankers of Dublin who had previously backed the PDR, as noted in the last chapter. Stephenson’s 
report also provided the catalyst for a meeting of those interests in January 1839 (two weeks after 
the Chester meeting) that was attended by lobbyists from Chester, Shrewsbury and North Wales. 
It was a tense meeting because of the conflicting views of those present and the imminent debate 
on the proposals of the IRC. Daniel O’Connell, the Irish leader, had a difficult role to perform. 
Parliament had still not considered the IRC report and O’Connell was broadly sympathetic to it. 
That report supported the PDR by implication but O’Connell tried to keep all his options open, 
including any new proposals from the CHR supporters. The ‘Liberator’, as O’Connell was known, 
emphasised the need for a route from London towards Dublin, but felt that the meeting should 
not express a preference because the committee he chaired in 1837 had received insufficient 
information to reach a conclusion. In that way, O’Connell was able to support the IRC position 
indirectly but not rule out the CHR. 26  The Irish leader was not concerned about which route 
succeeded so long as communication was improved in order to give Ireland: ‘the influence which 
the increase of facility can afford’ – thereby making clear that the London and Dublin link was a 
technological contribution to his own political ambitions.27 The meeting eventually agreed to urge 
the Government to institute an enquiry to determine the best route. The CHR was frustrated that 
it did not secure clearer Irish support but the PDR lobby was disappointed with the rather neutral 
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conclusions of the Dublin meeting.  As the Chester Chronicle pointed out, the PDR had been well 
placed in 1836 with considerable Irish support in Dublin, but the failure to get their endorsement 
for the scheme in 1839 changed the issue from: ‘one prejudged to one open […] the game is safe 
for Chester’.28 Vignoles had not helped the PDR by failing to attend the Dublin meeting, 
apparently because the prospect of challenging George Stephenson (who did attend) had 
intimidated him; as Vignoles noted: ‘it is almost “bearding the lion in his den” to enter into a 
professional contest with such a high authority’.29 That underlined the political value of 
Stephenson to the CHR – he was able to silence opposition by his reputation alone. There was 
optimism in Chester because political interests in the city considered that the Dublin link would 
pass through its city irrespective of whether the terminus was Holyhead or Porth Dinllaen - 
because the coastal route could potentially serve either port, as shown in Figure 4.1 below.30  The 
CHR gained further ground from the support of Anglesey landowners such as Sir Richard Bulkeley, 
who assured a Holyhead meeting that he had the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s word that there 
would be no public funding for the PDR. As for the CHR, he reported that he had solid information 
that major railway companies in England were ready to fund it.  All it needed was landowner 
support - and the CHR got that at the meeting.31 It seems likely that Bulkeley had the London and 
Birmingham Railway (LBR) in mind when he spoke of the support of railway companies, thus 
confirming that the CHR was backed by the most powerful English railway.32 That was sufficient 
for the Mining Journal to conclude that the CHR could not fail.33 
O’Connell knew the IRC proposals and the PDR were doomed after Peel’s opposition in 
Parliament in March 1839 as noted in the last chapter.34  Nevertheless, he did not abandon his 
hope of a railway link to Dublin, and within two weeks of the parliamentary vote on the IRC the 
issue of the railway connection with London was raised at the Dublin Chamber of Commerce 
meeting. The chamber was impressed by Stephenson’s claim that the CHR was £1 million cheaper 
than the PDR, and that the confidence created by his views had led to a company being 
established to build the line.35 The chamber considered that Holyhead provided faster 
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communication with London than Liverpool and decided unanimously to petition the Government 
in favour of the CHR if the ‘work is practicable’- a comment that suggested that there was still 
concern about whether crossing the Menai Straits by railway was possible.36 That overturned 
resolutions of the chamber in 1838, when it had doubted that the CHR was feasible.37 Thus, 
O’Connell cleverly switched his commitment to the CHR and abandoned the PDR without any 
personal intervention. He also delivered the Irish lobby to the CHR and thereby added to its 
political momentum. The Chester Chronicle was jubilant: ‘No longer is it a matter admitting of 
further controversy, as to either the principle or the details. Those are settled in favour of [the 
CHR]. One thing is certain; the [PDR] is gone-gone’.38 The CHR was thus well placed to go to 
Westminster with the Irish business community and major Anglesey landowners behind it; and 
with the vital political support of Daniel O’Connell on whom the Whig Government still relied. 
Peel had defeated the radical IRC and its linked PDR scheme in 1839 - and created a new 
opportunity for the CHR; all the CHR needed to proceed in 1840 was political support in 
parliament – and money.  
 
4.2 The Chester and Holyhead Railway in Parliament 1840  
 
The process of building political support for the CHR ahead of a Parliamentary debate was led by 
O’Connell, just as he had led the PDR in 1836. As in 1836, O’Connell led a deputation to Chancellor 
Spring Rice that included a number of those who were present in Dublin in March 1839.  Spring 
Rice was clear on the need to secure parliamentary support and he urged O’Connell to refer the 
matter to ‘competent and disinterested parties to decide’ and thereby remove the element of 
party dispute.39 That was an implied criticism of the impartiality of the IRC, just three weeks after 
its report had been debated in Parliament, and it was a classic use of technical expertise to avoid 
political difficulties in the manner suggested by Barry and discussed in chapter 1.40 Robert 
Stephenson completed his report on behalf of a Provisional Committee of the ‘Great Holyhead 
Railway’ in April 1839 - and firmly established the viability of the proposed line.41 O’Connell then 
sought clarification from Lord Morpeth on 25 June 1839 on his intentions for Irish railways and 
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the link to London in the wake of the IRC defeat. Morpeth did not follow Spring Rice’s example of 
1836 and implicate the state in the project; instead he made clear that it was up to private capital 
to fund the CHR and the state would only consider becoming involved if it failed.42 These 
necessary stages towards a bid for the CHR were completed by August 1839, when O’Connell 
successfully requested a report from experts to be appointed by government to decide between 
the four competing railway schemes (Giles and Stephenson’s versions of the CHR, the PDR and the 
GHR as described in Chapter 2) and the three possible harbours (Holyhead, Llandudno and Porth 
Dinllaen) that might complete the London to Dublin railway and sea link. 43 The report in 1840 
expressed a clear preference for Stephenson’s CHR, Vignoles performed weakly in promoting the 
PDR, suggesting only that his scheme would: ‘upon full and detailed and impartial investigation, 
be found the most desirable’.44 Sir Frederic Smith and Professor Barlow (the report’s authors) 
were unimpressed and could not see any reason to support the PDR.45 The GHR line that was 
proposed to terminate at Llandudno was discounted because it did not provide any clear 
advantage over the Liverpool route or the other two proposals.46 The report authors preferred 
Stephenson’s line to Holyhead to that proposed by Giles on grounds of cost.47 They also referred 
to the report prepared by Rear Admiral Sir J. A. Gordon and Captain Beechey, which clearly 
favoured Holyhead as the best harbour.48 That concluded the issue - and Holyhead was chosen for 
both the harbour and the railway.49 
Vignoles’ approach suggested an attitude of resignation to defeat by the PDR but its 
supporters continued to argue that Porth Dinllaen was the best harbour, even if the line along the 
coast was chosen, as it avoided the need to cross the Menai Straits (Figure 4.1). Gordon and 
Beechey’s report merely noted this variation on the CHR and referred it back to government.50 
Thus, in the short time since the IRC had been debated in March 1839, the PDR had been 
supported and then dropped, while the CHR had established itself as the favoured route from 
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London towards Dublin despite being previously ruled out ahead of the IRC’s deliberations. The 
CHR’s rapid political recovery was a tribute to the efforts of its supporters in creating a coalition 
between Irish and Welsh interests that was backed by Chester Town Council and important 
railway companies such as the LBR. However, the CHR had not achieved any official status in 
government policy – and the prospect of money - as the PDR had done through its inclusion in the 
IRC report. That was to prove a weakness for its supporters. 
 
Figure 4.1 Variations on the original rail routes through Wales 
 
 
The Original map appeared in 1840, London and Dublin, &c. communication. Reports to the Lords of the Treasury and Admiralty, 
relative to the best means of communicating between London and Dublin, 54, 1840 (250) XLV.277. 
 
There was powerful support for the CHR nationally, notably from Sir Robert Peel, who had 
done much to wreck the IRC and its radical approach, and had cleared the way for the CHR in 
parliament through a question to the Government that confirmed that it did not intend to fund 
any line towards Dublin.51  Chester political interests responded quickly and John Uniacke, Mayor 
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of Chester, told the Town Council that he was confident that the projected line from the city to 
Holyhead would proceed.52 A meeting in London in May 1840 was attended by important CHR 
personnel and chaired by the Marquis of Westminster, who confirmed the confidence expressed 
by Uniacke. The meeting particularly noted that the LBR and the Dublin Chamber of Commerce 
supported them, and then unanimously endorsed a proposal to proceed to parliament to obtain 
approval for the CHR.53 It was Captain Dundas, a Flintshire landowner and former senior naval 
officer, who rather dampened enthusiasm when he identified a procedural problem.54  
Parliamentary standing orders stipulated that no scheme could be brought before parliament in 
the same session in which notification of it had been given; and a deposit of 10 per cent of the 
total cost of any project was also required.  55 CHR supporters needed to secure the suspension of 
those orders if the scheme was to proceed in 1840.56 If the CHR failed in 1840 it could not go 
forward before the session of 1842.57 Money was a significant problem because although the CHR 
had criticised the IRC for requesting state funding for railways, it concluded in 1840 that public 
money was needed for its own scheme in lieu of the 10 per cent deposit requirement.  It argued 
that it was available through saving £77,953 from the concentration of all Irish mail traffic at 
Holyhead rather than using Liverpool and Milford Haven as well, giving an effective monopoly of 
the Irish mail contract to the CHR.58 That was the same argument used by O’Connell in his support 
of the PDR in 1836 as noted in Chapter 2 – but it was enhanced by the CHR which suggested that 
public money and a monopoly of traffic was justified because completion of the CHR was ‘an 
imperial question’ – i.e. an item of public policy.59   
The position was confirmed when the CHR provided the Government with a summary of 
its case in advance of the Parliamentary debate that it had secured. It argued that the IRC had 
raised expectations of public funding and that had effectively deterred private investors from 
coming forward so that according to the CHR’s advocates, it was government’s duty to provide 
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funds.60 Grosvenor (Marquis of Westminster) told Parliament that the CHR case had the support 
of impartial experts and that no landowners objected; so the normal period of notice for a 
scheme required by standing orders was unnecessary. On the vital issue of money, the marquis 
thought the deposit of 10 per cent should be waived because of the national importance of the 
project, and because the CHR would save the country £70,000 per annum as detailed above. 
Daniel O’Connell confirmed the support of the Dublin Chamber of Commerce and trusted that 
Irish interests would not be frustrated by a procedural technicality. In response, government 
ministers acknowledged that the railway had a national status but were unwilling to support a 
departure from standing orders even in support of O’Connell, which rather suggested that his 
agreement with government was nearing its end.61 Sir Robert Peel spoke for the Opposition and 
although he agreed with government’s position, he concluded rather perversely that he would be: 
‘exceedingly sorry if the standing orders were enforced […] as they posed an obstacle to the 
commencement of the work next year [but] he had the highest interest in coming to that 
conclusion’.62 The attorney-general encouraged Peel to support the CHR by noting that the 
proposal was untainted by speculation and was a truly national project. 63 Nevertheless, the 
motion to suspend standing orders was narrowly lost and Peel’s intervention was influential, just 
as it had been in the debate on the IRC proposals in 1839.64 All sides agreed that the CHR was a 
worthy project, but government was not willing to adopt it as part of Irish policy - so the measure 
was lost. 
The explanation for Peel’s approach had several elements. There was the suggestion that 
the scheme might be publicly funded, which was something that he had argued against in respect 
of the IRC. Peel may also have been unwilling to support Daniel O’Connell, who had sustained the 
Whigs in power since 1835, and with whom he had a poor relationship. He could also have been 
suspicious that the Government was hoping to lure him into the trap of supporting a case in which 
he had ‘the highest interest’. Peel had family links to the LBR supporters of the CHR, the 
Birmingham committee of which was chaired by his brother Edmund Peel.65 As recently as 1839, 
Peel had publicly declared his: ‘confidence in the good sense, honour and justice’ of the LBR and 
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so could hardly have been seen as neutral in a project that favoured its interests.66 Additionally, 
Peel argued for the ‘shortest line’ which had the potential to build a case for a line through his 
own land and constituency at Tamworth (see Figure 4.1). Only the CHR could include Tamworth, 
whereas Birmingham was on (or close to) both the PDR and CHR routes - but Peel needed time to 
galvanise the Trent Valley Railway that would deliver what he wanted.  Peel was also aware that 
the Whig government was nearing its end, and he may have preferred to see the CHR postponed 
until he was able to influence its direction, including the Tamworth connection. Even so, the 
wording of his opposition is such as to suggest that he half-hoped that the measure would pass in 
1840.  
The defeat of the CHR encouraged PDR supporters, who claimed that the reports in 
favour of Holyhead contained: ‘assertions the most unfounded and recommendations the most 
mischievous’.67 W. O. Stanley, M.P. for Holyhead complained about the slur cast on him and 
others by the specific claim that he had acted to secure a bias in the reports in favour of the town.  
That seemed to concern the role of Captain Beechey, who had previously acted for other parties, 
and had advocated Holyhead before undertaking the supposedly impartial government 
commission.68 The greater problem for the CHR was that it lacked funding in June 1840, as was 
made clear when a select committee considered the question of the suspension of standing 
orders for the CHR proposal.69 Mayor John Uniacke had to admit that CHR funding was ‘very 
trifling’, so that the select committee then confirmed that there were no grounds to suspend 
standing orders and the CHR was condemned to wait until 1842.70  
The Chester Chronicle expressed its fury at the outcome, especially towards Tory MPs 
whom it largely blamed for the loss.71 In parliament meanwhile, the PDR group attacked the idea 
of public money being spent on the CHR, claiming that both the Menai Bridge and Holyhead 
Harbour were not fit for purpose - and they demanded a further enquiry to prove that point.72 In 
August 1840, the Chester Chronicle noted that: ‘scarcely a day passes but produces some 
additional fact in favour of the Great Holyhead railway project’ - but there was little to support its 
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optimism.73 The main frustration for its PDR opponents was the lack of a railway between their 
line and Wolverhampton that would provide the connection to a main line for their scheme 
similar to that provided for their opponents by the Chester and Crewe line. The PDR supporters 
urged the local landowners to: ‘strenuously co-operate […] and frustrate the designs of the [CHR] 
clique’.74 In November 1840, the battle continued in Shrewsbury against its: ‘wary and vigilant 
antagonist the Chester Chronicle [to demonstrate] the superiority of Port Dynllaen to Holyhead as 
a Welsh terminus to an Imperial line’. The Shrewsbury News praised the Earl of Powis and others 
for their efforts, but seemed worried by the lack of response from local communities.75 The 
Chester Chronicle noted similar ‘apathy in the public mind’ in December 1840, but also reason to 
believe that a change was imminent because of discussions between the Grand Junction Railway 
(GJR), whose line linked Birmingham and Liverpool, and government. The paper was still adamant 
that: ‘the project be taken up on Imperial grounds, and in fact be made an Imperial work’.76 In 
other words it needed to become an element of the UK government’s Irish policy and publicly 
funded, as it had not been when it failed in Parliament in June 1840. 
Thus, the rail and sea link to Ireland remained a stubbornly local dispute rather than an 
item of national policy, as it had potentially been when supported by the IRC report. The prospect 
of a general election began to overshadow all else politically in London until August 1841 when 
Peel, the man who had frustrated both schemes for railway communication between London and 
Dublin, became Prime Minister.77 Despite his vote against the CHR in June 1840, the arrival of 
Peel’s Government clearly favoured the CHR - he had made positive references to the scheme in 
1840, even as he voted against it. As Prime Minister from 1841 he had the opportunity to give 
practical support for the CHR by making it part of his Irish policy. 
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4.3 Sir Robert Peel’s Irish policy and the Chester and Holyhead Railway 1841-44 
 
In 1841-42 Chartism was at its height and there were other major national security issues that 
were more of a priority for government than rapid rail access to Ireland.78 However, the future 
value of such a link was strengthened in this period because it became clear that: ‘the influence of 
railroads in securing the peace of the country has been strikingly exemplified. […] This new power 
enables Government to make a small force equal in efficiency to a large army.79 The situation in 
Ireland was less problematic for government than domestic unrest until 1842 because O’Connell’s 
party was reduced from the 39 to 18 in the 1841 election - showing that he had reaped few 
rewards from his cooperation with Melbourne’s Whig Government.80 The Irish leader was 
returned to parliament by Cork but knew that he had a much reduced status with the new 
government.81 Peel signalled his intention to undo the work of the Whigs in Ireland when he 
appointed Earl de Grey as Lord Lieutenant in Ireland – a man who was not in sympathy with the 
former regime at Dublin Castle.82  Peel thereby gave new life to O’Connell’s bid to break the Union 
between Britain and Ireland.83  
The first sign of change for the CHR occurred in March 1842 when government ministers 
were in Caernarfon and the mayor of that town met Home Secretary Graham on a matter of 
‘important public business’.84  While that business was not specified, the same issue of the North 
Wales Chronicle noted that Irish and Welsh MPs had asked for government support for a railway 
through Bangor to a suitable packet station.85 Those representations produced the desired result, 
and in June 1842 a further select committee was appointed to re-investigate the whole issue of 
railway connection between London and Dublin - and the period of national inactivity on the rail 
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link that had endured since June 1840 was over. The CHR again suggested that its line should be 
funded by concentrating all Dublin mail onto one route rather than sharing it between three.86 It 
had a novel additional suggestion that the railway should also manage ships on behalf of 
government on the route to Dublin.87 That approach was supported by the committee in its 
report which backed the route along the coast from Chester rather than the PDR, but did not 
reach a conclusion on the best harbour – preferring to urge government to appoint yet another 
committee to advise on that issue.88  
O’Connell continued conventional lobbying for a time, and was even a member of the 
group that petitioned the Government in response to the 1842 select committee that re-
examined the London to Dublin railway and sea route. His close supporters were prominent at 
meetings, as were interested parties from the Great Western Railway (GWR) which supported the 
PDR, an important development given the status of the GWR as a major national railway which 
could provide the finance that had been lacking in the earlier PDR scheme.  Dublin political and 
financial interests considered that there was little to choose between Holyhead and Porth 
Dinllaen in 1842, in contrast to their 1839 support for Holyhead - and their 1836 support for Porth 
Dinllaen.89  Irish landowners were also active and the Earl of Wicklow reported on a meeting in 
March 1843 at which Peel told him that government would not fund the CHR but were ready to 
listen to proposals from responsible companies to build the line. If a suitable company came 
forward he would implement the select committee report of 1842.90 Thus Peel signalled that the 
CHR could become an element of his Irish policy. 
That 1843 report from the Earl of Wicklow was greeted with cheers, reflecting growing 
concern with the state of Ireland that was clearly shared by leading members of government.91 On 
9 May 1843, Viscount Jocelyn posed a convenient question to Peel in Parliament that highlighted 
worries about security in Ireland. He wished to know whether the Government was:  
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 Aware of the fearful excitement which has prevailed for some weeks past in Ireland [and] whether 
or not the Government is determined to maintain, at all risks and hazards, the inviolability of the 
legislative union between Great Britain and Ireland?92 
 
 
Peel was clear that his Government was: 
 
 
Fully alive to the evils which arise from the existing agitation [and] that there is no influence, no 
power, no authority, […] which shall not be exercised for the purpose of maintaining the Union—
the dissolution of which would involve, not merely the repeal of an act of Parliament, but the 
dismemberment of this great empire.93 
 
 
Peel clearly thereby confirmed that the issue of the Union was a vital part of government policy - 
but would railways be counted among the influences, powers and authorities that he would use? 
The next day he was asked about forming railways in Ireland, but was clear in his response that his 
priority was to use railways for English, rather than Irish, interests. That marked a clear contrast 
with the IRC, which had taken a decidedly Irish perspective in its work. Peel told parliament that 
his Government was interested: ‘rather to facilitate the communication between England and 
Ireland than to aid in the construction of railways in the latter country’.94 A further statement by 
Peel reinforced that interpretation when he refused to address the question of: ‘how far an 
improved communication with Ireland from this country may tend to facilitate the introduction of 
railroads in the former’? He preferred to focus on: ‘the subject of communication between this 
country and Ireland with a view to its improvement’.95 It is difficult not to conclude that there was 
a connection between this use of more rapid railway communication between London and Dublin 
and Peel’s desire to stop the momentum of O’Connell’s drive to repeal the Union of Britain and 
Ireland. Peel had articulated railways as part of his Irish policy at a time when he saw that the 
Union was in danger. 
In 1843 there was a mounting crisis in Ireland, as O’Connell made a direct appeal to the 
populace which drew financial support and attendance at very large meetings.96 Until that 
moment there had been no clear connection between the building of the line towards Dublin and 
government concerns over the security of the Union. The lack of progress from 1840 to 1842 
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showed that the CHR was not important enough to gain public funding unless there was a political 
imperative. Between 1836 and 1839, the IRC had aimed to build the Union through constructive 
engagement, with O’Connell as a willing collaborator and advocate. Peel’s position, as articulated 
in May 1843, appeared very different. Earlier attempts by Grosvenor and Welsh landowners to 
secure the CHR for ‘imperial purposes’ - as they saw it - in May 1840 received very little response 
from London and as noted above, Peel voted against its scheme. But once O’Connell moved from 
cooperation with the Whigs to a full challenge to Peel’s Tory Government and the  Union, the 
credentials of the CHR as part of Irish policy manifested themselves at a time when: ‘the policy of 
conciliation was […] exhausted’.97 But this was clearly a different Irish policy from that suggested 
by the IRC. The Home Secretary James Graham was challenged about his opposition to the railway 
proposals of the IRC.98 Unlike the IRC, Graham could see no case for railways in Ireland:  
 
 
No railways succeed or are in a material degree valuable to the public interest, except those which 
unite large seats of manufacturing industry with each other, or with the capital, and in the present 
state of Ireland, a country purely agricultural, the advantage of railways, I am convinced, would not 
be at all in correspondence with the expense.99 
 
 
Viscount Howick, who had a record of challenging laissez-faire railway developments, emphasised 
the difference between the 1843 policy of government on railways in Ireland, as expressed by 
Peel and Graham, and that of the IRC explored in Chapter 3.100 Howick told parliament that the 
IRC scheme had been aimed at:  
 
 
Creating a demand for labour, and causing trade and manufactures to spring up where they had 
been unknown before [so that] in a certain number of years a demand would have been created 
for labour, which would have had the effect of rendering land no longer indispensable to the Irish 
labourer as a means of existence…101 
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By contrast, the focus of Peel and his government was apparently not to create a viable Irish 
manufacturing economy as argued by the IRC. That is consistent with the notion that the British 
Government saw Ireland as a necessary source of cheap food as argued by Kinealy in 1999.102 That 
notion was reinforced by the creation of the Devon Commission that examined landlord and 
tenant relationships rather than attempting to reduce the status of the land issue in Irish politics, 
which had been an aim of the IRC proposals, as confirmed by Viscount Howick.  The Devon 
Commission provided a summary of important reports from the 1830s but did not include that of 
the IRC. That is a remarkable omission given the scope of the IRC report, the fact that it addressed 
the issue of land and that it proposed a solution to that issue.103 The Government’s priority in 
1843 was a railway on the British mainland that accessed Dublin as part of its Irish policy, rather 
than railways in Ireland to develop the Irish economy, reduce dependence on land and relieve 
distress there. 
The CHR proposal moved quickly under pressure from government, and in a further 
survey of harbours, Captains Back and Fair were unequivocal in their support for Holyhead. They 
thought that Porth Dinllaen was unsuitable as a port for Dublin traffic in contrast to previous 
“expert” advice.104 Still there was no consensus on the best route. For example, there was a 
meeting in June 1843 at the London home of Colonel Douglas Pennant, a prominent North Wales 
slate owner. Attendees were clear that a mere naval report was inadequate because it failed to 
make a comprehensive case for the CHR. They considered that public confidence required that an 
eminent civil engineer be appointed in order to give credibility to any decision.105  James Walker, a 
prominent engineer, was appointed to provide such a report.106 In July 1843, The Times reported 
that government supported the CHR, but that the work would have to be funded from the public 
purse because there would be little local traffic on the line.107 By October 1843, the matter was 
urgent as the Repeal movement in Ireland reached its peak with the arrest of O’Connell after his 
planned ‘monster meeting’ at Clontarf was banned on Peel’s orders.108 Walker’s report did not 
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settle the matter of the CHR any more clearly than the previous one had.  It appeared in the 
Morning Post in full in October 1843 and included a consideration that had not been a part of 
previous plans for the CHR but had been mentioned by the IRC - the needs of the Welsh 
population.  Walker noted that if the: ‘thinly populated and mountainous part of the country’ did 
not get a railway as part of the line towards Dublin then it would be a long time before they 
benefited from any railway communication.109 Like Back and Fair, Walker favoured Holyhead, 
subject to improvements in the harbour and the provision of a breakwater at a cost of 
£400,000.110 That appeared to mark significant progress for the CHR. 
Walker made a number of technical points about the proposed railway that proved 
influential in the longer term - and supported Peel’s emphasis on speed of communication rather 
than economy of construction. In contrast to the frugal approach of the IRC, he suggested that the 
line be: ‘made in a good manner, as a great public work […] even if the traffic upon it were for 
some time small’.111 He dispensed with Stephenson’s plans for using the Menai suspension bridge 
in favour of a separate railway bridge, and he concluded controversially that Holyhead might be 
reached by an inland route rather than along the coast – perhaps the inland route of the PDR.112 
That provided some encouragement for the PDR that it attempted to use in 1846. It may have 
been Walker’s comments that led William Gladstone, President of the Board of Trade, to write 
privately to his father in November 1843 about a meeting with John Moss, Chairman of the GJR: 
‘The scheme of railway communication with Holyhead is on the carpet and he [Moss] seems to 
contemplate that the L&B [London and Birmingham] and GJR [Grand Junction Railway] companies 
should make a proposal to Government to undertake it’.113 That was a measure of the 
Government’s frustration at its failure to accelerate the CHR. 
Unsurprisingly, the Chester Chronicle thought all debate was at an end.114  The CHR took 
the same view, and by December 1843 it had deposited Parliamentary notices and books of 
reference necessary for parliamentary approval.115 In Dublin, while O’Connell was awaiting trial, a 
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meeting of senior Irish figures pressed government to endorse the CHR and especially the 
monopoly of postal traffic to the city from mainland Britain. The meeting also heard voices of 
dissent, especially from those who sympathised with the PDR. They demonstrated an increasing 
interest in the issue on behalf of the GWR that was beginning to challenge the power of the LBR 
and GJR in England - but the momentum was firmly with the CHR. 116  The Morning Post noted the 
use of the railway, alongside the steamboat, to support the Government policy in Ireland that was 
focused on law enforcement rather than social and economic reform: ‘The steam-boat and the 
railway are great marplots – and indeed, have afforded practical proof that an Irish insurrection is 
[…] almost a hopeless thing’.117 The paper (and government) got a practical demonstration of the 
need to improve the speed of communication in the announcement of the verdict in Dublin 
against O’Connell at the end of his trial.  Its reporter arrived in London on 12 February 1844 at 2 
am, having left Dublin at midnight on Saturday: ‘by means of a steam-boat engaged for the 
purpose and a special train on the railway’ – a journey of 26 hours.118 Just five days later, Peel 
received a private letter on the notepaper of the LBR, giving him the news that success for the 
CHR was finally in prospect as the LBR would support it financially. The letter was from Richard 
Creed, LBR company secretary - and the tone and private nature of the letter suggested that there 
was a close friendship between the two men: 
 
 
As you will probably be desirous of knowing what passed at the last General Meeting […] on the 
subject of the [CHR]. I have taken the liberty of sending you one of our reports. I may also venture 
to hope from the kindness I have always received at your hands that a strong and unanimous 
expression of the meeting in favour of a Testimonial for the Company [i.e. the CHR] to their 
secretary may gratify you.119 
 
 
Peel’s reply was equally warm and enthusiastic: ‘I rejoice in the unanimous and well merited 
testimony in your exertions and services that was shown at the meeting of the proprietors’. The 
personal connection between them was further emphasised as Peel hoped that Creed had: 
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‘recovered from the indisposition under which you were labouring when I last saw you’. 120 More 
practically, that liaison eventually delivered £1 million of capital for the CHR from the LBR - hence 
Peel’s rejoicing - a strong emotion from a notoriously cool character.121  That settled the logistics 
of the scheme; government would build the harbour at Holyhead and leave the LBR to make the 
railway.122 Peel had secured the CHR as part of his Irish policy and had not compromised his 
commitment to the private funding of railways. 
 The timing of these exchanges between Peel and the LBR is significant. In February 1844, 
Peel began to articulate a more positive approach to governing Ireland, with less reliance on force 
and more concessions to the emerging Irish Roman Catholic middle class. But railways were 
equally useful in that approach, as they had been in Peel’s tougher stance in 1843 that had first 
encouraged him to pursue more rapid access to Dublin. Gash outlined the important parts of 
Peel’s new Irish policy as being maintenance of the Union and the Church of Ireland, equality for 
Catholics and Protestants in the service of the state, equality in voting rights between Ireland and 
the rest of the UK, financial support for Catholic clergy, more funds for schools and Irish academic 
education.123 His account misses out the substance of this study – the creation of more rapid 
communication between London and Dublin. It is no coincidence that Peel’s exchange with Creed, 
the secretary of the LBR, took place during a debate about the repeal of the Union in February 
1844, and within a few days of O’Connell’s release from prison and his re-appearance in the 
House of Commons after his conviction was overturned.124 It was a dangerous moment for the 
Union between Britain and Ireland. Peel outlined the features noted by Gash as he described his 
policy towards Ireland – and he added one more that Gash did not mention - just five days after 
Peel received the favourable reply from Creed. He argued that Ireland could be governed 
effectively without the use of force and based his case on a technological solution: ‘the wonderful 
applications of science to bring Dublin nearer to London than many towns in England now are’.125 
That statement was the fulfilment of the comments he had made about communication between 
London and Dublin in 1843 that were noted earlier, albeit the policy in 1844 was more 
conciliatory than a year before. It shows specifically that by early 1844 the building of the CHR 
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was not necessarily about enforcement and the potential to transport troops but was specifically 
part of a new policy of governing Ireland: ‘by the ordinary rules by which a country should be 
governed’ – a phrase that Peel linked to improved railway connection in his parliamentary 
speech.126  Railway communication had been trailed in The Times in December 1843, where the 
CHR was noted as part of a more constructive approach to Ireland.127  The Duke of Wellington 
reinforced that element of government policy as he considered that: ‘there could be no object 
more interesting than to render the communication with Ireland as expeditious and convenient as 
possible’.128 No doubt the Duke, as head of the British Army, was interested in the carriage of 
troops – but that was not the primary purpose for which the CHR was envisaged in Peel’s 1844 
Irish policy. Contemporary newspapers understood that the CHR was a feature of Peel’s Irish 
policy, and one of which they approved. One London paper considered that the CHR was ‘the true 
way’ to carry out legislative union: ‘spontaneously and silently [with advantages] to the whole 
empire’.129 The Chester Chronicle agreed and considered that the revenue from goods and 
passengers was unimportant, and what mattered was that the CHR was the means to provide a: 
‘mechanical union of the two kingdoms which nothing less forcible than political disruption can 
repeal’.130 
The CHR also had the advantage of serving Peel’s more local constituency interests that 
he had defined in 1839 as ‘paramount to every other’.131 Expert opinion was clearly divided 
between Holyhead and Porth Dinllaen but ‘the great weight of opinion’ favoured Porth Dinllaen 
according to at least one railway journal.132 Any combination of line and port would have 
improved communication with Ireland in the way that Peel envisaged. But Peel had local political 
and personal interests in securing the Trent Valley Railway (TVR) through his constituency of 
Tamworth that connected to the CHR and shortened the distance between London and Holyhead 
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compared to the route from London via Birmingham (see figure 4.1). When the TVR eventually 
opened in 1847, a local newspaper was clear that it was Peel who had revived the scheme that 
had failed in 1844. He had done so when he had suggested that the line which would contribute 
most to lessen the distance between London and Dublin and should receive the sanction and 
support of government.133 In backing the CHR, he also built the case for the TVR and ensured that 
it was constructed. In addition to the advantages he claimed for it on the Irish route, the TVR also 
cut the London to Manchester distance. Peel’s family had made its money from cotton, and his 
efforts with the TVR showed that he continued to support the capital city of the cotton industry in 
Britain by giving it a shorter route to the capital.134 His personal engagement in the detail of the 
CHR was remarkable, given his apparent opposition to government involvement in railway 
building and the other pressures on his time. In January 1844 he: ‘manifested the most perfect 
acquaintance with the subject’.135 James Walker wrote to him directly in September 1844 with a 
detailed summary of his views on the issues he covered in his CHR report. Among those issues 
was Walker’s concern about the impact of the CHR on the existing London to Holyhead road in 
Anglesey, where road and rail were close together. Walker wrote: ‘surely attention ought to be 
paid to the safety of those who may prefer travelling by this magnificent road after the Railway 
shall be opened’.136 Peel dismissed this with a marginal note: ‘I do not think there is much weight 
in [this] objection’.137 His priority was speed, and was apparently a long way from the IRC concern 
that railways should be inexpensive and not duplicate state-funded infrastructure. 
Peel had done much to promote the CHR during 1843 when it was important to his Irish 
policy, and he remained closely involved in the following year as the CHR struggled through the 
Parliamentary process. His commitment appeared to combine a local interest in the railways 
through his constituency and a strategic interest in reinforcing London’s grip on the government 
of Ireland, with reduced reliance on the use of force. The CHR was quick to build on its political 
advantage. Lord Grosvenor pressed Peel on his attitude to Holyhead and secured the 
Government’s final decision in favour of the CHR. Peel’s answer in parliament showed how much 
care he had taken to get consensus on the decision after: ‘the impartiality of the persons who 
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made the report’ had been questioned and he asserted government support for Holyhead.  138  In 
March 1844, his personal involvement was shown clearly when he wrote privately to William 
Gladstone, President of the Board of Trade, in previously unpublished correspondence, and asked 
him to see Walker. He explained that Walker was: 
 
 
Engaged by the Government to survey the harbour at Holyhead and the line generally; […] a line 
which affects significant public interests in respect of the communication between England and 
Ireland. The Committee has the matter closely watched. The line ought not to pass over the Menai 
Bridge.139 
 
 
 Gladstone clearly responded, and in May 1844 argued for the inclusion of a member of the 
Government, Sir George Clerk, on the Committee considering the CHR. Gladstone cited public 
interests to support this approach and Peel backed him because public money was involved.140  
That was unusual because railway bills were private measures and were generally considered by 
committees consisting of MPs with local interests, who may not have had any particular 
knowledge of railways. The Government was not usually directly represented on the committees 
and it did not consider individual railways in the context of national interests.141 That was further 
evidence of its wish to secure rapid approval of the CHR as its Irish policy developed. The CHR was 
an exceptional railway – a politically generated railway - so it engaged the attention of the most 
senior figures in government. Thus, when there were further objections to Holyhead yet another 
report was commissioned by the Government from engineer James Rendel in May 1844.142 That 
report removed the remaining objections to Holyhead. Rendel also quashed a final bid by the 
Shrewsbury lobby to cut across North Wales via Mold and avoid Chester to reach the coast at 
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Abergele as advocated by engineer Francis Giles (see Figure 4.1). Rendel thought that route was 
unsuitable: ‘for a line where great speed would have to be resorted to’.143  
The PDR supporters were incensed by Rendel’s involvement as he was the engineer of the 
Birkenhead Dock Company which shared the same promoters, solicitor and agent as the CHR.  The 
PDR alleged that the company also held £70,000 in CHR shares.144 It was all to no avail. In June 
1844, Lord Dalhousie confirmed Holyhead as the favoured port and the grant of money to 
improve the harbour there - but only when the best line of railway was secured across the Menai 
Straits.145 The Duke of Wellington reinforced Peel’s private comments to Gladstone and made 
clear that unless the CHR built a new bridge the line would not be approved. 146  Once that was 
resolved, the measure cleared Parliament and received the Royal Assent on 4 July 1844.  
 
4.4 Public funding for the Chester and Holyhead Railway 
 
The CHR was unlike other railways in the Victorian period because it was a specific item of 
government policy and was supported financially and politically by government. That contrasts 
with Casson’s notion of Victorian railways being: ‘constructed entirely by private enterprise with 
minimal state subsidies’.147 Peel played a crucial role in the development of the line and was a 
generally a strong advocate of laissez-faire. As early as 1835, he had made clear that he would 
support railways: ‘on all occasions [if] they will succeed as speculations and prove a profitable 
investment’.148 It was against that background that Peel negotiated with the CHR in 1844. By then 
he had already acquired a reputation for: ‘his infidelity to every opinion and principle’.149 He used 
those abilities in full by providing government funding for the CHR in support of his Irish policy, 
while appearing to sustain his commitment to laissez-faire. His change in direction did not mean 
that Peel had abandoned his economic philosophy. Peel was a pragmatist: ‘who regarded 
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government intervention as an occasionally justified exception to the general principle of laissez-
faire.”150  
The negotiation between government and the CHR provided such an ‘occasionally 
justified exception’. On 11 January 1844 The CHR offered to carry the mail for £40,000 per annum 
with limitations on the number and speed of trains and excluded the cost of a bridge over the 
Menai Straits.151  The Government confirmed that it was inclined towards Holyhead rather than 
Porth Dinllaen but wanted a new bridge rather than using the road bridge.152 That was a personal 
decision by Peel, as shown by his letter to Gladstone in March in which he ordered that: ‘the line 
must not pass over the Menai Bridge’.153 On 19 January 1844 the CHR sought confirmation of the 
Government’s intentions to build a harbour as the parties sought a consensus, apart from the GJR, 
which was concerned at the costs involved.154  The GJR dropped out on 8 February 1844.155 John 
Moss of the GJR was flattered by the seniority of the ministers involved in the negotiation when 
he wrote to Gladstone’s father: ‘I ventured to say that I thought we had cause to be proud of 
having such talent as Peel, Graham and Clerk to meet a set of traders!!!’156 That was another 
measure of the importance of the CHR to government. 
The negotiations covered issues such as the provision of a harbour at Holyhead at public 
expense, payment for the bridge over the Menai Straits and whether the traffic on the line would 
provide a satisfactory return on investment. Eventually, the CHR agreed to meet the cost of the 
bridge and the Government accepted that it must guarantee: ‘the company a return of five per 
cent per annum on the capital subscribed’ as the line was unlikely to be commercially viable 
without that support.157 That showed the importance of these negotiations, conducted as they 
were against a background of serious debate in parliament about the governance of Ireland. The 5 
per cent guarantee amounted to public funding of the line and was very different from Peel’s 
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stated belief in private construction of the railways. The fact that this was public funding of the 
LBR was clear at the time – its secretary referred to it as a ‘grant’ in August 1844.158  That 
relationship was confirmed by a later select committee that noted the unique position of the CHR, 
and that its financial support from government was a: ‘sum which amounts in fact to a 
subvention’159 i.e. a grant from Government. The same approach was later used to support 
railway construction in India as part of national policy, where government offered to: ‘guarantee 
to them [railway companies] an interest of 5 per cent upon the capital invested’.160  That is almost 
identical wording to that used in negotiations with the CHR and reinforces the notion that the 
CHR was part of UK government policy towards Ireland from 1844.161 The CHR’s importance was 
shown clearly by the involvement of Peel, Gladstone, Dalhousie and Wellington, four of the most 
senior politicians in Victorian Britain, who ensured its success in Parliament and an arrangement 
that guaranteed its long-term financial security. It had been a long struggle for a controversial 
measure but the direct engagement of the Government in a matter that was part of its Irish policy 
ensured its success. However, if the Government hoped that the passage of the CHR’s private bill 
was the end of competition for Irish traffic it was mistaken. 
4.5 The Great Western Railway challenge 1845-46 
 
The CHR Act in 1844 did not end competition for the railway route towards Dublin, and the CHR’s 
position remained insecure until 1846.162 Doubts continued about the technical difficulty and 
expense of crossing the Menai Straits, so that the unexpected revival of the GWR scheme to Porth 
Dinllaen (PDR) in 1846 was a worrying proposition for the CHR and its supporters within 
government. The 1846 GWR scheme was more direct than the 1836 version of the PDR 
considered in chapters 2 and 3, as it travelled across Wales from Worcester rather than 
Shrewsbury. Charles Russell, the GWR chairman, was clear that its route was as direct: ‘as if it 
were made by a ruler’.163 Figure 4.2 below illustrates how correct he was in that assertion. It was 
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more difficult for Peel to oppose it, as he was a long-standing advocate of short routes and had 
argued for Holyhead on those grounds in 1840.164 The GWR was in a hurry to proceed, and it was 
also willing to commit significant resources to the project, as shown by the size of the proposed 
works that included a huge viaduct near Porthmadog.165 Charles Vignoles, the engineer of this and 
the earlier PDR scheme, apparently also envisaged direct competition with the CHR and included 
an option of extending the GWR route to Holyhead (with a second bridge over the Menai Straits) 
in his survey.166    
The seriousness of the GWR bid was shown by the power of its supporters and their offers 
of funding, as reported at the Oxford Worcester and Wolverhampton Railway (OWW) meeting in 
March 1846. Attendees heard that the broad gauge PDR was supported by landowners, Irish 
bankers and other railway companies to a total of £4.2 million.167 Its more powerful and faster 
locomotives also threatened to outperform the CHR on the main requirement of the London to 
Dublin link so that: 
 
 
The journey between Dublin and London might be performed in eleven hours, leaving four or five 
hours for the inhabitants of the respective places to answer letters before the return of the post 
the same day; and this was impossible to be attained by any other means than by that line.168 
 
 
The decision of the GWR to use broad gauge for its PDR may have given it a technical advantage – 
but it also provided opponents of the scheme with potential grounds for challenge that were used 
fully. The issue of railway gauge was fiercely debated in 1845-46 and the Gauge Commission (GC) 
appointed by government to decide the issue had concluded that the narrow gauge (used by most 
railways including the CHR) should predominate and that new broad gauge lines should be limited 
largely to south-west England.169 But the GWR directors were determined that its PDR would use 
the broad gauge.170 The GC’s decision on its preferred railway gauge was therefore also a decision 
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on the PDR and the wider railway schemes of the GWR, especially as it made it difficult to 
progress any new broad gauge schemes north of Bristol.  
It is important to understand the strategic significance of the GWR and its expansionary 
plans that rivalled the London and Birmingham (LBR) for the traffic between London, the West 
Midlands, the Mersey estuary, Manchester, Ireland and especially Dublin, as Figure 4.2 shows. 
The key to success in the struggle between the LBR and the GWR was the line from Birmingham to 
Liverpool that was operated by the Grand Junction Railway (GJR). If the GJR opted to cooperate 
with the GWR it deprived the LBR of access to Liverpool: if the GJR joined the LBR it stopped the 
GWR progressing beyond Birmingham.  Resolution of this issue was one of the most critical 
strategic decisions of the Railway Mania years of 1844-46.  
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Figure 4.2 Map showing the competing systems for Irish traffic before the decisions of the 
Gauge Commission of 1846 were implemented 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It apparently suited the GJR and its Liverpool supporters better to work with the GWR than to 
cooperate with the LBR, with whom they had had a difficult relationship. The GJR secretary Mark 
Huish told the select committee on the OWW Bill that he considered that the larger waggons on 
the GWR broad gauge enabled compressed goods such as cotton to be carried more cheaply - and 
revealed that the town to which it carried most cotton was not Manchester but Bristol, the home 
of the GWR.171  The GJR therefore served a city that rivalled Manchester in its main product. The 
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recommendation of the GC to support the narrow gauge in February 1846 tipped the balance in 
favour of Manchester’s commercial interests and frustrated Bristol as it restricted the broad 
gauge mostly to south of the line in Figure 4.2. That isolated the Liverpool based GJR because if it 
persisted in supporting the GWR, it would have no direct route to London without a break of 
gauge. After the GC’s decision the GJR could only achieve a line from Liverpool to London on a 
single gauge by aligning with the LBR and deserting the GWR.  The GC decision also stopped the 
PDR, which was north of the line that marked the permitted development of the broad gauge. The 
LBR was therefore handed a monopoly of the route from London to Liverpool and Manchester 
and the short-sea Dublin traffic through Holyhead by the decision of government to favour the 
narrow gauge on which the CHR was to be built – and funded in part by the LBR. The CHR route to 
Ireland was therefore protected from all competition. The position of the narrow gauge operators 
was further enhanced when government permitted- perhaps even encouraged - an amalgamation 
between the GJR, LBR and Manchester and Birmingham Railway that created a near-monopoly of 
railway access to the four main industrial cities in the UK as well as Dublin. They were joined 
together to form the London and North Western Railway (LNWR) in 1846.172 
The GWR lost this political struggle despite its advantages of higher speed, shorter 
mileage and a promise of a more rapid connection between London and Dublin. The decision that 
delivered that defeat caused controversy in 1846 when James Morrison MP, a prominent critic of 
railway policy in Britain as discussed in Chapter 3, argued that the process was flawed and 
possibly corrupt, because the gauge decisions were political ones about power and profit rather 
than being about the resolution of technical or administrative issues.  173 Morrison also opposed 
the creation of the LNWR for the same reasons. He saw that in 1845 the Board of Trade’s Railway 
Department supported the amalgamation of smaller but not larger railway companies because 
that latter reduced competition and might: ‘impede the formation of new Railways where they 
were required’ – such as the GWR’s competing line towards Dublin.174 The Railway Department 
considered that the CHR was ‘almost […] an extension of the [LBR]’ and should not amalgamate 
with the Chester and Birkenhead Railway (CBR) and block access to Birkenhead that was a rival 
port to Liverpool.175 Morrison extended the Railway Department argument by making clear his 
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view that the real objective of narrow gauge railway companies seeking amalgamation in 1846 
was: ‘to extend the sphere of monopoly, by uniting in a compact body different companies which, 
while separate, may interfere with each other’s profits’.176 Advocates of the LNWR were explicit 
that the argument for creating the large company was to control the traffic in the prosperous 
north of England under: ‘one entire management [and] to get rid of the competition for Holyhead 
traffic’.177 It was surprising that such a far-reaching development as the creation of the LNWR – 
truly an amalgamation of large companies - was permitted by parliament. Morrison saw it as a 
product of MPs being ‘heartily sick’ of the subject of railways by the end of the 1846 Parliament, 
and therefore not as alert as they might have been to schemes that damaged the public interest 
and benefited powerful economic concerns.178 But he may have been rather charitable in his 
assessment. 
The creation of LNWR was not celebrated as a great public good despite Reed’s view that it 
was ‘widely acknowledged as logical and appropriate’.179 Ross likewise suggested that there was 
no objection to the creation of the LNWR.180  The evidence from this analysis contradicts both 
statements. There was relatively little publicity for the creation of the LNWR, which tends to 
suggest that its promoters hoped to avoid attention.  For example, in Manchester one newspaper 
thought that it was not ‘generally known’ despite the significance of the change.181 This was no 
small event, and it was certainly noticed in the rival railway city of York, where it was remarked 
that the area of the country enclosed by London, Manchester and Liverpool: ‘the great triangle of 
its trade’ was under the control of one company: ‘a phase of affairs hitherto unknown to the 
constitution of the commerce of this country’.182 The York paper compared the LNWR monopoly 
to that of the Corn Laws with a tendency to produce ‘dangerous abuses’.183 The creation of the 
LNWR was a controversial development and one that is not easily explained, given the profile of 
opposition considered above.  
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Morrison clearly saw that the creation of the LNWR was intended to benefit its constituent 
companies, and he also showed that objections to the break of gauge were really a means of 
suppressing competition from the GWR.184  He argued in his 1846 select committee that the 
process followed by the Gauge Commission (GC) was flawed. Morrison tried to correct that by 
conducting his own forensic analysis through his select committee and showed that the GC 
committed a ‘very serious and singular mathematical error’ to the advantage of the LBR, in 
overstating the average passenger load on its trains as 84.9 when it was in fact 68.2.185 The 
evidence that the GC received had been heard without the opportunity for cross examination in 
which objections could have been aired.186 It also failed to consult James Walker, who supported a 
broad gauge rival to the CHR – a point noted rather bitterly by Morrison:  
 
It would be difficult to suppose that [the GC] were deterred from consulting him, by any 
impression that his opinions were adverse to those they might have themselves already formed, 
and yet equally difficult to account for the absence of such testimony.187 
 
Had they heard from Walker, he would probably have repeated his evidence to the Oxford 
Worcester and Wolverhampton Railway Select Committee in 1845 that supported the PDR as an 
additional line to the CHR, arguing that competition between them was in the interests of both 
Ireland and North Wales.188  
That had presented a new problem for the Government in its support for the CHR which its 
decisions on the gauge and railway amalgamation in 1846 resolved for them. The argument in 
1845 was not between the PDR and CHR – as it had been before 1844 – but for the PDR in 
addition to the CHR, and in direct competition with it. Worryingly for the CHR and its supporters 
in government, it was a competition that the PDR seemed bound to win, given the technical 
advantages over its rival.  Charles Russell, the GWR chairman, agreed that Ireland and North 
Wales would benefit from an additional railway, and he confirmed that he was willing to run such 
a line all the way to Holyhead and compete directly with the CHR.189 There was support from Irish 
witnesses for the GWR proposal. James Pim, one of the Irish supporters of the original PDR, 
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pointed out that the five hours turnaround time for the mail in Dublin that the CHR offered did 
not include any time for sorting mail and: ‘we would be receiving our letters from the postman 
just at the time our clerks were leaving our counting houses’.190 By contrast, the PDR’s more rapid 
route enabled letters to be received and the answer sent on the same day. Pim appeared to 
understand the Anglo-centric nature of the CHR and the companies associated with them which 
had not: ‘shown themselves particularly desirous to promote Irish interests’. 191 He also confirmed 
the importance of this issue in the Government’s Irish policy when he suggested that 
communication was: ‘a matter of greater importance to Ireland than all the Irish projects now 
under the consideration of Parliament’.192 That is a significant comment as the Maynooth Grant to 
support the training of Roman Catholic priests was considered in 1845 and has captured most 
attention from historians.193 
The case for a second railway towards Dublin in 1846 had not been expected by 
government, but its value was supported by contemporary evidence that Bristol was generating 
considerable business in finished cotton goods in Wales.194 Perhaps more significant was its wider 
success in penetrating markets in London, northern England and especially Ireland.195 That success 
reflected Ireland’s status as a major market for goods from mainland Britain, comparable to 
Australia or India.196 Bristol interests wanted to compete for that market and by 1843 appeared to 
be successful in doing so. Its decision to revive the PDR was not as absurd as Simmons claimed, 
and the struggle between the CHR and PDR (in its 1846 form) sponsored by the GWR should be 
seen in that overall context of a competition between regional economic interests for a large and 
growing market in Ireland, as well as the competition for the Government mail contract.197 
Decisions about those lines might also be seen as a reflection of the relative power of regional 
economic interests, and the support given to them by senior politicians. Opponents of the GWR’s 
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rival proposal to the CHR could not defeat it on merit since it was technically superior - so they 
devised other means to frustrate the GWR.198 The role of government was therefore vital as its 
political decisions could override technical arguments, and it was clearly not swayed by the 
advantages in speed and capacity of the broad gauge. Thus, in 1845 the CHR chairman: 
‘confidently expected from the support of the Government etc., they need not fear competition 
from any quarter’ – despite the technical superiority of its broad gauge rival.199 That underlines 
the notion of the CHR as a project that was protected by government, consistent with it forming 
an element of its policy towards Ireland. Morrison’s committee attempted to demonstrate how 
decisions in 1846 had given power to large railway companies at the expense of the public 
interest – including and perhaps especially in North Wales and Ireland – but logic and science 
were defeated by economic and regional interests represented in government by capable 
politicians.  
Of course, Morrison might himself have had particular prejudices in this matter. If so they 
were not evident, and it was known that he did not invest in British railway companies in order to 
avoid any suggestion of bias.200 Whether the broad or narrow gauge was technically better is not 
the issue for the current study, though a relevant judgement was given by Lord Dalhousie, a 
member of Peel’s Cabinet in 1846, after he arrived in India as Governor-General and took a direct 
interest in developing railways in the sub-continent.201 He argued for a broader gauge in India and 
noted that the British narrow gauge was: ‘not the best gauge for the general purposes of a 
railway’.202 That is a remarkable judgement from a man who had actively supported narrow gauge 
interests in Britain including the CHR. The GWR attempt to spread beyond the corridor between 
London and Bristol, as noted by Simmons, was effectively halted – and with it the PDR rivalry with 
the CHR.203 In 1846 unlike 1836, the PDR had not aimed to be an alternative to the CHR but to 
compete with it as a second line towards Dublin. That would have frustrated Peel’s ambitions to 
guarantee success for the CHR, so government used political means to defeat technical 
superiority.  
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The eventual success of the narrow gauge was assured, simply by the fact that it 
exceeded the mileage of the broad gauge so significantly.204 But powerful interests also appeared 
influential. As the scientist Charles Babbage observed, the broad gauge [that he supported] 
created: ‘violent party movements for and against it [because] it bore strongly upon pecuniary 
interests’.205 The essential point for this study is that the issue of gauge was raised in 1846 largely 
as a means to defeat the GWR in its attempt to expand, rather than as a technical issue. As a 
result, GWR competition against schemes supported by the LBR (and its LNWR successor) was 
prevented - and the CHR was a significant beneficiary.  
 
With hindsight, the success of the CHR in gaining a monopoly of short-sea access to Dublin might 
have seemed inevitable once the proposals of the IRC were defeated in 1839 - and with it the PDR 
that had formed part of its report. The reality was very different. The CHR made a strenuous 
effort to revive its scheme that culminated in the parliamentary debate in June 1840 in which its 
proposals were defeated for a variety of reasons as discussed in this chapter – but primarily 
through lack of government support. The CHR supporters maintained that the construction of the 
line was an ‘imperial’ question and deserved support from the public purse. That support was 
only forthcoming after Peel became prime minister and identified the CHR as part of his Irish 
policy. When Peel declared that the maintenance of the Union was a priority in May 1843 he 
simultaneously supported the CHR. Peel’s inclusion of rapid communication between London and 
Dublin in his more moderate Irish policy in February 1844 confirmed the status of the CHR as an 
important component in an approach that depended on constructive engagement in Ireland – 
with force as a last resort. His approach in 1844, though more constructive than in the period 
from 1841 to 1843, was still different from that of the IRC discussed in Chapter 3. While the IRC 
had focused on Irish economic development, with the London rail route ancillary to the creation 
of an Irish railway system, Peel favoured a line that supported British political, economic and 
social interests in sustaining the Union – and his personal interest in his own Tamworth 
constituency. He was not concerned about an Irish railway network in the way that the IRC had 
been – and not concerned at all about North Wales. Absolute government support for the CHR 
was confirmed in 1845-46 when the GWR attempted to revive the PDR. It was defeated by 
government decisions in support of the narrow gauge for new railways north from Bristol, and by 
the creation of the LNWR. It is not possible on the evidence discovered for this study to prove that 
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there was active collusion between government and the railway companies that supported the 
CHR. However, it is clear that the decisions made by government in the years 1842-46 consistently 
assisted the CHR and obstructed its challengers.  It is therefore difficult not to conclude that 
government intended the CHR to succeed and its rivals to fail, even when those rivals had better 
technology that offered certain attainment of the single objective of the London to Dublin rail 
link, as articulated by Peel – that a letter sent from London on Monday would receive a reply from 
Dublin on Wednesday. 
The next chapter examines how the CHR contributed to the implementation of 
government policy in Ireland after its completion in 1850, and considers whether the political and 
financial support extended to it by government secured the required result. 
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5. The Chester and Holyhead Railway and the governance of Ireland 1846-60 
 
‘The time has arrived for placing Ireland upon the same footing as Great Britain, and removing an 
invidious distinction that was only justified by the difficulties of dilatory and doubtful 
communication…’1 
 
Having secured the success of the CHR as analysed in Chapter 4, this chapter explores whether 
government then attempted to use it, and associated technologies such as the electric telegraph 
and steamships, directly to reinforce its control over Ireland. If the claim that the CHR was an 
element of UK Irish policy is valid then it might be expected that its completion was accompanied 
by some initiative from government that was intended to change the nature of the relationship 
between Ireland and the rest of the UK. The study examines political records and public opinion as 
recorded in the newspapers to show that such an initiative was undertaken by Russell’s 
Government in 1850. It is possible too that the Government in London had politically “softer” 
ambitions to integrate Irish society and its economy more closely with that of the rest of the UK, 
so the chapter analyses the 2010 work of McDonald that relates to the period when the Union 
between Britain and Ireland was established. She shows that speed of communication had been 
important to the British project to integrate Ireland for many years – but that the interest 
extended beyond the speed of government communications.2 This study collects and analyses 
data that shows that the CHR did not improve the time taken to deliver the mail between London 
and Dublin in its first ten years of operation – and therefore could not deliver any of the formal or 
informal improvements expected from more rapid communication beyond what had been 
accomplished when the mail was routed via Liverpool.  
Finally, the chapter briefly examines the wider context of these developments. The period 
from 1844 to 1860 saw major developments that affected the relationship between Ireland and 
the rest of the UK. Ireland suffered a humanitarian catastrophe in the form of the Great Famine of 
1845-47 that changed its political landscape. This chapter explores whether that restricted the 
potential of the CHR to deliver its intended objectives within government policy. In the 
circumstances created by famine, Irish nationalists’ attitude towards railways may have become 
less positive than they were when O’Connell led them. The chapter explores whether the 
replacement of the liberalism of O’Connell by the more overtly nationalist, anti-liberal rhetoric of 
Young Ireland – typified by John Mitchel - weakened the project to use the CHR and railways more 
generally for the political and social integration of Ireland into the UK. 
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5.1 The special status of the Chester and Holyhead Railway  
 
By 1847 the relationship between government and the CHR had become so close that ministers 
asked the directors of the CHR to contribute £200,000 in return for exclusive use of the inner 
harbour at Holyhead, including the right to run a railway along it.3 That was not popular in Ireland 
where there was cynicism about the cost of the Holyhead developments - and a suggestion for an 
alternative use for the money at a meeting in Dublin: 
 
Would to God that there was as much anxiety shown by people in high places to send that money 
to starving Ireland, as there was to send it for the purpose of accumulating a heap of stones at 
Holyhead without any feature of public utility.4 
 
 
The CHR agreed to make the contribution but had a significant request in return; government 
should permit the CHR to run a complete service from London to Dublin, including the sea 
crossing, as Holyhead was only, in Peel’s words: ‘an intermediate station on a grand route’.5 The 
CHR also argued that the only way to gain full advantage from this route was to make: ‘the steam 
boat interest identical with that of the railway’.6 The operation of steamships by railway 
companies was considered monopolistic in the 1840s, so granting that power to the CHR was an 
exceptional step.7 Initially, the steamship power was rejected by the Select Committee on 
Holyhead Harbour whose chairman: ‘did not think that, under any circumstances, Parliament 
ought to sanction the avowed intention of [the CHR] to become steam-ship proprietors, either 
directly or indirectly’.8 The issue was referred to the Railway Commissioners, alongside a similar 
bid from the London and South Western Railway for steamship powers to cross the English 
Channel.9 The commissioners’ conclusions underline how different the CHR was from other 
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railways. They considered that the sea passage in both cases was ‘a portion of the railway 
enterprise’ and that, although the route from the south coast to France was ‘of considerable 
public importance’ – it was not as important as the CHR.10 When the matter was referred to a new 
committee, the CHR’s opponents were dismayed that Peel, although no longer Prime Minister, 
was chairman, given his consistent backing for the CHR. Free of his prime ministerial 
responsibilities, since Lord John Russell replaced him in 1846, he was able to reveal the special 
status of the CHR for him and his late government. He had:  
 
 
Always looked upon the railway as a great national undertaking, the terminus of which was not, in 
fact, Holyhead but Dublin, [so his government] had departed from the ordinary rules and granted a 
sum of money to assist in carrying it out.11  
 
 
As President of the Board of Trade and custodian of laissez-faire principles, Henry Labouchere 
admitted his strong inclination to oppose special powers for the CHR but nonetheless assented to 
the company being given the power to operate steamships from Holyhead to Dublin.12 The 
measure was agreed in 1848, even though the City of Dublin Steam Packet Company was willing 
and able to undertake the work, so that the CHR special powers were not really required.13 
National security may have been a factor, alongside the special status of the CHR within the 
policies of both Peel and Russell’s governments, for Ireland was in active rebellion in 1848. In the 
same issue as the steamboat report, the Freeman’s Journal referred to the: ‘reign of Whiggery – 
the reign of famine, pestilence, and death, with the consummating perfection of military law, of 
summary tribunals [and] arbitrary hangings and burnings all over the country’. 14 In those 
circumstances, government probably preferred to have the whole line to Dublin under a single 
English management to secure rapid communication. Irish opinion was as antagonistic to the 
decision to allow steamship powers as it had been to spending money at Holyhead - and Peel was 
accused of favouritism. The Cork Examiner suggested under a banner of ‘Justice for Ireland’ that 
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Peel had reached a private agreement while in government with the CHR that guaranteed them a 
monopoly of Irish traffic.15 The decision on steamship powers was a further example of the Anglo-
centric nature of the decisions that was consistent with Peel’s efforts to the defeat the IRC 
proposals in 1839 as analysed in Chapter 3. Peel was at the centre of those decisions as 
opposition leader and Prime Minister, and his support for the CHR continued in 1848, even when 
he was out of office and no longer led the Tories.  
A further feature that marked out the special relationship of the CHR with government 
was the electric telegraph. In May 1845, government announced its intention to have the 
telegraph along the whole route to Dublin in support of: ‘closer connection between the 
metropolis and the sister isle’. 16 At that time the telegraph was regarded along with railways and 
steamships – and in the way suggested by the Mattelarts and discussed in Chapter 1 – as the 
nervous system of the British body politic: 
 
The metropolis will instantaneously transmit and receive information from every important point 
in the island. For every great need or emergency the very farthest point will soon communicate its 
tidings or its wants and will receive immediate reply. […] The island will become one nervous 
system with a scarcely less quick and infallible action than the human frame. The metropolis will 
become the sensorium of one acutely sensitive and intelligent fabric. […] The table or the walls of a 
parlour in Downing Street will become the retina of an empire…17 
 
By 1850 the Electric Telegraph Company was reported to be in the process of building the crucial 
link of this “nervous system” from Holyhead to Dublin.18 In June 1852 that link was completed.19 
Headrick suggested that: ‘steamships, railways, and telegraphs allowed the Europeans to control 
their newly acquired colonies efficiently’.20  However, methods used to strengthen the UK 
government in respect of Ireland demonstrated above occurred much earlier, as part of UK 
government policy for Ireland, than they did in places like India. Technological developments 
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could therefore be added to other examples where the government of Ireland provided the: 
‘prototype for what would later evolve on the imperial periphery’ as argued by Jackson. 21   
Thus, the CHR and its virtual owners, the London and North Western Railway (LNWR) had 
a special position among railway companies. The CHR was given the advantage of a large harbour 
constructed mostly at public expense, a special power to operate steamships in conjunction with 
the railway and the application of the electric telegraph. That intense combination of the newest 
technology deployed on one route by political direction was unique in the late 1840s, and the first 
time it had involved an underwater cable between two capital cities within UK jurisdiction 
anywhere in the world.22 It showed the importance of the CHR, not only to the commercial 
interests of its owners but also in the wider concerns of government to establish firm control over 
Ireland.  
 
5.2 The Chester and Holyhead Railway in action 1850 – 58 
 
The CHR was begun in March 1845 and construction was underway while the Great Western 
Railway (GWR) mounted its significant opposition through a revived PDR discussed in Chapter 4. 
The final stage of construction of the CHR enabled the line to cross the Menai Straits and 
facilitated through working of the whole railway in March 1850.23 It was the conclusion of a 
process that had started in 1836, and had been revived by Peel’s government in 1842-43 when 
the situation in Ireland was deteriorating.  It was not completed until after the Great Famine of 
1845-47 but remained a part of government strategy in Ireland when Peel left office in 1846. The 
operating company was the CHR - but engines, rolling stock and other logistical components were 
provided by the London and North Western Railway (LNWR). The process that created that 
company enabled it to become the most powerful railway company in the UK and the largest joint 
stock company of its day.24 It was a creation of the state through the process described previously 
that brought rival companies in active dispute together, and gave them a monopoly of the most 
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lucrative traffic in the UK, including Ireland. In return, the LNWR and the CHR had important 
services to provide to the state. 
Sir Robert Peel had ceased to be prime minister by the time the CHR came to fruition in 
1850. Russell’s Government did not have the same constructive ambitions for Ireland as 
Melbourne’s Whig Government under the Lichfield House Compact between 1835 and 1841 as 
discussed in Chapter 3. O’Connell and Drummond were essential to the earlier arrangements but 
were no longer involved when the CHR opened: Drummond died in 1840 and O’Connell in 1847. 
Although the important public figures were different, the overall aim of using the CHR to 
strengthen the governance of Ireland remained as clear in Russell’s Government as in Peel’s 
previous administration. There was an early opportunity to show the potential of the CHR even 
before its formal opening in March 1850. In February 1850, an official in Dublin Castle thanked the 
CHR in lavish terms for: ‘making such arrangements as enabled them to transmit [the Queen’s 
Speech] to Dublin, by the electric telegraph, an express engine, and a special steamer with a  
rapidity hitherto unexampled.25 That was the first use of the steamer, telegraph and railway 
together for government purposes in Ireland, and was entirely consistent with Peel’s ambitions 
for the line noted in Chapter 4. In 1836, the Royal Mail had been congratulated for delivering the 
King’s Speech from London to Dublin by road and sea in 24 hours – by 1850 it was delivered in 
fewer than 10 hours, albeit with the help of the electric telegraph, which could be used for 
individual documents but not for bulk communications - a rapid surface postal system was still 
essential.26 
The Government did not wait long to test the efficacy of the apparently improved 
London-Dublin communication that coincided with the opening of the Britannia Tubular Bridge 
across the Menai Straits in March 1850.  The Times identified the political potential of the bridge 
because of its impact on the issue of the time taken to communicate between London and Dublin, 
and because it would shortly be combined with the telegraph. The paper was frustrated with the 
arrangement that maintained a devolved Irish administration in Dublin and considered that: 
 
The little pageant in Dublin Castle has now become a mere burlesque – a ceremony without a 
meaning, an expense without a result. […] The time has arrived for placing Ireland upon the same 
footing as Great Britain, and removing an invidious distinction that was only justified by the 
difficulties of dilatory and doubtful communication…27  
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That was a remarkable development - a proposal for a major constitutional change based solely 
on the creation of a railway line and associated technologies. The Times argued that the CHR 
could effectively replace the Lord Lieutenant, who was one of the three officials who had the 
overall direction of Irish affairs.28 Russell confirmed The Times account of his intentions when he 
brought his proposals to parliament in May 1850.  He argued that it had been necessary to have a 
person in authority in Dublin only because of the problems of communication as The Times had 
suggested. He considered that such an arrangement was no longer necessary because of the 
creation of the CHR – and he produced a novel piece of evidence to support his case in the form 
of the Bradshaw's Railway Guide.29  He suggested that the improved journey times that MPs could 
find in the guide effectively signalled the end of the  Dublin Castle executive in Ireland and the 
replacement of the Lord Lieutenant by a fourth secretary of state in cabinet. 
His proposal was not well received by all MPs.30 Generally there was concern among Irish 
MPs that the measure would reduce the status of Dublin.31 John Reynolds, the MP for Dublin City, 
dismissed the technical basis of Russell’s argument because of its dependence upon the railway 
and its infrastructure.32 However, there was a clear majority in favour of the motion.33  The debate 
resumed on the second reading in June 1850 but the issue remained contentious. Russell could 
then count on Peel, who offered his broad support and considered that 1850 was the right time 
for the measure because the railway provided an improved means of conducting the government 
of Ireland from London. That was no surprise as Russell’s proposals were effectively the fulfilment 
of Peel’s own ambitions for the CHR articulated to parliament in 1843 and implemented by the 
time he left office - as analysed in the last chapter.34 Most interestingly for this study, Edmund 
Roche MP, saw Russell and Peel as conspirators in a new approach to government based on 
technology. His was probably the first articulation of the use of railways to reinforce the power of 
government, which is an important theme in analysing the effectiveness of the CHR: 
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[Russell and Peel] seemed to have strange notions of the uses of government. […] They took a 
railway view of the question, and looked on it as a matter of time and space. […] Let them but give 
him a railway, an iron bridge, and a steamboat, and he would do anything in that way.35  
 
 
Roche’s sentiments are similar to those expressed by Headrick in his 1988 study of the use of 
technology to strengthen governance in the context of European imperial expansion after 1850.36 
While it is not the intention of this analysis to claim parity for the CHR with later railway 
developments in Africa or India, it does appear that the CHR was a clear example of the use of 
railways to enhance government control in Ireland.  And, to the extent that Ireland’s relationship 
with Britain was an imperial one, an early attempt at “railway imperialism” .  The Government won 
the vote easily, but it was unable to challenge the crushing authority of the Duke of Wellington’s 
intervention in the House of Lords’ debate on the measure.37 Wellington took no comfort from 
the improved technology available to government through railways and the telegraph but relied 
on a more old-fashioned version of battlefield command, conducted close to the action and 
assisted by: ‘the superintending direction and assistance of the Lord Lieutenant’.38 The measure to 
abolish the post of Lord-Lieutenant was dropped by government in July 1850 because of such 
doubts.39 It was a remarkable initiative by government that had proposed a constitutional change 
because rapid communication by railway was available. It was the clearest and earliest attempt to 
use railways, steamships and the telegraph together to alter the nature of the constitutional 
relationship between an imperial capital and a country that it wished to govern more directly. 40  
In 1850, the CHR was the explicit mechanism for that exercise of political control of 
Ireland, through the plan to dismantle the devolved government in Dublin and govern Ireland 
from London as an integral part of the UK. Historians have omitted it from their analysis and 
focused instead on issues such as land reform, the Maynooth grant and the creation of Trinity 
College in Dublin.41 This study establishes an important role for railway development in successive 
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governments’ Irish policy from 1843 to 1850. The defeat of the measure to abolish the post of 
Lord Lieutenant meant that the plan was less successful than government had hoped - but it does 
not alter the status of the CHR as the first railway in the UK that was planned and built as part of 
government policy and used explicitly for a political purpose.  
 
5.3 The informal importance of communication time in the governance of Ireland   
 
The failure of Russell’s attempt to change Ireland’s relationship with the rest of the UK in 1850 by 
abolishing the post of Lord Lieutenant did not mean that any hope of impact from more rapid 
communication was lost. Technology has impact at both formal and informal levels – a fact clearly 
understood by Peel. His aspirations for Ireland were:  
 
 
Curiously connected with the course of the post […] other men think of wild lands reclaimed – of a 
rude multitude civilized […] of peace, order, and security, where now there is the gloom of dark 
conspiracy and hatred. [Peel] however, arises in Parliament, and says, “What I want to see is this – 
I want to see the day when a letter posted in London at eight o’clock on Monday morning, shall be 
answered from Dublin by Wednesday morning. […] This would be a great public advantage.42 
 
 
The Morning Post was sceptical: ‘However worthy an object of mechanical ambition, [it] is not 
exactly that upon which the eye of a great politician, anxious for Ireland’s good, should be so 
devotedly fixed’.43 
  There was more sense behind Peel’s 1844 ambition than the paper allowed. Jupp has 
argued that the growth of newspapers immediately before this period was an important element 
in influencing opinion in Ireland.44  In a study of London-Dublin communication in the period 
1790-1801 undertaken in 2010, Sarah McDonald identified that it took between 5 and 6 days for 
news to reach Dublin from London.45 Her work provides a valuable baseline for analysis of the 
years from 1820 to 1859.  Although Peel’s comments related to personal correspondence, he 
appeared to envision a relationship between London and Dublin similar to that of the rest of the 
UK. In her conclusions, McDonald suggests that this was very important to London, where the 
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Dublin press was regarded as vital to secure the Anglicisation of Ireland.46 That approach was 
consistent with the importance of newspapers and railways from around the middle of the 
nineteenth century to people in the UK in the ‘cooperative effort’ of both creating and reflecting 
public opinion as argued by de Nie in 2004.47 Improved communication had the potential to affect 
the ‘time value’ of news for the wider public: as McDonald pointed out, as news gets older it 
changes from information to entertainment.48 It is reasonable to suppose that the authorities in 
London wanted to inform rather than entertain the reading classes in Ireland, so it was important 
to get London news and opinion to them quickly - this being similar to what Peel meant by a 
‘great public advantage’.49  He and others believed that it was the absence of this British influence 
in Ireland that was the cause of much of the difficulty in governing that country.50 In respect of 
Dublin newspapers, government ‘regarded their copy as influential’ and subsidised some of them 
accordingly.51 Peel wanted the CHR to increase the speed of communication between London and 
Dublin to strengthen government and to influence the content of newspapers. But did it deliver 
that increase in speed?  
In order to test the changes in speed of communication, the date of reports of the 
sessions of the ‘Imperial Parliament’ included in the Freeman’s Journal were examined. That 
paper was the ‘principal organ of moderate repeal opinion’, the very audience Peel wished to 
influence.52  
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Table 5.1: Time taken for parliamentary reports from London to be published in the Freeman’s 
Journal in Dublin for all available years 1820 – 1859 
 
 
Date of Paper 
Summer 
“Imperial 
Parliament” 
Session 
Reported 
Time 
Lag 
Date of Paper 
Winter 
“Imperial 
Parliament” 
Session Reported 
Time Lag 
 6 June 1820 31 May 1820 6 24 February 18 February 6 
 6 June 1821 11 June 1821 5 19 February 13 February 6 
1826 OPENING OF   MENAI ROAD BRIDGE  
30 June 1830 4 June 1830 4 9 December 5 December 4 
17 June 1831 14 June 1830 3 16 December 12 December 4 
12 June 1832 9 June 1832 3 7 January 3 January 4 
  4 June 1833 31 May 1833 4 15 February 11 February 4 
  6 June 1837 2 June 1837 4 16 February 13 February 3 
  5 June 1838 1 June 1838 4 25 January 22 January 3 
24 JANUARY 1839  DUBLIN MAIL VIA LIVERPOOL  RAILWAY 
  6 June 1839 3 June 1839 3 11 February 7 February 4 
  4 June 1840 1 June 1840 3 24 January 21 January 3 
6 APRIL  1841  DUBLIN MAIL VIA BIRKENHEAD RAILWAY 
10 June 1841 7 June 1841 3 28 January 26 January 2 
  8 June 1842 6 June 1842 2 12 February  10 February 2 
14 June 1843 12 June 1843 2 10 February 7 February 3 
  5 June 1844 3 June 1844 2 22 February 19 February 3 
14 June 1845 12 June 1845 2 14 February 11 February 3 
20 June 1846 18 June 1846 2 6 February 4 February 2 
  9 June 1847 7 June 1847 2 19 February 17 February 2 
  7 June 1848 5 June 1848 2 16 February 14 February 2 
1 AUGUST  1848  DUBLIN MAIL VIA HOLYHEAD RAILWAY 
  6 June 1849 4 June 1849 2 23 February 21 February 2 
5 MARCH 1850  BRITANNIA BRIDGE  OPENED 
  6 June 1850 4 June 1850 2 12 February 10 February 2 
  4 June 1851 2 June 1851 2 20 February 19 February 2 
  9 June 1852 7 June 1852 2 14 February 12 February 2 
  8 June 1853 6 June 1853 2 17 February 15 February 2 
16 June 1854 14 June 1854 2 11 February 9 February 2 
  6 June 1855 4 June 1855 2 28 February 26 February 2 
12 June 1856 10 June 1856 2 2 February 31 January 2 
25 June 1857 23 June 1857 2 12 February 10 February 2 
11 June 1859 9 June 1859 2 22 February 21 February 2* 
 
* Electric Telegraph used to deliver report, so counted as two rather than one as this was the prevailing time taken by 
rail at the time. 
Data gathered from Freeman’s Journal on the dates given 
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Figure 5.1: Speed of London to Dublin Communication:  
All years when data available 1820-1859 
 
 
 
 
Data taken from Table 5.1. 
 
Variables such as the frequency of publication of the journal, weather conditions that affected the 
sea crossing and frequency of parliamentary sittings are accounted for by avoiding where possible 
the intervention of weekends, and by choosing dates occurring towards the middle or end of the 
week. The months of June and February were generally selected because those two months had 
the most regular sittings of parliament. There were also periods where the publication was not 
available, for example only 1820 and 1821 were available in the period before the Menai 
Suspension bridge was opened in 1826. 1834-7 issues were also missing. 1858 had only six 
months of data and was excluded. 
The time-delay data show that the completion of the London to Holyhead road in 1826 
reduced the London to Dublin time by two days compared to the time taken in 1820 and 1821. 
The figure of 6 days in that early period is consistent with McDonald’s findings. There was litt le 
further change until the mail was switched to rail and concentrated at Liverpool in 1839. It was 
then sent from Birkenhead in 1841, when a faster rail journey was established to that port. The 
latter change delivered a steady two-day time delay in summer and a two or three-day delay in 
winter. During the last three years of this service two days was a consistent performance in both 
summer and winter.  
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The data provided above shows clearly that there was no further improvement when the 
mail switched to the CHR in 1848. There was not even any improvement on the opening of the 
expensive Britannia Tubular Bridge in 1850. This is a remarkable finding, given the immense effort 
and expense that had been incurred in completing this line. Stephenson’s original estimate was 
£2.1 million,53 but the CHR actually had authorised share capital of £2.75 million and authorised 
loans of £926,000 – a total of £3.676 million.54 Stephenson overspent by 47 per cent and 
delivered a cost per mile of £44,000, or £10,000 per mile more than average in the period up to 
1844.55 The bridge to Anglesey alone had cost £674,000, although estimated at only £250,000.56 
The evidence above suggests that this investment did not improve the time taken for 
communication from London to Dublin, even though that was the only justification for the CHR; it 
was not intended to deliver any benefit along its route through North Wales. The performance 
was not capable of delivering Peel’s aim of a correspondent receiving a reply on Wednesday to a 
letter sent from Dublin to London on Monday. His confidence that the CHR would deliver that 
improvement was misplaced. However, his 1844 suggestion that a failure to deliver that objective 
would mean that the project was a waste of money is valid.57  
 
5.4 The performance of the London – Dublin rail and sea link 1850-60 
 
The failure of the CHR to live up to its purpose of reducing journey time from London to Dublin 
discovered in this research is not acknowledged in studies of the CHR, which appear to assume 
that there was an improvement. Simmons, for example, defined the CHR as a: ‘project to speed 
up communication with Ireland’, but did not say that it failed to do so in its crucial early years 
when it might have made a difference.58 This is surprising because it was certainly noticed at the 
time.  As early as July 1850, there was a report of an apparently unnecessary two-hour rail delay 
at Chester.59 The service did not improve and Henry Herbert addressed parliament on the issue in 
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April 1853 and pointed out that Russell’s high hopes for the CHR in 1850 had not been realised.60 
There were contrasting views on the cause of the problem. A director of the ferry company 
suggested that the railway journey was the problem, while Sir Richard Bulkeley, a promoter of the 
CHR, blamed the ferry company. Mr Mangles, a former CHR Director blamed government, and a 
Dublin MP thought that the problem was simply one of money.61 In fact, the evidence is that all 
parties should have known the project would fail even before it was completed. In 1838, Charles 
Vignoles (the original PDR engineer) had stated in an appendix to the IRC report that the CHR 
would not improve on the time taken to send the mail via Liverpool because of the length of 
journey compared to the Porth Dinllaen Railway (PDR).62 That assertion was repeated, as noted in 
Chapter 4, in the 1845 evidence to a select committee, by which time the rival PDR was faster 
than the original scheme.63 The analysis in Figure 5.1 suggests that those assessments of the likely 
performance of the CHR were correct. The Government either did not notice, or ignored it 
because it did not suit their political intentions and the economic interests that supported the 
CHR. And so, just three years after the completion of this high profile and expensive project, a 
review of the CHR’s performance by select committee was ordered by government based on the 
critical comments in the House of Commons. 
The select committee concluded that the service was actually worse than before 1850.64 It 
blamed the slowness of the rail journey to Holyhead and the low calibre of the vessels between 
Holyhead and Dublin. It concluded that the journey could be accomplished in 11 hours compared 
to the 14 hours 25 minutes that the select committee found that it took. 11 hours was the exact 
time promised by the GWR in return for political approval of the PDR in 1846 as noted above. One 
witness thought the ‘abominations and nastiness’ that prevented better performance were so 
bad that it was not: ‘polite to describe [them] in plain English’.65 He suggested that lack of 
competition on the route to Dublin was the problem and argued for a rival broad gauge route to 
Birkenhead, despite the decision of the Gauge Commission in 1846 that prevented such a 
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scheme.66 The committee focused on the end to end journey time and the need for larger vessels 
and did not offer any strategic vision or solutions. It was ‘not advocating any new principle’ but 
merely a return to a system which it claimed had worked beneficially for the interests of both 
countries’ – North Wales did not seem to feature.67 The Observer, sister paper to the free trade 
Manchester Guardian, still hoped that Ireland might become fully part of the ‘Integral Empire’ 
[United Kingdom] via an improved rail link and the abolition of the Lord Lieutenancy, recalling 
Peel’s notion of the CHR as the ‘consummation of the Union’.68 The paper rather betrayed its anti-
Irish prejudices by arguing that the solution was to put the shipping route in the hands of the: 
‘leading line of railway [and the] ships of this country [and not] any pettifogging, cheese-paring 
company [uninterested] in the true and perfect union of Her Majesty’s Home Empire’ – a clear 
reference to the (Irish) Dublin Steam Packet Company that carried the mail between Holyhead 
and Dublin and the LNWR as the ‘leading line of railway’.69  
There was no major response from government. The period of grand strategy and high 
expectations of the rail link to Ireland articulated by Peel and Russell was apparently over. In 
1853, the rival parties merely haggled over the details of rail and ferry timings and argued with 
government about responsibility for the failings. The issue persisted into 1856, when government 
rejected an offer from the CHR to reduce journey time in return for an increase of subsidy to 
£70,000. On that occasion (unlike 1844) government understood that the reduction in rail journey 
time did not deliver a faster postal service, but merely increased the amount of time the post bags 
were left on the dockside in Dublin or Holyhead. So it insisted instead on arrangements that 
would save 24 hours ‘for business purposes’ as much as for the essential processes of 
government.70  By 1859, government requirements were very detailed and there were penalties 
for failure to deliver.71 Finally, by 1860 – ten years after the CHR opened – there was great 
celebration when the journey from London to Dublin was performed in 10 hours 44 minutes – 46 
minutes faster than required by the contract.72  There was also greater reliability, so that in 1860 
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the mail was delayed on only four occasions - with just one counting as an unreasonable delay.73 
The grand hopes of Peel that the CHR would revolutionise the relationship with Ireland had been 
replaced by detailed argument between governments, railway and ferry companies over the 
reasons for delay in the post. Meanwhile, through the trauma of the Great Famine of 1845-47 and 
the crisis of the rebellion of 1848, the relationship between Ireland and the rest of the UK had 
changed dramatically, and effectively ended the hope of politicians like Peel and Russell that 
faster communication might integrate Ireland into the UK. 
 
5.5 Irish politics and railways 1846 – 1860 
 
O’Connell had tried to work with the British Government in the years 1835-40 but the results 
were mixed for Ireland. Shortcomings in his agreement with the Whig Government of Melbourne, 
such as the failure to implement the IRC report, had weakened his influence in Ireland.74 When 
Peel took office in 1841, O’Connell reverted to direct action, culminating in his arrest in October 
1843. Throughout this process and his earlier campaigns, it was unclear whether he really wanted 
repeal of the Union or was just bargaining for position.75 His support for initiatives that put Ireland 
on the same footing at the rest of the UK suggest that he was a supporter of the kind of 
government favoured by the Whigs and latterly by Peel himself in which, as one MP told 
Parliament, Ireland: ‘instead of being ruled as a colony [was treated like Scotland] and the three 
countries [sic] render truly a United Kingdom’.76 
The Great Famine changed everything because as Comerford observed: ‘gradualist, co-
operative, clientilist politics was no answer to a mounting socio-economic catastrophe’. 77  Such 
an approach was replaced by a more confrontational and violent movement of Young Irelanders 
who rejected the approach adopted by O’Connell. 78 That did not provide a clear way forward for 
Ireland either, for according to Fieldhouse by 1850: 
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Ireland was exhausted: emigration doubled to over 100 thousand in 1846 and again to 200 
thousand in 1847 […] But in Ireland there was little support for the abortive attempt of Young 
Ireland at rebellion in 1848; or, on the other extreme, for Russell's plan to abolish the viceroyalty 
and separate administration. […] Neither separation nor integration provided a popular answer. 
Land remained the over-riding issue…79  
 
Thus, any hope of using railways to connect and integrate Ireland within the UK had gone by 
1848. Before the Great Famine the IRC approach of establishing state-funded railways might have 
mitigated that crisis, as the Morning Chronicle suggested in 1846: 
 
 
It has often been a subject of regret that years ago Ireland was not mapped over with railways, 
when the Irish Railway Commissioners, in 1837 [sic], proposed a comprehensive plan to 
government for the purpose. Doubtless had this been done, Ireland would have presented a far 
different prospect. […] Had this general system been carried out, Ireland would have now been 
netting a large revenue, and have acquired an increased manufacturing and agricultural 
character.80 
 
 
While it is not possible to state that this analysis is correct, it is difficult not to conclude that 
Ireland would at least have been better placed to deal with the famine if it had had a railway 
system in place by 1845, which the IRC proposals would have delivered. To that extent, the 
generally more positive view of Peel’s handling of the famine compared to the subsequent Whig 
government might be reconsidered since Peel was clearly the main instrument of the destruction 
of the IRC.81 By 1848, the political, social and economic environment had changed so that 
solutions such as that offered by the IRC were no longer available and probably would not have 
worked. Within Young Ireland, John Mitchel argued for violent action including the use of railway 
infrastructure for very different purposes. He thought rebels: ‘could hardly desire a deadlier 
ambush than the brinks of a deep railway cutting’.82  As Quinn showed in 1983, Mitchel also 
emphatically rejected the progress of the industrial revolution and political reform and: ‘the 
possibility that modern inventions such as railroads, steamships, and the electric telegraph could 
improve the general quality of life’.83 Mitchel was equally dismissive of the benefits of free trade, 
                                                             
79  David Fieldhouse and Frederick Madden, The Dependent Empire and Ireland, 1840-1900: Advance and 
Retreat in Representative Self-Government, Vol. 5 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 758. 
 
80  “Railways in Ireland and the Employment of its People”, Morning Chronicle, 6 October 1846, 2. 
 
81   Kinealy, Christine. "Rotten Potatoes and the Politics of Relief." In A Death-Dealing Famine: The Great 
Hunger in Ireland, 41-65. Pluto Press, 1997. 
 
82  “Prosecution of the Nation Newspaper”, Bradford Observer, 15 January 1846,3. 
 
83  James Quinn, "John Mitchel and the Rejection of the Nineteenth Century," Eire-Ireland: A Journal of Irish 
Studies  (2003), Vol 38, No. 3-4  
141 
 
arguing that it produced impoverishment, famine and dependency in Ireland, culminating in his 
most famous suggestion that the: ‘Almighty indeed sent the potato blight but the English created 
the famine’.84 Mitchel’s brand of extreme nationalism and anti-liberal rhetoric was not always 
characteristic of Irish resistance to British rule in the nineteenth century but it left a powerful 
legacy.85 Mitchel himself was arrested, charged and convicted in the course of the 1848 uprising 
and was transported for fourteen years, taking little further direct part in Irish politics.86 He 
harked back to a time when the people relied on the land rather than industry to survive and this 
struck a chord, at least in the south of Ireland, in the wake of the Great Famine.  It was also a 
notion that was understood earlier by Drummond and the IRC in its scheme to use railways to 
shift people away from the land and into industry as the Morning Chronicle extract above shows 
clearly. Eventually, the removal of much of the poorer population was achieved by famine, 
whether or not that was the intention of the UK government. The issue of the ownership and use 
of the land then dominated Irish politics, rather than improved industry and communication as 
the IRC had hoped.87 Ireland, in the south at least, was no longer fertile ground for the politics and 
ambitions of economic liberals like O’Connell, Russell and even Peel, or for their most potent 
weapon of change – the railways. The Economist asserted in 1843 that the extent of Irish 
nationalism was simply not understood in the UK: 
 
 
The Scotch [sic] and the Welsh are still extremely national in their feelings, but the Irish are 
national throughout the whole state of their mind, feelings and physical composition. [They are] as 
intensely national a people as any race that ever existed.88 
 
 
A similar analysis was given by an Irish MP in 1850 to explain why he considered that the move to 
abolish the Lord Lieutenancy and treat Ireland in the same way as the rest of the UK deserved to 
fail. It simply did not take account of: ‘the moral, social, political, and religious differences 
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between the two nations. Of these the Channel is but in truth a very inadequate symbol’.89 It 
followed that if the ‘channel’ (Irish Sea) was an ‘inadequate symbol’ of the distinction between 
Ireland and the rest of the UK then the conquest of that channel by railways, steamships and the 
electric telegraph was not sufficient to counter Ireland’s sense of alienation within the UK which 
increased markedly after the Great Famine. 
As for Irish railways, they were slow to develop until the late 1840s but then progress was 
rapid and the essential parts of the system were completed by 1850.90 Ironically, in view of his 
argument for letting private capital deliver Irish railways, Peel had to intervene to divert capital 
from continental railways to Ireland.91  But he ensured that they were English as much as Irish 
undertakings, since by 1850 half of private capital in Irish railways was from England. 92 Many of 
the lines largely followed the design of the system suggested by the IRC, which Peel had been 
instrumental in defeating.93 A large scheme to put £10 million of public money into Irish railways 
was promoted in 1847 by Lord George Bentinck, who had led the opposition to repeal of the Corn 
Laws in 1846, and used the issue of Irish railways to challenge Russell’s Whig Government. 
Bentinck planned to deal with hunger but was opposed because Russell judged that the 
malnourished Irish poor were unfit to work on railways and would not benefit, as Bentinck 
claimed - and so the measure was lost.94  
The study of Irish railways suggests that there is at least some truth in Mitchel’s notion 
that Ireland was essentially a market and a source of cheap food for mainland Britain - and 
railways were the means of extracting that value from the latter country.  For example, the Dublin 
and Drogheda Railway’s list of shareholders contained many corn merchants from Manchester. 95 
That company was also chaired by G. A. Hamilton, who had taken part in the Devon Commission 
that aimed to consolidate agricultural land into larger units even before the Great Famine. 96  The 
Secretary of the London and Birmingham Railway had noted in August 1844 that the Dublin and 
Cashel Railway was essentially an Irish extension of its own lines, as it would: ‘concentrate in 
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Dublin the whole of the midland [sic] and south of Ireland [so that] they could not have a more 
important feeder’.97 There is also some support for Mitchel’s view in a report to the board of the 
LNWR in 1849, after the impact of famine was clear. The report anticipated with pleasure an 
increase in Irish cattle traffic because of: ‘the breaking up of a vast number of small-holdings and 
the conversion of these into larger-sized farms’. 98 That was a direct result of the famine and the 
clearance of population and may explain why the LNWR apparently invested £3 million in the line 
from Dublin to Cork to access that market.99 Ireland was also a promising market for English goods 
so that according to Lee: ‘investment by Lancashire businessmen in Irish railways was virtually an 
investment in the sales sections of their own businesses’.100 An important point to consider in this 
analysis is that this benefit to English, particularly Lancashire and Manchester, producers was the 
result of the privately commissioned railways favoured by Peel, rather than the publicly-funded 
and commissioned railways that the IRC had advocated that would have assisted in developing 
the productive economy of Ireland rather than it just being a ‘feeder’ to the British economy. 
Ireland got abundant railways by the 1860s but the south of the country did not get the 
development that the IRC had planned. Ireland became in Lee’s words an: ‘underdeveloped 
economy with a highly developed transport system’.101 The CHR was the product of a distinctly 
Anglo-centric approach to railway connection between Ireland and the rest of the UK. Where the 
IRC approach started with Ireland and then linked it to London (with some intended benefit for 
North Wales), the CHR started from its connection with London at Chester, largely ignored North 
Wales and created connections to Ireland’s privately-funded railways for the purpose of profit 
and government policy. Both approaches intended to keep Ireland in the Union - but the CHR (as 
compared to the IRC proposals) was more clearly a part of government policy that was designed 
for British economic and political purposes whereas the IRC proposals contained a greater 
element of Irish economic development. 
In the political environment that emerged more clearly in Ireland after O’Connell’s death 
in 1847 and the 1848 rebellion, the relevance of schemes for improved communication between 
London and Dublin declined. The failure to remove the post of Lord Lieutenant in 1850 also made 
the issue less critical as it stalled the aim to match economic and political union. However, such 
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communication remained important for the ‘business purposes’ of economic union (such as 
LNWR cattle traffic) as government acknowledged in 1856. The CHR continued to carry the mail at 
least as far as Holyhead - though government gave the contract for the sea passage of the mail to 
the City of Dublin Steam Packet Company in 1850. That was a strange outcome given the grant to 
the CHR of powers to operate steamships. Simmons is surely correct in his 1997 suggestion that 
this was a result of Irish pressure at Westminster.102 The CHR blamed the change of government 
and especially the loss of their consistent advocate Peel, who died in 1850.103  John Mitchel of 
Young Ireland was transported to Australia for his suggested use of railways for purposes of 
rebellion, which was not taken up widely. But it had a sequel in 1867 when the CHR and the 
steamships to Dublin were considered by Irish rebels as part of a plan to transport arms that they 
intended to steal from Chester Castle. The plot was foiled but it showed just how far Irish 
nationalism had strayed from O’Connell’s advocacy of a railway link between Dublin and London 
as a means to cement the Union between Britain and Ireland.104 
 
Peel defined Ireland as a constitutional question that affected the integrity of the UK. The CHR 
was an important part of the answer, thereby making the railway political in nature – and it was 
defined as such in its day. But the need to cross the Irish Sea meant that the link with Dublin was 
about more than railways. It was a railway plus steamships, and eventually the electric telegraph 
as well. Thus, it was not only that the CHR was applied to a constitutional question that made it a 
very different railway from its contemporaries but also its use in conjunction with steamships and 
the telegraph. The way that the railway was created and supported partly by the state, and given 
a monopoly of traffic, also added to its unique status. 
Surprisingly, the data gathered in Table 5.1 and presented in Figure 5.1 above show that 
the CHR actually made no difference to the communication time between London and Dublin 
between 1850 and 1860.  It failed in its single operational purpose, but that does not detract from 
the CHR’s status as a specific element in the Government’s Irish policy in the period 1843-50. It is 
clear from the analysis in this study that the intention of Peel’s government, and its Whig 
successor, was to use the line to control Ireland directly from London. The attempt to change the 
constitutional relationship between Great Britain and Ireland in 1850 through the abolition of the 
post of Lord Lieutenant was unique in being explicitly based on the opening of a railway line. The 
CHR’s special status was underlined by the fact that government guaranteed a five per cent return 
on capital for the CHR to support its construction - an approach that was used later in India.  
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In an age when railways were deemed to be the business of private investors, the attitude 
of government to the CHR was exceptional. And it was Peel, whose consistent pursuit of his 
Anglo-centric approach to British and Irish political and economic development who created the 
conditions for the CHR’s success. But that was not just a matter of personality as espoused by 
Carlyle and his view that: ‘the history of the world is but the biography of great men’.105 Peel 
represented powerful economic and political forces that shaped the economy and the 
constitution of the UK - and the CHR was ultimately a creation of those forces of laissez-faire 
economics and free trade politics. The complexities of Ireland, its politics and the trauma of 
famine – and the performance failures of the CHR itself - brought the experiment in the use of 
railways as a specific part of policy in Ireland to an early end. The CHR remained important and 
contentious for the rest of the century, but supported government in Ireland in a secondary role 
in the rapid transport of the mail and in ensuring that Irish MPs could attend Parliament, the 
purposes most often recalled and analysed by historians of the line. Thus, the CHR’s influence in 
Ireland declined steadily as the century wore on, even as it increased unexpectedly in North 
Wales.
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6. Railways, monopoly and the politics of “progress” in North Wales 1845-80 
 
‘[The first LNWR chairman, George Carr Glyn] ‘looked upon Railway enterprise with the eye of a 
statesman [as] a means of extending civilization, commerce, and enlightenment’.1   
 
This chapter and the next address how a political relationship developed between the Chester 
and Holyhead Railway (CHR), its London and North Western Railway (LNWR) operators, and the 
people and politicians of North Wales. The analysis is within the context of Leo Marx’s important 
questions noted in chapter 1 for assessing the how, why and by whom of the relationship 
between technology and politics.2 In this chapter, the focus is on the ownership of the technology 
and how its development beyond the CHR into the Welsh-speaking heartlands of North Wales 
was explained in the absence of any obvious commercial value. The justification for the CHR was a 
clear national priority to reach Dublin from London quickly – but that was not an argument that 
applied to the creation of an extensive network of lines within North Wales from 1850 to 1880. 
Indeed, the additional lines created complications for rapid access to Ireland because they added 
local traffic to the main line.3 The next chapter considers the reaction of society in North Wales as 
the railways developed and how that affected the nature of politics in the region. The resulting 
political contest between North Wales and the owners of the powerful railway technology will be 
analysed in chapter 8.  
The evidence in this chapter will show how the LNWR developed a monopoly of railways in 
North Wales in order to protect its main line to Ireland. As Simmons has made clear, the rural 
Welsh railways, including those connected to the CHR, had little commercial value and were 
generally: ‘bitterly disappointing to the shareholders of the companies concerned’.4 In North 
Wales that meant shareholders of the LNWR. In the absence of any obvious financial advantages, 
the chapter shows how the social and political interests that backed the construction of the CHR 
branch lines suggested a cultural purpose that was similar to the ambitions of the Education 
Commission of 1847 for Wales. It had examined Welsh society and schooling and was highly 
critical of them - and especially the Welsh language that predominated. It was in: ‘both tone and 
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content […] anti-Welsh, but this was not a racially based animosity, more a genuine contemporary 
middle class endorsement of Standard English as the language of civilized society’. 5  This chapter 
argues that the attitude in the education report – especially towards the Welsh language - was 
reflected by those who promoted the smaller railways that linked to the CHR, and then by the 
LNWR that acquired them. So the LNWR’s project to reach Dublin quickly fitted into the broader 
Anglicising project in Wales that centred on the work of the Education Commission. That is what 
eventually made railway development and operation so political in North Wales – as will be seen 
in the subsequent chapters. 
In order to set the North Wales research in the broader context of politics and technology 
discussed in chapter 1, the study looks further afield for a comparable approach to that in North 
Wales. The notion of a similarity between India and Wales in the challenge to their languages 
from Victorian “improvers” is suggested by Colley’s 2014 analysis of the UK, which draws a 
parallel between the approaches adopted in each, where English was seen as an essential first 
step to receiving the “benefits” of progress.6 As was seen in chapter 1, the wish to deliver “moral 
improvement” alongside private profit was part of the political dimension of railway investment in 
the empire.7 This chapter looks for parallels in North Wales, where such improvement was also 
seen as necessary according to the Education Commission of 1847. 
 
6.1 The establishment of a railway monopoly in North Wales 1845-80 
 
In order to develop the findings of the previous four chapters in respect of the ‘system of beliefs’ 
of those exercising control over the use of railways, it is helpful to consider the characteristics of 
the people who led the LNWR. Its first operational manager from 1846 was Mark Huish who: 
‘demonstrated managerial capitalism at the proto-corporate stage of Britain's history’.8 George 
Carr Glynn, its first chairman, ran a bank with the largest railway business in Britain.9 He saw the 
LNWR as being more than a mere railway company and: ‘looked upon Railway enterprise with the 
eye of a statesman [as] a means of extending civilization, commerce, and enlightenment’ – exactly 
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the mixture of moral purpose and private profit noted earlier.10  He was succeeded by Lord 
Chandos: ‘an early example of a member of the high aristocracy entering the world of business’. 11 
Richard Moon, who chaired the company in the years 1861-91, was a Conservative and devout 
Anglican.12 At different times they held important positions in the largest industrial enterprise in 
the world. The profile of these senior corporate leaders was very different from that of  the bulk of 
the population of North Wales, as this study will show. 
As the chapters relating to Irish policy have already demonstrated, there was a close 
relationship between the state, which provided significant financial backing to the CHR and the 
LNWR.  It is not easy to characterise that relationship because of the laissez-faire economic 
approach of government which meant that it wished to remain at “arms-length” from private 
enterprise. The evidence from previous chapters shows the closeness of the relationship between 
government and the LNWR. For example, the allocation of £1million of capital by the London and 
Birmingham Railway (LBR) in 1844 - the largest component company of the LNWR - to the CHR 
was an example of how the public policy of building a railway to Holyhead was implemented in 
part by private means. It was a decision communicated privately to the prime minister by the LBR, 
as shown in Chapter 4.13 The Government sustained its official line that it did not fund railways 
and the company was repaid indirectly through enhancements to the mail contract.  In like 
manner, a director of the LBR was requested by Peel to become involved in an Irish railway in 
support of the latter’s notion that private capital was the way forward for railways in Ireland. 14 
Another example from the period of the American Civil War 1861-5 showed how an unofficial 
government policy was supported by the LNWR.  The official Government position was neutrality, 
but individual members of Palmerston’s Government, most notably Gladstone, suggested a 
different policy when he told an audience that the Confederate States of America had ‘made a 
nation’.15 That informal government position was supported by the LNWR. It sold two Holyhead-
based steamers to the Confederacy, which converted them for war purposes in breach of official 
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British policy.16 In terms of more routine domestic politics, the LNWR also had a virtual monopoly 
of newsprint that was essential to national communication, and always held two weeks’ supply of 
the material.17 These examples illustrate the alignment of the LNWR with the state, somewhat 
elusive in official sources - but tangible in its operation. It was certainly consistent with that 
relationship that the LNWR Board decided that the company badge: ‘should represent the figure 
of Britania [sic] encircled by the inscription London and North Western Railway’.18 Similarly, it 
decided that London time should be exported to all points on the line and feature in all its 
timetables, clearly demonstrating its metropolitan focus.19  That showed that it was a company 
that represented, according to its first chairman: ‘uniformity of system and concentration of 
authority’, which was certainly consistent with a close connection with the state, and was also 
likely to complicate the relationship with the remote and rather alien political environment in 
North Wales.20 
 In North Wales, the LNWR used railways in a monopolistic manner, and 
established its position to do this in three distinct phases. During the first phase from 1845-60, the 
LNWR and GWR struggled for ownership of important lines that accessed North Wales and 
Birkenhead from the direction of Shrewsbury, which became a vital town in railway development 
in that period.21  During the second phase from 1861 to 1875, after money supply became more 
difficult for the large companies, railways were often built by contractors and then operated 
independently or sold on to the highest bidder.22 Railways were built in areas where contractors 
were confident that larger companies would be interested in buying them in order to secure their 
own position in a region, and to prevent a rival company from doing so. The third phase from 
1876 to 1880 was one in which companies began to build lines for themselves once again, and 
this was reflected in the activities of the LNWR in North Wales. While government had supported 
the CHR and the LNWR up to 1850, it did not protect them from competition thereafter, and the 
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LNWR’s powerful position was slowly eroded, but without seriously affecting its national 
supremacy among railway companies.23 
 Even before the completion of the CHR in 1850, the LNWR and CHR were alert to the 
dangers of competition in the North Wales region.24 In September 1845, the CHR announced its 
intention to build lines along most of the access routes to the North Wales coast.25 That was 
consistent with the LNWR’s practice of building or acquiring strategic railway lines after 1847 for 
no other reason than stifling competition.26 It clearly remained nervous about the Great Western 
Railway (GWR), even after the defeat of the latter’s Porth Dinllaen railway (PDR) in 1846 – and it 
identified almost the whole of North Wales as an area that it wished to dominate.27 According to 
the GWR secretary, who gave evidence to a select committee in 1853 about this period, the 
LNWR was keen to maintain its own monopoly, while preventing any other company developing 
the capacity to challenge them.28 While it can be assumed that his opinion was not entirely 
impartial, North Wales provided a case in point. Figure 6.3 below shows the potential directions 
from which competition for the region might come. Although the CHR and the LNWR were 
technically separate companies, the former acted in support of the latter as the study will show. 
By 1880 many branches had been added to the CHR to protect it, so that any analysis of the 
impact of the CHR should include the branches that connected to it within North Wales.  
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Figure 6.1  Potential competitor routes and ports to the Chester and Holyhead                        
Railway in North Wales in 1840 
 
 
 
 
 
By comparison, Figure 6.2 below demonstrates the success of the LNWR. It shows that all the 
potential routes to the CHR and Irish traffic identified in Figure 6.1 were closed to opposition by 
1880.  The map includes only strategic lines and is not a complete map of railways in the area. 
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The first priority acquisition for the CHR, even while it was completing its own line 
between 1844 and 1850, was the Chester and Birkenhead Railway (CBR) that was a potential 
target for the GWR in its drive northwards. It was a highly strategic line that gave access to the 
Mersey and the Irish and Atlantic traffic to the west (A in figure 6.1). The CHR was interested in 
purchasing this line from 1844, but it was dismayed when its offer was rejected in December of 
that year.29 The arrangement between the CHR and the CBR had created some opposition and the 
matter remained contentious within the board of the CBR.30 By March 1845, it was apparent that 
the CHR was committed to extra spending on a bridge over the Menai Straits and that 
government was offering rather less for the mail contract than it had expected. CBR shareholders 
were then nervous about a financial connection with the CHR, given its poorer financial prospects. 
The CHR refused a revised proposal from the CBR to merge with them, and the latter decided to 
oppose the Bill that contained that amalgamation. A furious row ensued, followed by a vote that 
committed the CBR to oppose amalgamation with the CHR and become a potential ally of the 
GWR. 31  As a result, the CHR and LNWR became vulnerable from the direction of Shrewsbury 
because that was a missing piece in a GWR route from London to the Mersey. 
The loss of the CBR was the first in a series of failures by the CHR (and its parent company 
the LNWR) to contain that threat from the south of Chester (B in Figure 6.3) as the GWR pressed 
for an outlet towards Ireland via the Mersey on the narrow gauge, having been prevented by 
government from using its preferred broad gauge north of Bristol on new lines. The CBR was 
confident that it could survive without the CHR, and concentrated on the situation south of 
Chester, where the North Wales Mineral Railway (NWMR) had created a link between Wrexham 
and Chester in 1844. Chester, like Shrewsbury, became a highly strategic location as it gave access 
along the NWMR towards Shrewsbury and the West Midlands – and it was soon at the centre of a 
major dispute.  Shrewsbury and Chester Railway (SCR) staff and business were kept out of Chester 
station by the LNWR using: ‘rails, posts, bolts, chains […] stretching across the entrance of the 
road to the station’.32  The LNWR was accused in parliament of being: ‘the leviathan of railway 
companies, […] which exercised a huge and unjust monopoly, and lived upon litigation, se lfishly 
and constantly oppressing the smaller companies’.33  
The SCR could not compete unaided with the might of the LNWR and between 1852 and 
1854 it joined with the Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway (SBR) and attempted to combine 
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with the GWR - the only company capable of resisting the LNWR. By 1854, the LNWR was an 
amalgamation that had become the ‘enemy of amalgamation’.34 But it could not resist 
competition on that occasion, and by September 1854 the GWR had reached Birkenhead via its 
connections with its new allies in Shrewsbury, Chester and Birmingham. It was a rare victory for 
the Shrewsbury and mid-Wales interests that Sir Watkin Williams Wynn, the largest of all Welsh 
landowners, marked with a great banquet.  35  That was an early sign of the LNWR’s negative image 
among some important Welsh economic and political interests. The GWR success in reaching 
Birkenhead was certainly significant - hence the banquet and a stiff response from the LNWR. A 
group of LNWR senior directors visited Chester and Holyhead and threatened to build a rival new 
line to Birkenhead.36 The issue was not resolved until 1860, when the LNWR and GWR were so 
concerned about the cost of their contest that they agreed joint ownership of the line from 
Chester to Birkenhead.37  
The LNWR and CHR had more success to the west of Chester and the threat of a line 
towards Mold (C in Figure 6.3) that could have shortened the route to Holyhead from London or 
served another port towards Ireland such as Rhyl. As early as 1845, the CHR had plans to 
construct a railway to Mold but progress was not as smooth as it had hoped.38 The increasing 
costs of construction put pressure on profits, and by March 1849 the CHR were unable to 
complete the purchase of the Mold Railway (MR) because of shareholder opposition. LNWR 
Chairman George Glyn was concerned that if the CHR did not buy the Mold line then another 
railway company would, thereby damaging the LNWR’s strategic interest in keeping large rival 
companies such as the GWR out of North Wales. Glyn persuaded a majority to support the 
acquisition – a result that suited the LNWR rather more than the CHR and its increasingly worried 
shareholders. 39 The Mold line barely covered its operating costs in 1850, which prompted one 
shareholder to characterise its acquisition by the CHR as a ‘most infamous and impudent 
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robbery’.40 The process demonstrated the limited freedom that the CHR had in its operations; in 
all but the most minor of issues it was in the hands of the LNWR, which was steadily gaining 
power in North Wales.41 
After this initial phase of activity, attention turned to new railways that were being 
constructed by independent contractors. In 1854, a line was projected from Wrexham towards 
Denbigh, with the possibility of reaching the Irish Sea at Rhyl and establishing a port to Ireland 
that would rival Holyhead. The GWR was reported to be interested in such a line as a foundation 
for its own network in North Wales to build on its success in gaining access to Shrewsbury, 
Chester and Birkenhead.42 The GWR initiative was blocked by the Vale of Clwyd Railway (VCR) that 
joined the CHR at Rhyl and potentially closed off access to that town to the LNWR’s greatest rival 
(D in Figure 6.3).43 The VCR was nominally an independent line, which technically left the way 
open for the GWR to express an interest in it in competition with the LNWR.  In 1860, when the 
contractor Thomas Savin began to seek powers to extend the VCR towards Corwen to the south-
west and Mold to the east, the line became central to the battle between the GWR and LNWR.44 
The GWR announced its intention to run expresses from London to a new station at Rhyl once it 
acquired the VCR – so the LNWR purchased enough shares to control the VCR and by April 1861 
the LNWR’s ‘empire-building proclivities’ had secured the line - and thwarted the GWR once 
again. 45   
Further west, another private contractor called Edmund Sharpe built the Conway and 
Llanrwst Railway (CLR) in 1861 that joined the CHR at present day Llandudno Junction (E in Figure 
6.3).  Comments from Sharpe on the occasion of him leaving the area for Switzerland, after a 
profitable sale to the LNWR, demonstrated that he knew that the line was at the centre of local 
railway politics. He told his banquet guests  
 
No one who takes up a map of this part of the country can fail to observe that a continuation of 
this line to Corwen would open up to others as ready an access to Llandudno and the Irish Sea  [as 
at present enjoyed by LNWR at Holyhead, but] to attempt to work this line […] in connection with 
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and in continuation of the Llandudno Railway [against the consent of the LNWR] would have been 
a somewhat dangerous experiment.46 
 
 
In 1857, Sharpe had written a pamphlet suggesting that no profitable standard gauge railway was 
possible in the Conwy valley. His solution then was a series of tramways on the opposite side of 
the valley from that on which he actually built the line.  47  The calculation changed six years later 
because the LNWR wanted the line in order to block the route to its rivals; it was not really 
concerned with Sharpe’s analysis that the line might not pay. Once Sharpe and the local 
landowners understood that, the CLR was built and they made their profit, while the LNWR 
ensured that its main line was not threatened by the GWR approaching from the south and 
creating a port at Llandudno to compete with Holyhead. Sharpe’s analysis of the LNWR position in 
North Wales indicated just how powerful it had become, and how far it was prepared to go to 
maintain its monopoly position in North Wales, even securing branch lines that did not make a 
profit. This lack of profitability was shown when the line was later extended and local  people 
complained of  the ‘parsimony’ of the LNWR in the delay in opening the extension from Llanrwst 
to Betws-y-Coed: ‘for no other reason than the smallness of the profit likely to be realised by the 
Company’.48  
The building of lines west from the Shrewsbury and Chester Railway (H in Figure 6.3) was 
led by Henry Robertson, another local contractor and promoter of railways who had close 
connections to the GWR.49 He had also exposed Robert Stephenson (the CHR engineer) at the 
enquiry into the Dee Bridge collapse of 1847, showing that the renowned engineer should have 
known that a cast iron rail bridge was liable to failure because of the brittleness of the material.50 
By 1860, Robertson had begun to demonstrate the inaccuracy of George Stephenson’s earlier 
claim about the PDR (noted in Chapter 2) that a railway through the middle of North Wales was 
‘impracticable’.51 Robertson was engineer of the line from Ruabon to Llangollen and thence to 
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Corwen, and he revealed his strategic ambitions to a meeting at Bala in 1860, when he announced 
his intention to continue north-west to the slate town of Blaenau Ffestiniog.52 Working closely 
with Benjamin Piercy, he aimed thereby to complete the original PDR scheme discussed in 
Chapter 2, apart from the final stretch from Pwllheli to Porth Dinllaen itself.53 While the LNWR 
may have liked to acquire these lines, they were generally peripheral to its core area of interest in 
North Wales so long as they did not include a port capable of challenging Holyhead, such as Porth 
Dinllaen. But that possibility continued to concern the LNWR into the 1860s, as shown by 
Robertson’s stated intentions, and by other observations such as those of the Liverpool Mercury - 
that Porth Dinllaen and a route through central Wales remained: ‘the shortest and best means of 
communication between England [sic] and Ireland’.54  That comment occurred in one of a series of 
articles that identified Wales as a national entity, and made the case for a railway system that 
held it together.  As Grigg has observed, the railway lines of Wales are largely Anglo-centric as 
they travel east to west.55 By contrast, the embryonic railway manifesto for Wales in 1864 
wanted: ‘one if not two lines, extending north to south […] to render the system complete’.56 A 
further article in the series referred to this as an explicitly political: ‘grand task of uniting the 
whole of the Principality of Wales’.57 Although the articles were anonymous, it seems likely that 
they were authored by Henry Robertson, who was a Liberal MP in Shrewsbury 1862-65, and 
engineer of many of the lines mentioned in the articles.58 The articles showed a frustration at the 
lack of attention to the needs of North Wales from existing railway operators and offered a very 
different set of priorities from those of the LNWR. While the LNWR focused on Ireland, the author 
of these articles took the Welsh perspective that railways were: ‘essential to the working of 
minerals in Wales’.59 The articles also observed that public railways had failed the owners of 
mines and quarries and that more needed to be done on their behalf. 
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So the LNWR remained vigilant, and took the opportunity to obstruct the possibility of a 
line north from the Cambrian coast route towards Porth Dinllaen by acquiring the Carnarvonshire 
Railway (CR). In February 1869, the LNWR reported that an opportunity had arisen to purchase 
that line and that it proposed to do so because of the access it gave them to the slate traffic (F in 
Figure 6.3).60  In fact, it was just another in the list of North Wales railways that enjoyed a short 
independent life before being absorbed by the LNWR, largely for strategic rather than traffic 
purposes.61 In its final phase of expansion in North Wales, the LNWR extended the CLR from 
Llanrwst south to Blaenau Ffestiniog (G in Figure 6.3). The aim was to prevent the GWR from 
claiming the route, even though little traffic was expected.62 It was opened in 1879, ahead of the 
GWR’s arrival in Blaenau Ffestiniog from Bala in 1883 as planned by Robertson and noted above. 
The LNWR again showed how determined it was to prevent competition by building a line to 
Blaenau Ffestiniog that included a long and costly tunnel through hard rock.63 This line provides 
an example of how the interests of the LNWR in preventing competition were not aligned with 
those of North Wales in the strategic development of its economy,. The Porth Dinllaen railway 
schemes centred on Porthmadog, which was the focus of the developing regional economy in the 
1830s and 1840s because of its extensive slate, shipping and railway facilities.64 That was 
undermined by the CHR, which denied the London traffic to Porthmadog in 1850 - and then in 
1879 created a rival outlet for slate along the Conwy valley with its line to Ffestiniog, so that 
Conwy was then: ‘in active rivalry with Portmadoc as a flourishing and important shipping outlet 
for the slate trade - the staple industry of North Wales’.65 Such developments tended to reinforce 
the notion that the LNWR was not in tune with the region, which made it less likely that it would 
enjoy a positive position in local politics. 
 Although this overall process of establishing an LNWR railway monopoly in North Wales 
appears complex, it aimed to achieve three objectives. First, to secure the monopoly of the short-
sea Irish traffic between Holyhead and Dublin, and in that it was wholly successful. Second, it 
wished to consolidate the regional advantage given to the company by the decision to restrict the 
spread of the broad gauge. In this respect the LNWR was only partially successful. The GWR did 
establish a narrow gauge route to the Mersey at Birkenhead and made some progress in mid – 
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Wales through acquiring the lines built by Robertson. But the dominance of the LNWR in the 
region was not impaired seriously by these GWR successes.  Third, the LNWR aimed to sustain the 
national momentum it had been given when it was created in 1846 through its early dominance 
of the prosperous UK cities of Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham from its London base. Its 
objective was to remain the UK’s ‘Premier Line’.66  It did so in an aggressive manner in the various 
regions adjacent to its linear system from London northwards – North Wales being but one 
example, and perhaps the only one where virtually all competition was excluded, apart from on 
the periphery of the region.67  
The progress described above might have benefited North Wales more if the purpose of 
the railway monopoly had been to develop the potential of the region as outlined in the railway 
manifesto of 1864. But even first advertisement for the CHR in 1848 made clear that the LNWR 
interest in North Wales was its line to Ireland: ‘Chester and Holyhead Railway opened throughout 
to Holyhead – London to Dublin in 13 hours’.68 There was no part of the advertisement devoted to 
accessing North Wales itself.  However, from 1850 there was greater consideration by the CHR of 
the potential to create profit from within North Wales. It was driven initially by the refusal of 
Russell’s Government to increase funding to the CHR in 1850, which in turn forced the CHR to 
examine other sources of traffic under the direction of chairman, Samuel Peto.69 Peto demanded 
that CHR managers engage aggressively with local industry and provide access to its main line to 
quarry and mine owners in order to boost business.70 His initiative was not intended to benefit 
the people of economy of North Wales in the manner that the Irish Railway Commission’s 
proposals might have worked for Ireland. It was an economic necessity and was directed towards 
what the CHR could take out of North Wales in terms of mineral extraction rather than how it 
could work with local people and businesses to improve the functioning of the North Wales 
economy. For example, the CHR identified taking business off the local and prosperous coastal 
shipping concerns in order to boost its own traffic.71 The CHR also began to identify tourism as a 
possible source of revenue, although its aim to make Bangor (rather than Llandudno or Rhyl) into 
the ‘Brighton of Wales’ was evidence of its limited understanding of the potential of the region - 
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and that effort failed.72 The CHR approach was consistent with Dodd’s assertion that railway 
development in North Wales stunted the local economy as noted in Chapter 1.  The problem was 
perceived at the time, even by those who supported the CHR. Edward Parry, the first chronicler of 
the line, suggested that better management would improve profits.73 But Parry made one 
important proviso: ‘this cannot be done by the employment of parties ignorant alike of the 
language of the people, and the trade of the country, even in the locality of the stations’.74  The 
CHR addressed the potential for traffic from within North Wales once Peto arrived. However, its 
overall attitude to the region, articulated by Parry, shows that it was still essentially an English 
company operating in an unfamiliar environment; and the CHR was apparently not prepared to 
adapt to that environment. That rather Anglo-centric approach to the use of railways in North 
Wales had the potential to create political tension between the railway company, the people of 
North Wales and their representatives. In doing so it would forge a new and contentious form of 
local politics in North Wales with railways forming an important item on the political agenda. 
This section has demonstrated the authoritarian character of the LNWR in its approach to 
railway competition in North Wales and thereby answered Leo Marx’s “who” and “how” of 
technological operation (via railways) in North Wales from 1850. The next section explores the 
system of beliefs of those who built and operated the lines and explores whether it was similar to 
any approach to railway development examined in chapter 1. That helps to create the political 
profile of technological deployment in North Wales in order that its interaction with the people 
and politicians of the region can be explored in the two succeeding chapters. 
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Figure 6.2 Significant railway lines completed by 1883 in North Wales 
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6.2  Railways and a ‘system of beliefs’ in North Wales 1855-80 
 
At a meeting of the LNWR in 1848 a shareholder was able to state without any sign of dissent that 
the Welsh were ‘simple-minded’.75 That sentiment was not an isolated one. The opening of many 
railways in the UK was an occasion for an elaborate ceremony and the deployment of the 
language of “cooperation” and “progress”, which as Freeman notes: ‘endorsed society’s 
governing status quo’.76 They were highly political events, and in North Wales the dignitaries 
referred to the arrival of the railway as being a positive invasion of the country in which the aim 
was apparently to “civilise” Welsh people in North Wales. An early example was when the Vale 
Clwyd Railway (VCR) opened in 1858. While the LNWR were viewing it as a strategic acquisition, it 
was being proposed by its promoters as part of an unofficial mission of social improvement so 
that: ‘When the barrier of language will be removed – which railways are the most sure means of 
doing – the [Welsh person] would be able to stand upon the platform of civilization without a 
blush’.77  
It was the invasions of the Saxons, and a comparison with the Crimean War that formed 
the core of the Chairman’s remarks at the opening of the Conwy and Llanrwst Railway (CLR) which 
was also primarily built as a strategic route for sale to the LNWR or GWR, as noted in the last 
section: 
 
 There were still fortresses in Wales which the Saxons could never storm. These fortresses have 
fallen today […] but carried by no murderous thunder of artillery, nor by angry clash of hostile 
hosts […] Our Sebastopol has yielded to diplomacy, and this railway has made a breach whereby 
Saxon youth may poise their lances before Celtic beauty…78 
 
 
When the Cambrian Railway along the coast from Aberystwyth to Pwllheli was commenced, one 
speaker reckoned that its engineers were greater than Owain Glyndwr, the Welsh rebel at the end 
of the fourteenth century. Glyndwr had driven the English out of Wales, whereas the railways had 
brought them back again.79  When the line was completed in 1867, the same speaker thought it: 
‘added another and stronger tie connecting England and Wales’.80 
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Were these sentiments replicated at similar events in the UK but outside England? 
Scotland and Ireland had a more recent history of conquest by English forces than North Wales, 
but the opening of the Morayshire Railway in Scotland, in the same area as the Battle of Culloden 
of 1746, did not reflect that history.  There was no reference to conquest and the audience was 
merely provided with a description of the route.81 Similarly, when the Dublin and Drogheda 
Railway was opened in Ireland in 1844 - a line that passed the site of the Cromwellian Siege of 
Drogheda - the Lord Lieutenant was most conciliatory and made no mention of the historic 
connections, battles or invasions – and did not suggest that the railway would civilise the local 
people. He simply observed that: ‘the rich man does good to the poor by expending his capital 
among them’.82 The openings of railways seemed to follow a formula that showed the extent to 
which they were part of the established order. This was the case at the opening of the Conway 
and Llanrwst Railway in North Wales in 1863 discussed above. The first toast was to ‘The Queen’ 
and other royals; the next to the ‘Army, Navy and the Volunteers’; ‘the Bishops and the Clergy’; 
‘the House of Lords and the House of Commons’; ‘the railway company’; ‘the landed proprietors’, 
and finally ‘the ladies’.83 Excluding the last, this was the entire paraphernalia of power in the 
Victorian UK state. The format was no different in North Wales than elsewhere in the UK, which in 
itself is a significant point.84 For in North Wales, the language of the bulk of the population was 
not the language used on those occasions, and their religion was not the one represented at the 
openings.85  
There is greater similarity to the language that was employed at railway openings in North 
Wales in more in far-flung parts of the British Empire such as India, where the format comparable 
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to that described above - as shown by Kerr’s study.86 When the Madras Railway opened in 1856 
Lord Harris, the Governor of Madras, told the audience it was: 
 
 
So close to Arcot, where we may consider ourselves on classic ground. Here Clive first brought 
himself to prominence and commenced that glorious career from which has resulted […] the 
predominance of British power in this country. Let us hope that as great results […] may be 
effected by the undertaking we inaugurate here this day.87 
 
 
In December 1864, the Punjab Railway opened in India and the Anglesey Central Railway (ACR) in 
North Wales. The language at both was similar. At the opening of the latter Sir Richard Bulkeley, a 
prime mover of the CHR project, told the audience that:  
 
 
Not until the Saxons of old got possession of the island [of Anglesey] were they ever able to hold 
and keep possession of the country [of North Wales]; and this railway now penetrated through its 
very heart. […] He never saw any country so much in want of civilization as a certain portion of the 
line through which they came that day.88 
 
 
In India too, hope was expressed that the railways would be a force for Victorian “progress”.  In 
both North Wales and India, speeches referred to the railways as coming to an area in need of 
some form of civilising force. The language in the Punjab reflected that used in Anglesey, with the 
hopes in India that the: ‘various nations and races of the Punjab, as well as the semi-barbarous 
tribes that girdle its frontier, will all the sooner succumb to its [the railway’s] civilising influence’. 89 
There was a sense that both India and Wales were considered by some to be cradles of 
superstition and antiquated beliefs. The Britannia Tubular Bridge (BTB) of 1850 across the Menai 
Straits, close to the area that Bulkeley thought needed civilizing, was described by Philp in 1868 
within his History of Progress in Great Britain: 
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Near the very spot where the last battle was fought having for its object the extermination of a 
sanguinary and baneful superstition there now stands a great monument to the triumphs of 
progress. The [BTB] crosses the Menai Straits near the place where the army of Suetonius fought 
the Britons who had assembled to guard the Druids, whom they reverenced as a sacred order of 
men. […] No longer have we need of extermination; the aim and effort of today is to mingle the 
families of the human race, and to trust to the peaceful operation of truth to root out error and 
superstition wherever they may still linger and clog the onward paths of men.90 
 
 
For those in any doubt about the message, Philp provided two illustrations showing the difference 
between an ancient battle and a modern invasion by the forces of progress in North Wales. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration  6.1: Comparison of the invasion of Anglesey by Seutonius who defeated the Druids by 
force in 61 AD (left) and the modern invasion of Anglesey on the same spot using Robert 
Stephenson’s Britannia Tubular Bridge and railway in 1850 (right).  
 
Taken from Robert Philp, The History of Progress in Great Britain (London: Houlston and Wright, 
1868), and 48-49. 
 
 
Similarly, in November 1868 the railway at Umballah in the Central Provinces of India was opened 
and was followed by an account that mocked the supposed superstitions of the locals who: 
 
 
Crowded round the engine, bewildered and astonished. […] They had heard of English magic, and 
of the many inventions and devices we had learned from Satan, but now it seemed that we were 
outdoing even ourselves, and had got the Evil One bodily amongst us…91 
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In 1863, The Times made a direct comparison between Wales and India, and considered the likely 
impact of railways in an article about the financial importance of the English language to the 
Welsh, which it considered similar to the benefits to Indians. The paper directly reflected the 
argument of this thesis that railways in North Wales were seen by their promoters as being on a 
political mission. They were a modern, progressive invasion and conquest of Wales by the English 
- with the CHR following the same route from Chester that was taken by Edward I in his conquest 
of Wales in the thirteenth century: 
 
Not with bow and bills, but with money and locomotives, and the new invaders were more 
successful than the old ones. The parallel is indeed a curious one. […] The halts of the British 
engineer have represented exactly the halts and stages of the Plantagenet Monarch. […] The 
railway took up its track but has already exceeded its bounds […] and will soon cross the very heart 
of Powysland [North Wales] from east to west.92 
 
Thus, in India and in Wales the railway was seen as an invading force – but one that was 
modernising and missionary in intent and that would lift local populations to a higher level of 
what English contemporaries considered to be “civilisation”. In North Wales, it was one very 
English company – the LNWR – which was in charge of the process after it acquired the branch 
lines to the CHR. Although missionary activity was not one of its formal intentions for the region, 
it was noted earlier that the LNWR’s first chairman regarded ‘extending civilization, commerce, 
and enlightenment’ as among the benefits of railways. That general perspective on the use of 
railways by the LNWR chairman was made specific by the promoters of the lines that the LNWR 
acquired in North Wales to secure its overall monopoly. Thus, while the LNWR did not specify 
political objectives in its activities in North Wales, its whole approach incorporated a metropolitan 
perspective and was inherently unsympathetic to Welsh culture as the comment from Parry about 
the work of the CHR noted above makes clear.93 
While Ireland may have been the greater political challenge to UK government, Wales was the 
more alien to metropolitan culture in terms of its language and customs. It was the least English 
of the countries that made up the UK, though for some it was not a country at all, and its sense of 
nationality was not as strong as it was in Ireland.94 Where Ireland had absentee landlords, Wales 
had a powerful, English, resident elite.95 In North Wales the status of the elite was originally based 
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on the ownership of land and the membership of the established church. The arrival of the LNWR 
– the largest industrial enterprise in the world in the mid nineteenth century - was, as The Times 
suggested, an invasion on similar scale but greater geographical extent than the incursion of 
Edward I in the thirteenth century. It added the LNWR as owners of the railway to the existing 
sources of power, and also to the political elite in North Wales. The older Welsh landowners were 
personally identifiable to the people but the LNWR was a new form of metropolitan commerce, 
owned by invisible shareholders and run by a new professional elite.96 A remark made by LNWR 
chairman Richard Moon at Caernarfon (the centre of medieval power in North Wales) in 1870 
suggested that he understood the social and economic implications of the LNWR monopoly and 
the status of the company in North Wales. For Moon, the LNWR was similar to the former feudal 
landlords, which placed the LNWR in North Wales alongside the region’s ruling elite. He told his 
metropolitan guests: ‘from London, Liverpool and Manchester, and other places’, who had been 
invited to the opening of a tunnel under Caernarfon: 
 
 
The [LNWR] had only accomplished in commerce what they [the landowners] had done in 
feudalism long ago. They had woven a girdle which now completed the circle round Wales, and 
they had done so in a manner that would neither disturb artists or tourists . Their object had been 
to bring coal into North Wales and take back slates.97 
 
 
Moon thus articulated a role for the LNWR in North Wales which extended beyond merely 
protecting its Irish traffic, and was consistent with the work that Peto had started in 1850 as 
discussed earlier. The LNWR aimed to bring in the produce of England and take away the mineral 
resources of the region in a manner that would not compromise the beauty of the area and its 
promise of traffic from ‘artists and tourists’.  Moon seemed unconcerned with any impact upon 
the local population (few of whom seem to have been invited) from the largest change in the area 
since Edward I had built the castles of the thirteenth century. He regarded the completion of the 
LNWR monopoly as comparable to the power of feudalism – an order of society that railways had 
done much to undermine.98 Moon’s comments illustrate clearly a point made by Revill in 2012 
about the feudalistic nature of geographical railway monopolies that were: ‘every bit as 
exploitative and coercive as that of a medieval monarch’ – though as noted earlier, The Times 
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estimated the power of the railway in North Wales as being much greater than that of Edward I, 
the region’s own medieval monarch.99 Such a position in the region was inherently political – the 
LNWR was a technological force that was bound to challenge the way of life of the region and its 
political structure.  
 
This chapter has addressed aspects of Leo Marx’s questions from chapter 1 in order to show how 
railways were extended beyond the main line from Chester to Holyhead in a manner that suited 
the LNWR’s strategic interest in keeping out rivals from the region. It also indirectly supported the 
Anglicising agenda that was articulated by government through the Education Commission of 
1847. The evidence in this chapter shows how the LNWR emerged from ferocious railway 
competition in the mid-nineteenth century to become the most powerful railway company in 
North Wales.  
For the Education Commissioners and railway builders, North Wales was a suitable subject for 
Victorian improvement. In that sense, North Wales had a similar experience to the much larger 
example of India, where Victorian improvers were also at work while the railways were being 
built. Kerr’s views on the role of railways as a modernising influencing in India are strikingly 
replicated by evidence of the analysis of North Wales, and Colley’s suggestion that in both cases 
the imposition of the English language was an important part of the process is also apparent in 
the evidence provided in this chapter.  Richard Moon’s comparison of the impact of the railway in 
North Wales as being similar to that of feudalism – creating a girdle around Wales - is telling. 
While this chapter has shown that the development of railways in North Wales was a highly 
political exercise, the next two chapters examine how the local people reacted and how that 
contributed to the development of the political response as the vote was extended to more men 
by 1880. After that, new political mechanisms became available to challenge the control of the 
LNWR over the region’s access to railways and how the benefits of that technology were 
distributed between its owners and the people of North Wales.
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7.   The London and North Western Railway and the politics and people of North Wales 1850-80 
 
‘If any Company deserves to be opposed then this great Company certainly does […] let the whole 
community take it in hand.’1 
 
The LNWR was a formidable political actor in North Wales and its use of technological power 
occurred at the end of a long period when Wales had been regarded by its powerful English 
neighbours as ‘intellectually backward and politically dormant’.2  The arrival of the railway was a 
factor that transformed the capacity of people to engage in politics by providing both a support 
for collective action and an object of political interest. This chapter starts with an examination of 
important factors that affected the response of the Welsh population to the arrival of the railway 
and considers whether these can be placed in a theoretical framework such as that offered by 
internal colonialism.  It also analyses the interaction of changes within North Wales and those at 
the UK level that gradually gave political voice to a larger number of people beyond the traditional 
landed elite. The second part of the chapter traces the development of the political relationship 
between the railway and the people as the latter struggled to influence the owners of this 
technology after the initial shock of its arrival in the region. This struggle focused initially on the 
issue of how much the LNWR was required to pay in local poor rates after it joined the existing 
North Wales elite as a major owner of land, which had been the source of political power in North 
Wales for centuries. The other side of the financial relationship was what the LNWR charged for 
freight and passenger traffic on its network and that is also explored in the second section, along 
with the attitude of the LNWR to local people and politicians. The third part of the chapter looks 
for evidence that people other than politicians engaged in a quasi-political challenge to the LNWR 
in the period before most men had the vote. The chapter identifies the beginning of a change in 
the power balance between railway and people as the franchise was extended. North Wales 
lacked national political leadership such as Ireland had enjoyed with Daniel O’Connell, but the 
region happened to be the home of William Gladstone, the most prominent politician of the 
Victorian age. He had both personal and political reasons for taking up the issues of railways and 
Welsh politics by the 1870s, even if he did not make the connection between them until the 
1880s - as will be seen in chapter 8.   
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7.1 Setting the scene: North Wales society and its early reactions to railways  
1845 - 65 
 
Existing scholarship has tended to emphasise four issues at the heart of Welsh politics in the 
period from 1850-1900 – English dominance of land, religion and education and the challenge to 
the Welsh language.3  This study adds the concern with railways as a feature of political life in 
North Wales. It was clearly a factor in strengthening distinctly Welsh institutions such as the 
Eisteddfod and Nonconformist religion through the help it gave in organising large numbers to 
participate beyond their own towns and villages.  At the same time, the railway conducted its 
business entirely in English and was a conduit for English influence through newspapers, tourism 
and exposure of North Wales to the products of the English economy. The LNWR also became a 
major landowner itself and thereby joined the local landed elite and participated in its 
responsibilities, its privileges - and above all, its politics.   
In the 1840s and 1850s, North Wales was virgin territory for main line railways in a way 
that industrialised areas like Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham were not. It was the least 
English of the regions penetrated by early railways in Britain – and one of the first where local 
traffic was initially of little or no interest. The arrival of the railway in North Wales was the biggest 
event since Edward I had invaded and built an ‘iron ring’ of castles: ‘demonstrating to the Welsh 
that he had conquered them once and for all’.4 Many of those castles were along the same route 
as the later CHR as noted in Chapter 6 –and had the kind of shock impact that Leo Marx has 
suggested for remote rural areas receiving a  new technology. Even the process of building the 
Chester and Holyhead Railway (CHR) was a major disruption to the people of North Wales. 
According to a local paper, the CHR had provided: ‘among other “benefits”, an inpouring of 
confessedly and notoriously the worst of our species, rough and ready for a strike, a shindy, or 
mischief of any sort’.5 The influx of “navvies” to build the line was at least a temporary 
experience, while the arrival of the trains themselves marked a permanent change for many of 
the population. The scale of the works on the CHR was sufficiently large to attract Queen Victoria 
to visit - and the impact of her train on the senses of the local people as it emerged from the 
enormous tubular rail bridge to Anglesey was recorded in a manner that supports the analysis of 
Leo Marx: 
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Looking through the Tube you see the fire-box of the engine gleaming as it advances from the 
other extremity. You hear the throb of the locomotive and the reverberation of the iron: the shriek 
of the steam whistle startles you with its almost demonical expression and as you listen and gaze, a 
mass of sound gradually accumulating to a perfect hurricane, swells upon the ear, while the 
brightening glow of the furnace and the majestic progress of the engine fill the eye and impress 
the imagination…6 
 
 
A more specific shock effect was also recorded after the first death of an innocent bystander on 
the CHR. It was an: ‘ancient cockle-gatherer [killed by a train] rushing up at full speed [that] 
crushed life out in an instant [and denied her the chance of] dying in her bed [at the] close of a 
long and laborious life’.7 Here was the clash between old and new in its starkest form and the 
experience of the local community from this technological death involved: ‘sensations of the most 
painful kind’.8 A more general, and less dramatic, example of the domination of the new by the 
old was the loss of local time. The fact that railways ran to Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) was not 
an easy discipline for some in North Wales to learn in 1848: 
 
 
We were sorry to observe a car with passengers come full tilt into the railway yard […] just as the 
train had started for Chester, […] the cause of which was the difference set in point of time, the 
railway clock being set to Greenwich Time, the Town ditto as before.…9 
 
 
The report added that the difference in time: ‘will no doubt be set to right’. 10 Right time was, of 
course ‘railway time’, and it showed where the power lay in this matter that affected how every 
citizen lived, even if they never used the railway.11 Railways thereby brought to North Wales the: 
‘punctuality and specific rule-governed behaviour’ noted by Revill as the ‘ideal for the respectable 
citizen’ in Victorian Britain.12 As one speaker noted on the opening of the Anglesey Central 
Railway in 1864, the new railway would bring modern economics to the area as it would: 
‘undoubtedly teach the farmers of Anglesey a little more punctuality; it would also teach the 
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value of time, and that “time is money”’.13 Thus, in the manner described more generally by 
Revill, Schivelbusch and Leo Marx, the ‘long and laborious’ way of life of Welsh people - subject as 
it had been to slow change for centuries - rapidly yielded before the most powerful weapon in the 
armoury of the Victorian improvers. Its politics were bound to change with this impact. 
 The similarity demonstrated in the previous chapter between the introduction of railways 
in North Wales and in India does not mean that the relationship of both countries to the British 
state was similar.  The Blue Books of the Education Commissioners made clear that Wales was 
generally far from being “English” but this had not previously been an issue since Wales had been 
a settled part of the United Kingdom since 1536. As Williams notes: 
 
Neither the Tudor state nor the Stuart state nor the Hanoverian state were particularly interested in 
forcing cultural assimilation on Wales and so, notwithstanding certain pejorative attitudes towards the 
Welsh as a poor, ill-educated, coarse, shifty, garrulous and untrustworthy people, worth mentioning but 
not worth overstating, Wales became a junior partner in the expanding British state.14 
 
So, while Wales was not in a colonial relationship such as the one between the UK and India, 
neither had it become English as the authors of the 1536 legislation had hoped. That is why the 
promoters of railways felt that there was still an unofficial improvement task to be undertaken in 
North Wales. But how likely were they to succeed? One possible approach to understanding the 
Welsh response is in the notion of ‘internal colonialism’, as first advanced by Michael Hechter in 
1975. 15 Hechter contrasted  internal colonialism with the notion of ‘diffusion’ (similar to that 
advocated by those railway promoters in North Wales in chapter 6) whereby, with the onset of 
industrialisation, the characteristics of the ‘core’ - in United Kingdom (UK) terms England and 
more specifically London - were absorbed by the ‘periphery’, including regions such as Wales.16 
Hechter was interested to understand why this process had worked for some parts of the UK and 
not others, including Wales. He surmised that significant differences such as language and religion 
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caused a reaction rather than ‘diffusion’, and one of the impacts of this reaction was a greater 
political sense of nationality and a desire to resist absorption of the characteristics of the core. 17 
The idea has been sufficiently influential for internal colonialism sometimes to be invoked to 
explain the history of the Celtic fringe:  
 
The English pursued a policy of internal colonialism toward Wales, Scotland, and Ireland alike. In each 
case, London ordered a political union consummated to submerge the Celtic people and culture in 
question: Wales in 1536, Scotland in 1707, and Ireland in 1800. In each case, either a local parliament 
was abolished (in Scotland and Ireland) in order to shift representation to Westminster or English law 
was simply imposed by statute, as with Wales.18 
 
While some historians have embraced the concept of internal colonialism, others such as Williams 
have argued that Wales, despite its unequal relationship with England, had been a full member of 
the British state for centuries and was definitely not an internal colony.19 It is beyond the scope of 
this study to tackle such a controversy, although it is possible to agree with Mclean that while it: 
‘is only patchily supported by the evidence […] the idea of internal colonialism remains fruitful’.20 
For historians of politics and technology, the most fruitful concept appears to be that of the 
‘heightening of interaction’ between periphery and core, the role of the railways in it and the 
political reaction to it. 21 Hechter gave a brief description of the rail system in Wales, but 
suggested that a significant weakness in building contact with the core was there being fewer 
miles of railway per head of population in Wales than in England.  22 Given the extent of railway 
coverage in North Wales by 1900, the opposite argument has greater force - railways were such a 
force for change precisely because of the intensity of their coverage of North Wales.23  Even by 
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1866, the Liverpool Mercury could comment that: ‘there is little danger of the principality [Wales] 
being left behind in the march of civilization, so far as railway accommodation can promote its 
progress’.24 
The factors tending towards assimilation in North Wales are the well-documented 
deference of Welsh society, its agricultural nature, and its alleged adherence to superstition.  
Deference was a feature of the feudal nature of Welsh society as the railway age approached so 
that: ‘By virtue of estate, birth and education […] the heads of the landed families of Wales had 
exercised power and exacted deference as their due’.25 In the face of the assumed superiority of 
the owners of technology as analysed in chapter 1, Welsh people were likely to accept the 
authority of the London and North Western Railway (LNWR) - that held a monopoly in North 
Wales - and to see a powerful new force such as railways as further proof of the inadequacy of 
Welsh culture that had been suggested by the Education Commission. The Commission’s 
assessment was both resented by Welsh people and accepted as a stain on their character that 
they should strive to remove.26 The Education Commission made the Welsh language a political 
issue and railways reinforced that development by communicating only in English.27 The 
Education Commissioners underlined their assessment by asserting that Wales was a superstitious 
country where: “Belief in charms, supernatural appearances, and even in witchcraft, sturdily 
survives all the civilisation and light which has long ago banished these remnants of the dark ages 
elsewhere.”28 That view was also held by some prominent Welsh people, especially within non-
conformist religions.29 These religions were influential and likely to support a force such as 
railways that they perceived was tending to undermine “pagan” beliefs and promote assimilation. 
But perhaps the clearest characteristic of Welsh society that was likely to dispose it 
towards assimilation and the new technology of railways was the overwhelmingly agricultural 
nature of North Wales.  For, as Leo Marx observed: ‘to see a powerful, efficient machine in the 
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landscape is to know the superiority of the present to the past’ - especially for those with no 
previous experience of technological development.30 North Wales, particularly away from the 
English border, had little awareness of advanced technology, having perhaps only two significant 
experiences of it; Edward I’s chain of castles in the thirteenth century and Telford’s road to 
Holyhead completed in 1826. The first was well beyond living memory, while the second had only 
a limited impact, and did not use any of the advanced technologies that marked the second half 
of the nineteenth century. 
In contrast to the factors assessed above, there were elements of Welsh culture and 
character that tended to make the people of North Wales less receptive to externally imposed 
change, and could even lead to outright opposition. Examples were cultural activity, epitomised 
by the Eisteddfod movement, religious non-conformity and above all, the Welsh language. The 
last was a uniting factor in Wales that was used extensively in religious and cultural activity in the 
period before 1885 when many men in Wales were not entitled to vote – so that the Eisteddfod 
was an important element of Welsh political life.31 Over time, the Eisteddfod movement became 
the weakest of the three; sufficiently weak in its support of the Welsh language for Edwards to 
suggest that although: ‘activated by a strong initial desire to enhance the status of the language 
[Eisteddfodau] found themselves providing a platform for the “superior” English language at the 
expense of the mother tongue’.32 That charge could not be made against the religions of 
nonconformity which mainly used the medium of Welsh in Wales. 33 Henry Richard MP, an early 
advocate of the emerging Welsh nationalism in the nineteenth century, argued further that the 
notion of “nonconformity” defined the whole Welsh nation as a feature of a new: ‘democratic 
culture which challenged the power of landlordism and the religious establishment and the 
politics of deference upon which they depended’.34 The growth of national awareness in Wales 
was supported by changes at a UK level that progressively extended the right to vote, so that after 
1885 almost all adult males in the UK were included. In North Wales that meant that Welsh 
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became both the language of religion and the language of politics.35 Of course, as noted in the last 
chapter, it was decidedly not the language of railways. 
This review of the social and political factors present in North Wales provides the context 
within which the construction of the CHR and its branches took place between 1850 and 1880 – 
outlined in chapter 6 - and the political relationship between the railway and the people 
developed. It has shown that the CHR was an inherently political project because it challenged the 
way of life of many inhabitants of North Wales, provided them with different choices and 
experiences and brought them into direct contact with the metropole. They initially struggled to 
respond because of their lack of experience of large infrastructure projects, but that changed over 
time and was supported by the way railways enabled people to meet in larger numbers at 
religious, political and cultural gatherings. There was then the potential for political challenge to 
the LNWR from the growing sense of nationality of local people that was reinforced by the 
process of enfranchisement. In the earlier stages of railway development in North Wales those 
who had status from their ownership of land were the first to engage the railway owners 
politically, and that is the focus of the next section. 
 
7.2 The LNWR, the landed elite and the growing electorate in North Wales 1850-80 
 
The positive effects of railways were initially felt most directly by the better off, who could afford 
to use them in the early days of their operation. Thus, when one railway official left the area in 
1854 to take up a senior position with the LNWR there was an event in Conwy at which the 
benefits of railway travel were celebrated extensively.36  By the 1860s the local landed elite were 
more challenging towards the LNWR.  They had become accustomed to railways and wished to 
shape the system to support their own priorities that included more frequent trains and 
reasonable charges. They were also more concerned to get additional railways than to worry 
about the impact on ordinary people. Thus, in November 1862 the local paper protested against 
the LNWR’s reduced winter schedule and the difficulty in holding the company to account. An 
influential gathering in Bangor followed, including Lord Paget, Colonel Pennant and W. O. Stanley, 
who had originally supported the CHR. The power of the LNWR was apparent in the meeting’s 
reassurance that it was: ‘got up in no hostile feeling for that company’ and Lord Paget ‘deprecated 
any spirit of hostility’ to the LNWR.37  However, reality was dawning on those present that the 
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interests of the LNWR were in getting through North Wales, rather than getting to or from the 
region. The meeting complained that expresses no longer stopped at Bangor and that this was to 
the detriment of the town.38 That was consistent with what the LNWR’s greatest rival – the Great 
Western Railway (GWR) - had argued to a Select Committee in 1853, when its secretary suggested 
that a monopolistic operator such as the LNWR tended to run only those trains that maximised its 
profit.39  There was more evidence of this point in the same month as the dispute at Bangor 
discussed above.  The North Wales Chronicle noted: ‘The utter contempt with which the [LNWR] 
treat the inhabitants […]. They have not even the common courtesy of replying to a letter, and 
have now added injury to insult by substituting horse for locomotive power [to Llandudno]’40  
 Thus, even the local elite in North Wales had begun to understand that on a high profile 
railway, where speed is a priority: ‘there is much to be gained and lost for those included and 
those left out’.41 The influential residents understood that the CHR was built: ‘not out of love for 
[Wales] but in order to get cheaply and quickly to that hotbed of loyalty and treason – Ireland’.42 
That tension lay at the heart of the initial political struggle between the owners of the technology 
and those who wished to access it. The priority for the LNWR in the 1860s was Irish traffic, while 
local people with the power to protest wanted more trains and better stations. The evidence 
above shows that these were already serious political issues in North Wales by the 1860s, but 
relatively few people were in a position to challenge the railway monopoly in the region. And 
those with political power in North Wales had to take care in their relations with the LNWR 
because the results of railway investment in the region were ‘something to astonish the Welsh 
nation’: 
 
 Look at the fine houses in those formerly deserted places. […] now all this prosperity, and the 
increased trade, travelling accommodation […] and the yearly rush of tens of thousands of rich 
visitors into every part of the country, are solely and entirely owing to railways. […] As railways do 
so much good we can scarcely have too many of them – the more the merrier say I.43 
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This comment demonstrates the ambiguity in the position of the local political elite. They wanted 
to challenge the power of the LNWR and make it work better for their own needs, while 
understanding that they could not afford to alienate the company. The profiles of the LNWR and 
that of the landowning elite in North Wales were not essentially different – English speaking, 
conservative and supporters of the established church, so that these early political arguments 
about railway technology were conducted within the dominant powers in North Wales – 
exemplified by the dispute over the route of a railway to the slate town of Llanberis in 1864. It 
was described by counsel at the parliamentary hearing as a ‘triangular duel’ between the slate 
interests of Bangor, those of Caernarfon and the LNWR, which simply wanted sole access to 
Llanberis alongside its existing monopoly of Bangor.  The interests of ordinary members of the 
public were apparently not important. According to one comment at a political meeting during 
the 1865 general election in North Wales, Welsh people were: ‘deficient in talent [and] lacking in 
wealth and intelligence’.44 In other words, they were regarded as irrelevant to the politics of their 
own region by those with political power. 
A change of mood, even among the gentry, was apparent by 1869 when a further meeting 
was held that involved some of the same people who had complained so mildly about LNWR 
services in 1862. The 1869 meeting was angry about ‘the real torture’ it had witnessed from the 
need to climb into railway carriages and cross lines at Bangor station. One member of the local 
gentry had even fallen twice into an LNWR ash pit. 45 This time the meeting was highly critical of 
the LNWR and its chairman Richard Moon - and they decided on a political tactic to exert some 
influence over the company that they regarded as entirely metropolitan: ‘ruled by cotton […] with 
headquarters in Manchester [and] no sympathy with this country’.46 The LNWR had taken powers 
in an earlier act to improve Bangor station, but had not even started the building work. The 
meeting therefore resolved to obstruct LNWR legislation until Bangor station was improved. 47 The 
tactic appeared to work because two months later new works had begun at the station – a small 
political success for local people in their developing struggle with the LNWR.  48  It was also a tactic 
that would prove increasingly useful in the political struggle with the LNWR in North Wales.  
Thus, by the 1860s the parties to the political relationship between railway and region 
began to understand their relative status and obligations and develop mechanisms to resolve 
their differences - but there was a long way to go before anything close to equilibrium between 
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them could be achieved. The LNWR grew in strength, while the power of landowners in North 
Wales was in decline after the 1868 election under a wider franchise that disturbed ‘the political 
balance of centuries’.49 The new power of an emerging middle class in the region, many of whom 
had voted with Gladstone in 1868, had still not found full expression.  But there were signs that 
they were becoming more confident – especially when exercising roles in the local governing 
bodies, such as the Poor Law Guardians. That reflected a wider shift in the balance of power in the 
UK that resulted in the railways becoming more defensive in the face of the enfranchised 
population on issues such as safety, fares and freight charges - and the perceived abuse of 
monopoly power.50 An example in North Wales was the prosecution of two Welsh employees of 
the LNWR in the aftermath of the Abergele railway accident of August 1868. The accident was the 
worst on Britain’s railways up that point and the LNWR seemed content to allow the blame to fall 
upon its employees. But in March 1869, a high profile jury led by Watkin Williams Wynn, the 
largest of all Welsh landowners, found the employees not guilty in just ten minutes and issued a 
statement accusing the LNWR of : ‘culpable neglect in not having given more direct instructions to 
their respective officers, and not having seen that such instructions were carried out’.51 Their 
judgement was backed by the findings of the official enquiry.52 This was a marked shift compared 
to the wish not to offend the company that was evident in 1862 and a confirmation of the more 
assertive approach just a few weeks before the jury verdict, as discussed earlier in this chapter.  
The first overtly political issue that showed this new confidence in dealing with the LNWR 
in North Wales was the payment of poor rates by the railway, which the company had resented 
from its inception.53 Rates were a major burden for them as the analysis of land values of 1876 
provided in Appendix A makes clear. It shows that the LNWR held the most highly-rated land in 
North Wales and had joined the ranks of its largest landowners, if not in the area of land that it 
owned, then certainly in its value. The LNWR had holdings in each of the four counties of North 
                                                             
49  Kenneth Morgan, Wales in British Politics 1868-1922 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press 1991), 22. 
 
50  Jack Simmons, The Railway in England and Wales 1830-1914, Volume 1 The System and its Working 
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978), 82. 
 
51  “Abergele Catastrophe: Acquittal of the Breaksmen”: North Wales Chronicle, 27 March 1869, 3. For 
Watkins Williams Wynn see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sir_Watkin_Williams-Wynn,_6th_Baronet  
 
52  Reports of Inspecting Officers of Railway Dept. on Accidents on Railways, June-December 1868, 1868-69 
(54) LIV.83, 72. For the Abergele crash see, also see L.T.C. Rolt, Red for Danger (London: Pan Books, 1966), 
181-4. 
 
53  David Hodgkins, The Second Railway King: The Life and Times of Sir Edward Watkin 1819-1901 (Cardiff: 
Merton Priory Press, 2002), 75-9. Poor rates were a precursor to more general local authority rating of 
property and were used to fund workhouses and other aspects of poor relief under the terms of the Poor 
Law Amendment Act of 1834. Railways argued that as they only passed through an area they should not pay 
rates whereas the local Poor Law Unions argued that the railways extracted value from areas they served 
and should be taxed. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poor_rate [Accessed 24 August 2017] 
 
179 
 
Wales and was by far the largest railway landowner with the most valuable land. Appendix A also 
shows the power of landowners in North Wales with the LNWR among them. The top half of the 
table lists the Glynne–Gladstone dynasty based at Hawarden; the Mostyn’s who owned 
Llandudno; the Duke of Westminster - the wealthiest man in Britain; and the slate-owning 
Pennant and Assheton-Smith families, with estates in Caernarfonshire.  But the LNWR clearly 
heads the list in terms of the value of its holdings, with the next highest value of land held by the 
LNWR’s rival, the Great Western Railway (GWR). The GWR’s land was valued at £9.7 per acre  
compared to £77.1 for the LNWR – only 12.6 per cent of the value of the latter’s land holdings. 
That is clear evidence of which company had succeeded in securing the most lucrative railway 
traffic in North Wales during the battles for control of the region from the 1840s to 1880 that 
were discussed in chapter 6. 
Simmons’ analysis of the land issue demonstrated that the value of railway company land 
was very high generally, even though it owned a small percentage of the total. His analysis does 
not demonstrate fully the status of the LNWR in North Wales in terms of the value of its land in 
the region. He chose to include Anglesey in his study, with 4.4 per cent of land owned by the 
LNWR - in the middle of his range. Table 7.1 shows that had he chosen Flintshire, at 14.7 per cent, 
he would have had an example that far exceeded any of those in his list. Caernarfonshire was also 
higher than all but six of his examples. Anglesey is therefore not reflective of North Wales, which 
averaged 7.1 per cent overall – close to the 7 per cent that Simmons selected as a high figure in 
his study of the issue.54  
 
Table 7.1:  The Rental Value (RV) of LNWR land holdings in North Wales as a percentage of total 
RV for each county 
 Total Rental 
Value (£) 
LNWR Rental Value 
(£) 
LNWR rental value as a 
percentage of the total 
Anglesey 171259 7372 4.3 per cent 
Caernarfonshire 378137 23866 6.3 per cent 
Denbighshire 450422 10396 2.3 per cent 
Flintshire 382143 56014 14.7 per cent 
Total 1381961 97648 7.1 per cent 
 
Information for this table is taken from “The Great Landowners of Wales in 1873”, Brian Ll James, National Library of Wales journal. 
1966, Summer Volume XIV/3 and from “Landowners in North Wales”, North Wales Chronicle, 26 February 1876, 6, and 4 March 
1876, 3. 
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Comparison with the established church is relevant because of its status in North Wales as an 
institution available to all, even though many chose not to use it as shown by Harris and Startup in 
1999.55 Only that church, like the LNWR, could claim land holdings in all four counties as shown in 
Appendix A.  However, the actual holdings of the church, though similar to that of the railway in 
acreage, were worth only £1.8 per acre compared to £77.1 per acre for the land held by the 
LNWR. The railway was also rather more powerful than the church because of its monopolistic 
control over the rapid movement of people and goods in North Wales. There was no alternative 
to the LNWR for those who needed to travel or send their goods quickly, while there was a choice 
of religions - and most Welsh people who attended church were not members of the established 
church. By comparing the North Wales figure of 7.1% in this study with Simmons estimate of 3% 
for railways overall, it becomes clear that the holding of valuable land in North Wales by the 
LNWR far exceeded the average for holdings by all railway companies in the 20 rural areas chosen 
by Simmons.56 That serves as an important measure of the LNWR’s political prominence North 
Wales, given that land was the currency of power in the mid-nineteenth century in a region which 
had, according to Gwyn Alf Williams: ‘the most grotesque concentration of landlordism in 
Britain’.57 The LNWR’s was a different type of land ownership, corporate rather than personal, and 
one that secured for it an important place in local politics. 
But there was a disadvantage for the LNWR from these valuable land holdings – it had to 
pay rates on them. It was a local Anglican minister who saw the prospect of reducing the burden 
on the emerging middle class in the poor rates that they paid - if only the LNWR could be 
compelled to contribute more of its profits, particularly from the CHR. The Reverend William 
Venables Williams made it his personal mission to tackle what he perceived as the inadequate 
contributions made by the LNWR to local poor rates.58 The LNWR had previously resisted payment 
of poor rates in North Wales, for example at Llangefni in Anglesey in 1859.59 The Holyhead Union 
was also evidently in dispute with the company in 1868 over the rating of water pipes.60 Matters 
came to a head in 1871 at Caernarfon Court of Quarter Sessions when an appeal by the LNWR 
against the assessment of railway property in the Conway Poor Law Union was lost by the 
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company and the rateable value of the CHR was fixed at £500 per mile, a large increase on the 
previous rate and one based on: ‘the sum per mile a hypothetical tenant could reasonably be 
expected to give for the line as rent’.61 The magnitude of this defeat for the LNWR was 
demonstrated by the way it was applauded nationally. The Chamber of Agriculture Journal and 
Farmers’ Chronicle recorded how the Conway Union had been challenged at a higher court by the 
LNWR – the ‘Leviathan’ company according to the report - which appealed with: ‘a good deal of 
bounce and swagger’ expecting to defeat the £500 per mile award. The Conway Union took 
advice and was told to ask for double its original claim. When LNWR witnesses from the original 
case were examined further: ‘some very unwholesome truths leaked out [and the] manifestations 
of distress became clearly traceable on the countenances of the company’s advisers’.62 After an 
adjournment, the LNWR caved in to the new demands and agreed to pay £950 per mile for seven 
miles of its line and £700 on the remaining six miles through Conwy. It was a very large increase in 
the LNWR’s contribution that saved the local ratepayers six pence in the pound.63 
 It had been a bitter political struggle that required a great deal of courage from the 
members of the Conway Union in the face of a wealthy corporation that called on the best legal 
advice. Venables Williams’ comment to the LNWR solicitor in the local paper showed how this 
was essentially a dispute within the political elite in North Wales, albeit an elite that had extended 
beyond the landed classes. He stated in an open letter to the LNWR that: ‘as a ratepayer […] l am 
desirous […] of having the line placed at its proper assessment; as a shareholder in the [LNWR] I 
am extremely unwilling that it should be charged more than its due’.64 The way that the LNWR 
was both embraced and opposed by local politicians demonstrates its rather ambiguous 
relationship with North Wales’ politics before 1880. Williams became a local celebrity, not least 
because the LNWR’s contribution reduced the financial demand on other ratepayers.65 This was 
an unusual political victory for North Wales, which even the Tory North Wales Chronicle had long-
reckoned was in need of an O’Connell or a Cobden to lead them.66 Williams’ success was the best 
example of local political leadership in the 1870s in North Wales in the period before the 
extension of the franchise brought a new class of elected local politician into existence. But it was 
a victory for the emerging political elite rather than for ordinary members of the local Welsh-
                                                             
61  “Assessment of the Railways”, North Wales Chronicle, 15 July 1871, 4. 
 
62  ‘Railway rating of the Conway Union’, North Wales Chronicle, 30 March 1872, 5. 
 
63  ‘Railway rating of the Conway Union’, North Wales Chronicle, 30 March 1872, 5. 
 
64  “Railway Rating” North Wales Chronicle, 27 January 1872, 7. 
 
65  “Honour to whom Honour is due” North Wales Chronicle, 24 February 1872. 7. 
 
66  “The Chronicle”, North Wales Chronicle, 20 January 1846, 3. 
 
182 
 
speaking and nonconformist population - against whom Venables Williams was a formidable 
opponent in later disputes about paying tithes to the established church.67  
Retaliatory success for the railway came when the LNWR used its parliamentary power to 
maintain the CHR rates for passengers and freight, which were higher than elsewhere on their 
network, when it formally absorbed the company in 1879. Local people considered that the LNWR 
had used its monopoly position in North Wales to compensate for the lower rates it charged in 
areas where customers had a choice of lines. That marked the start of the political reaction to the 
monopoly that the LNWR had established in North Wales as analysed in chapter 6.68 But local 
people had no effective representation in parliament to challenge the LNWR – the local landed 
elite seemed to have been silent on the issue of higher charges, which had progressed a long way 
through parliament before local interests became aware of them  - from England and through 
Chester Town Council.69 Traders in North Wales recognised the power of the LNWR and its 
tendency to contest any issue that affected its interests, but were limited to a local political 
campaign against the LNWR’s plans.70 The importance of that campaign in local politics may be 
gauged by the plaudits given to those who were involved. For example, Mr Kneeshaw was re-
elected to the Chair of the Council in Penmaenmawr largely because of his: ‘assiduity in reference 
to the communication transacted between him and the directors of the [LNWR]’71. The reaction 
from traders in North Wales showed how such issues had begun to forge local politics and 
national identity in the region - for them this was a ‘really Welsh commercial grievance’.72 A 
tension was evident because people in North Wales were becoming more conscious of being 
Welsh at the same time as succumbing to what the President of one Eisteddfod referred to in 
1879 as: ‘the English tide [that] flowed in too strongly over Wales in our time to be restrained’.73  
In North Wales, the main source of that ‘English tide’ was the LNWR, with its daily flow of visitors, 
goods, newspapers, letters and business people on its trains, and its unbending use of the English 
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language in its communications with local people. If they wanted to use the railway they had to 
speak English. 
Although it was a private company, the LNWR was an important part of the social, 
political and economic landscape of North Wales. In addition to providing the only source of rapid 
transport in the region, it was crucial to the development of Llandudno from 1849, for example in 
the creation of Marine Drive that made the resort more attractive to tourists.74 But the LNWR was 
not always in sympathy with local political interests – and it opposed the acquisition of the local 
gas and water companies by the council in Bangor because it had previously obtained preferential 
rates from them. 75 It also contested Conwy’s Harbour Bill as it affected its own plans on the other 
side of the estuary.76  There was also some suggestion that the LNWR interfered directly in local 
politics in North Wales when its interests were at stake, for example at Holyhead in 1880 when it 
needed local support and local land for its extensive works on the harbour and breakwater.  The 
issue was sufficiently important for it to feature in an account in The Times which provided 
evidence both of the strength of local feeling and the indifference of the LNWR to that opinion: 
‘Local energy failed to make a successful stand against an all-powerful railway company who can 
with perfect truth claim that the town was called into being by them and owes what prosperity it 
enjoys entirely to their enterprise.’77 According to one correspondent to the local paper, there 
was an element of collusion between the LNWR and members of the local council and: ‘morbid 
indifference [had made] Holyhead, Holyhead people and the Holyhead Local Board the catspaw of 
[the] all-powerful [LNWR]’– a claim made after the Board had apparently gifted land to the 
company with nothing much offered in return apart from an inaccessible local harbour.78 The 
tension had been brought to a head by the LNWR’s behaviour in excluding local people from a 
royal visit to the town to open the breakwater in 1880, and the evidence suggests that the 
company did treat local people with contempt: 
 
Loyal citizens feel a little sore that the railway people are going to keep His Royal Highness to 
themselves, that they will not let him budge beyond their own premises, that they have brought a 
division of the Metropolitan Police to keep all but a privileged few at arm’s length and that they 
have stuck glass along the surrounding walls to punish enthusiastic persons who may presume to 
peep over…79 
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The response from local people to the LNWR’s arrangements for the royal visit was predictable: 
 
 
The oldest inhabitant and his friends were unanimously of the opinion that Holyhead had been 
badly treated and were proportionately grumpy [as it is] eminently unsatisfying for a loyal 
Welshman [to be] met at every passage […] by the dismal Welsh legend “Dim Canytiad” [No Entry] 
and to be cuffed about on his own streets by London Policemen while strangers from all parts of 
England and Ireland were being treated with Royal smiles and iced champagne…80 
 
 
The LNWR had at least departed from its usual practice by using the Welsh language – but only to 
declare its exclusion of local people from the event, so that the impression of contempt was clear. 
It was reinforced by the LNWR chairman Richard Moon, who used the occasion to boast of the 50 
years of railway dominance in the UK by his company since the opening of the Liverpool and 
Manchester Railway, and of the LNWR’s supreme power and wealth within the industry. And he 
showed little concern for local anger at the rates charged by the company in North Wales when 
he complained of traders who ignored the achievements of railways and: ‘thought [the LNWR] 
ought to carry their traffic for nothing’. 81 He also underlined the exclusion of Wales from the 
occasion by declaring that the new harbour was: ‘a great blessing and a connecting link between 
the two countries’ [England and Ireland].82  It appears that none of the responsibility for the way 
this whole event had been delivered could be ascribed to the royal visitor, the Prince of Wales, 
who might have been thought capable of influencing the nature of the celebration. When political 
leaders in Rhyl wrote and asked him to stop at their town on his way home, they were told by his 
secretary that the prince would have been pleased to do so but that: ‘railway arrangements will 
not allow of the train being stopped [so] it is not in his power to comply with the request’.83 
In the wake of these events, one correspondent issued a rallying cry to local people under 
the banner of ‘Railway Tyranny at Holyhead’. He suggested that: ‘If any Company deserves to be 
opposed then this great Company certainly does […] let the whole community take it in hand’.84 
There is no evidence that any effective political action against the company immediately followed 
this encouragement but local opinion had clearly been galvanised against the LNWR. The 
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impression left by these and other exchanges is that the political relationship between railway 
and region, even after the increase in poor rates paid by the LNWR, was an unequal (and often 
unhappy) one - a situation that was exacerbated by the focus of the LNWR on its position as an 
instrument of the British state and its Irish policy, rather than having any serious role in furthering 
the interests of North Wales. That was articulated clearly in The Times in its reflections on the 
opening of the enlarged harbour at Holyhead when it noted that the ‘[LNWR] is a trustee for the 
public […] and the common good of the public has long been realized in the 275 miles land 
journey which part London from Dublin’.85 It did not appear to consider the implications for the 
regions in between London and Dublin, of which North Wales was one of the least developed. 
The struggle over poor rates, fares, freight charges and the treatment of the people of 
Holyhead marked a change in the relationship between the region and the railway. The LNWR had 
gained an early advantage from its success in sustaining its higher rates and fares by using its 
power virtually unopposed in parliament, but the local people had also tasted success through 
increasing the poor rates charged to the LNWR. By 1880, Welsh people and politicians were 
beginning to develop forms of cooperation that at least mitigated the LNWR’s ‘English tide’ in 
North Wales. The focus of opposition to the LNWR had moved from the landowning classes 
towards an emerging middle class, whose political power increased with changes in the franchise. 
They valued railways but wanted to secure greater regard for their interests by the LNWR. 
Outside formal political channels there was also an increasing sense of the importance of railways 
in North Wales, but one that was tempered by the sense that their owners were unsympathetic to 
the Welsh nationalism that they were partially, and inadvertently, responsible for creating. 
 
 
7.3 Railways, the general population of North Wales and the Welsh language  
1845-80 
 
The success of the LNWR in Parliament in 1879 emphasised that it had sufficient national 
influence, particularly in parliament, to overcome local resistance which was not supported by 
effective representation in London. However, pressure for political change was growing from the 
local population, which posed a challenge to the LNWR. Railways were playing their part in 
building that resistance, albeit unintentionally, by strengthening the ability of groups to meet in 
larger numbers and thereby foster a greater sense of Welsh nationality.86 At an Eisteddfod in 
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Anglesey, one contributor noted the importance of the gatherings to: ‘bring us together as 
Welshmen, and unite us as an ancient nationality’ and thanked to the LNWR for making the event 
possible through its extra trains.87 Some idea of the size of the traffic at such events is shown by 
the train that brought people home from the Pen y Groes Eisteddfod in 1872. The train was ‘long 
and well-filled’, hence the extensive injuries caused to fifty people when it was struck by another 
train.88 There had been another accident nearby that involved a train carrying 500 Methodists 
who had attended a religious convention and six people died. The organisers of the event were so 
keen to make use of the railway that they had persuaded its owner to run the train on a line that 
was not certified for public use by the government inspector. Such was the status of the railway 
owner that the local paper reckoned him deserving of: ‘our sympathies in his sore affliction, 
rather than ill-considered vituperation and unreasoning censure’. 89 Attendance at Eisteddfodau 
and religious meetings in North Wales was made possible by the CHR and its branches. As these 
did much to instil a sense of being ‘an ancient nationality’, the railway clearly contributed to the 
emerging sense of Welsh nationalism, even if it did so unintentionally and the results were not 
necessarily to the advantage of the LNWR.  
While commercial and other interests in North Wales did not succeed in overturning the 
success of the LNWR in Parliament in 1879, there was evidence that in a rather uncoordinated 
manner, local people attempted to redress the balance when the opportunity arose. The CHR was 
created as a corporate body with authority to control the actions of individuals on its property. 
Among its powers was the right to detain people pending appearance before a magistrate, though 
it was one to be used only in exceptional circumstances.90 They were a significant civil power but 
the LNWR’s use of the courts was not always appreciated in North Wales. One defence lawyer 
admitted that the railways were beneficial to the area but: ‘all they knew of it in this quarter was 
being allowed to contribute to the heavy expense of [LNWR] prosecutions’.91    
When the services of a jury were required, local people could effectively make a 
statement through their findings even if the evidence didn’t justify it. Thus, in July 1875 one judge 
told the jury in a case brought by the LNWR that they were responsible for a ‘great miscarriage of 
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justice’ because they had acted against the evidence.92 Similarly, William Griffith was acquitted at 
Beaumaris after comprehensive evidence of his theft of whisky from the LNWR was presented. 93 
The official report on a fatal railway accident in Anglesey in 1877 had to contradict the local 
inquest because there was a: ‘strong impression in the minds of some jurymen that blame was 
attributable [to the LNWR]’.94 Even when the railway pursued a prosecution to deter people from 
risky behaviour, it was open to criticism, for example when prosecuting a woman who was badly 
injured trying to join a moving train at Flint. The court heard that this was one of many cases 
brought by the LNWR in a ‘most oppressive and unfair manner’.95 When a local supplier of 
newspapers attempted to challenge the apparent preference given to stationers W H Smith at 
Denbigh he faced a stiff defence in court from the LNWR. He claimed that his case was: ‘really a 
fight for the trade of the town. We are newsagents and the defendants are common carriers […] 
bound to carry goods for everybody upon equal terms’.96 The company made clear that W H 
Smith were offered ‘special advantages’. Having won the case, the LNWR then secured costs 
against its opponent whose words echoed some local sentiment towards the company: ‘You 
always fight every case, whether you are right or wrong’.97  
While there is no evidence that the litigation of the LNWR in North Wales was different 
from elsewhere, it was delivered in a context that was different and had the potential to create 
political opposition. While many of the people who were prosecuted spoke only Welsh, 
proceedings were in English, which potentially disadvantaged them. They also faced a distinctly 
hostile judiciary, who assumed that Welsh people were more prone to tell lies than most other 
people.98  Railway proceedings were a case of a powerful English corporation (the LNWR) acting 
against generally poor, sometimes deferential, Welsh-speaking defendants, while a confident and 
powerful English judicial process provided the means to conclude the issue. Unsurprisingly, by 
1870 the court system had become a target for the emerging Welsh nationalism, which received 
an impetus with the election of Henry Richard as MP for Merthyr Tydfil in 1868 - after which 
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distinctly Welsh problems began to be brought to the attention of the UK parliament.99 When the 
Lord Chancellor appointed an English-speaking judge to an almost exclusively Welsh-speaking 
area in 1871 the issue was debated in parliament and was subject to a Times leader that asserted 
that the: ‘ignorance of English is the chief misfortune’ of Wales and noted that education had 
proved of little value since on leaving school people were ‘apt to resume their Welsh’.100  The 
comment provoked a lively debate in the correspondence columns that provided an insight into 
the impact of railways in Wales in respect of the highly political issue of the Welsh language: 
 
There cannot be a doubt that the Welsh language is rapidly dying out. [A few years ago] my 
residence was 50 miles from the nearest railway and it was a rare exception to meet anyone […] 
who could speak or understand the English language, except in the towns. By degrees during the 
last ten years, railways have penetrated into every part. […] The effect has been magical. […] I can 
assert from my own experience in my district (not an exceptional one) that all the children now 
speak English, and many adults who were ignorant of it ten years ago have learnt [enough] to be 
useful members of the community…101 
 
This assessment is interesting for the emphasis it places on the role of railways in tackling the 
“problem” of the Welsh language, and for the sense that without English a person was not 
‘useful’.   
The LNWR were users of the court system and owners of  a powerful technology, and so 
clearly part of the local English-speaking political establishment alongside landowners, the 
established church, and the education system. They were also powerful purveyors of the English 
language to a largely Welsh-speaking population. The significant impact of railways on the 
language was accepted by prominent Welsh politicians such as Osborne Morgan, who thought 
that Welsh would survive alongside English as the first language of the people.  102  But his 1876 
Eisteddfod analysis, like the earlier one in The Times, identified railways as being at the heart of 
the political challenge to the Welsh language because: ‘English colonies have sprung up in the 
neighbourhood of our railway stations’.103 For the president of that event they were not just 
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railways they were ‘English railways [by which] we are now made to mingle with our English 
neighbours’.  
The occasional overt opposition towards the LNWR, such as in the courtrooms in North 
Wales, did not mean that their trains were not valued by the people.  Simmons has shown how 
Welsh people were peculiarly attracted to trains because they were an antidote to the centuries 
of isolation and neglect that the country had experienced.104 In that sense, the bulk of the 
population had the same relationship to railways in North Wales as the landowning elite, they 
wanted more railways and more influence with railway owners, but they did not have any 
effective means to challenge railway power. So railways were important to all classes in Wales, 
and as the franchise extended, politicians were alert to the potential success that might come 
from supporting improved communication by rail – none more so than the most senior of all 
Victorian UK politicians, William Gladstone.  105 
 
7.4 Gladstone and the politics of railway monopoly in North Wales 1860 - 80 
 
The frustration of the Denbigh newsagent noted earlier was symptomatic of a larger problem in 
the relationship between the LNWR and North Wales. The railway was bringing English produce 
into the area, denying opportunities to more local enterprise, except where the product was 
unique to the area, such as slate. This problem had been foreseen in 1846, when the traders of 
Conwy concluded that the arrival of the CHR would destroy their market along the coast between 
Abergele and Bangor.  Their solution was to aim to build a new road and open ‘new sources of 
traffic’ inland towards Porthmadog.106 Other places along the CHR also suffered. As early as 1848, 
Holywell, only two miles from the CHR, had become a ‘deserted village’ with tradespeople 
intending to migrate locally to Rhyl, which was on the CHR, or as far away as America.107 Local 
producers found themselves in competition with imports from areas such as Manchester and 
Liverpool, and the local economy suffered – in part because the large railway companies were not 
interested in the business of smaller local producers, as will be seen. 
While its arrival had created significant turbulence in North Wales, the position of the 
LNWR seemed secure both nationally and regionally. In 1862, LNWR shareholders heard that 
recent reductions in dividend were due to erosion of its monopoly in mainland Britain, but that 
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better prospects lay ahead from the improved state of the national economy. Not all of them 
were convinced, and a shareholders revolt demanded: ‘boards to manage local lines [because] the 
whole line is too large to be effectively managed by any one central board, such local boards to 
possess independent action, with the exception if matters of general import’.  108   They were not 
able to secure any delegation from Euston – the LNWR was a centralised metropolitan 
corporation which was tightly managed from its urban bases. So this shareholder revolt, which 
coincided with the protests in North Wales about poor levels of service discussed earlier in this 
chapter, met with a stern response from the chairman Richard Moon.109 The LNWR was very 
difficult to challenge, as even the protesting landowners in North Wales had discovered. By 
comparison, the coal trade in Flintshire and Denbighshire had more influential supporters and the 
GWR success in reaching Birkenhead by 1860, described in chapter 6, raised hopes of competition 
against the LNWR that would bring improvements in the level of service in the Wrexham area, 
and greater sympathy with the local language. There seemed to be a prospect of a different 
experience of railways in North Wales with:  
 
Two ways to London and as many to Liverpool, with railways to Bangor, Overton and Ellesmere on 
one side of town, and […] Mold on the other [and] a Welsh stationmaster to converse with the 
people in their own vernacular…110  
 
Ultimately, such hopes were dashed when the GWR made peace with the LNWR and the two 
companies opted for greater cooperation and exclusion of smaller companies, rather than 
competition and expensive duplication. As the Liverpool Mercury observed, the relationship of the 
large to the smaller companies in North Wales was like: ‘the position of Austria and Prussia to the 
smaller German states. The small companies smile when the great ones smile and tremble when 
they frown; and the intriguing that goes on is very considerable’.111 However, local hopes of 
challenging the LNWR and GWR in north-east Wales were raised in 1862 when William Gladstone, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and a Flintshire landowner, cut the first sod of the Wrexham, Mold 
and Connah’s Quay Railway (WMCQR) under a banner of ‘Free Trade in Railways’ which indicated 
the anti-monopolistic nature of local political opposition to railway power.112  He was a major 
national figure in the 1860s and was also a ‘Flintshire Squire’ with significant financial interests in 
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north-east Wales.113 Despite his support, the WMCQR had to engage in a: ‘contest ranging over 
three sessions, and carried on in the face of the fact that the two most powerful companies in the 
kingdom [the LNWR and GWR] had coalesced for its defeat’. 114 
The WMCQR was an example of the movement in the mid-1860s that saw increasing 
political interest in the behaviour of railway companies and the power of monopolies, particularly 
the position of companies such as the LNWR and GWR. That concern about railway practice 
increased as the franchise was extended and the public could apply pressure to their MPs in areas 
like North Wales that experienced little railway competition.115 North-east Wales provided a case 
in point, and one where parliament allowed new lines to be built to challenge the trading 
restrictions applied by the large companies which, according to one local commentator was the 
only: ‘means of counteracting a system which, in the Welsh mineral districts more especially, bids 
fair to create a species of monopoly of which, until the past session, faint rumours only had 
reached the ears either of the legislature or the public’.116  In short, railways were becoming a 
political issue and Gladstone backed those public concerns for four reasons. He had a long -
standing concern about the power of railways that he had challenged in part in his 1844 Railway 
Act; he had a personal financial interest as a local landowner; he wished to generate Welsh 
political support for his Liberal Party, and after 1885 he wanted to gather support for his Irish 
policies from Welsh MPs. From 1865 to 1880 it was the first three of these interests that 
concerned him. If the WMCQR had stopped at Connah’s Quay it would have been of little benefit 
to Gladstone. He and other land and coal owners in the area around Wrexham needed rail 
connection to the River Mersey, Birkenhead and Liverpool to access larger markets. So when the 
WMCQR went to Parliament for an extension across the Dee to Birkenhead, Gladstone, his 
powerful neighbour Lord Grosvenor and the shipping magnate John Laird, gave supporting 
evidence in committee.117  
If the WMCQR had limited itself to North Wales, then it would have attracted little 
attention from the LNWR, which dismissed the North Wales coalfield as a source of traffic 
because it only supplied Chester and its vicinity with a mere 44,000 tons of coal in 1848. The 
LNWR was not interested in that compared to the 1,350,000 tons consumed in Liverpool in the 
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same year.118 However, when the LNWR’s position as a carrier of coal to Liverpool and Birkenhead 
was threatened it took the issue seriously, and it had reason to do so once the Manchester, 
Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway (MSL), under the chairmanship of Sir Edward Watkin, who was 
also a leading Liberal politician, reached Chester in 1862 through the salt area of Northwich. 
Unlike the smaller railways, the MSL had the resources to expand into North Wales.119 That 
challenge to the LNWR was partly blunted by the depression in railway building caused by the 
collapse of the Overend Gurney Bank in 1866.120 The discovery of new coal seams at Wrexham in 
1870 encouraged a revival of interest in new railway lines and Gladstone himself became a coal 
owner in 1872, and thus had an even more direct political interest in the issue of transport from 
his successful Aston Hall colliery.121 A year later, he told a parliamentary committee that he 
favoured the Mersey tunnel (which was part of the plan to extend railways from North Wales to 
Liverpool) because: ‘railway communication was really a matter of life and death’ for the 
region.122 By then he was the Prime Minister and was a potentially formidable political opponent 
– even for the mighty LNWR. 
Gladstone’s personal interest in developing railways was not initially linked directly to 
Welsh politics, but he began to address Welsh matters more directly from the 1870s. In 1871 
there was some suggestion that Gladstone had even espoused the cause of Welsh nationalism by 
suggesting in a speech at Aberdeen that if Ireland were given Home Rule then the same privilege 
should be extended to Wales and Scotland.123 In a speech he gave at the 1873 Mold Eisteddfod he 
supported the retention of the Welsh language and acknowledged that his views on Wales had 
been changed by the arguments of Henry Richard MP. But the only practical result of that change 
was that he appointed a Welsh-speaking bishop for the first time. But the limits of Gladstone’s 
support for a distinct Welsh nation were clear in his clear argument for the primary use of English, 
which should be:  
 
Encouraged in the schools [and should not be] discouraged at home. It is most important that the 
masses of the Welsh people should be acquainted with the English language […] the tongue that is 
and must be the prevailing tongue of the country.124  
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As Gladstone was not a strong advocate of Welsh culture and language like Henry Richard, he 
needed to offer Wales something that addressed its political priorities and garnered Welsh 
support in parliament. Gladstone’s personal interest in railways, the increasing resentment of the 
LNWR among the local population and the growing strength of Welsh nationalism provided a 
fertile environment for railways to emerge as an even greater political issue in the 1880s as the 
franchise was extended to more of the male population. It clearly had the potential to engage the 
Welsh population, especially in the hands of a skilled statesman such as Gladstone, who knew and 
understood railway politics and practice. 
Against him, the LNWR appeared to be in a powerful position nationally by 1880 
according to its chairman Richard Moon, who reported that it had 9% of the national track 
mileage in the UK but 15% of the traffic, and that Irish traffic had been doubling every five 
years.125 It was particularly powerful in North Wales with a monopoly over the railway carriage of 
goods and people in four counties – it was the railway in the region and was also beginning to 
recognise the potential for a huge increase in holiday traffic to seaside towns like Rhyl, Abergele, 
Colwyn Bay and Llandudno. Powerful landowners could occasionally exert some influence on the 
LNWR, as could local authorities from time to time - but the company was larger than either, and 
even its own shareholders struggled to control it. The LNWR was involved in many encounters 
with the population of North Wales, a sample of the largest of which is recorded in this chapter, 
but most of which were routine journeys for people or freight – which gradually made the LNWR 
indispensable to the people of North Wales and thereby placed it at the heart of local politics.  
This chapter has provided evidence that those encounters slowly galvanised the towns, 
traders and public of North Wales, who began to develop a sense of Welsh unity in the region 
against the LNWR by 1880 – though the company remained stronger than the region and its 
people. Collective action against the LNWR in North Wales was difficult to organise because of the 
limited franchise, deferential attitudes, a rather small middle class and the declining power of the 
land owners. But as the period covered by this chapter came to an end, the political landscape 
was changing in ways that that could lead to a more serious political challenge to the LNWR in 
North Wales – if only they could be harnessed effectively. William Gladstone provided the best 
hope of the leadership that was required to challenge the LNWR once he combined his personal 
interest in railways to encompass the ambitions of the growing electorate of North Wales. That 
began a major challenge to the LNWR that continued and grew after Gladstone left the political 
stage. He was replaced in North Wales by a radical Liberal group of politicians with a nationalist 
agenda that targeted the LNWR – as will be seen in the next chapter.
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8. The LNWR and politics in North Wales 1880 -1900: ‘The Great Railway Problem’ 
 
‘At last we have men in the House of Commons thoroughly capable of guarding our 
interests […] the great railway problem will have to be grappled with sooner or later’.1 
 
The development of the franchise towards near universal male suffrage by 1885 transformed 
Welsh politics, and the general election of that year showed a major shift towards the Liberal 
Party led by Gladstone. In North Wales, the election results effectively ended representation by 
the old landed gentry, which had been weakening since 1868, and replaced it with a Liberal and 
radical intake of MPs. 2The example set by the Irish in their demands for land reform and 
disestablishment of the Irish church provided an agenda and a source nationalist parliamentary 
support for the Welsh Liberals.3 They had the opportunity to promote that agenda with Irish 
support after 1892 when they effectively held the balance of power at Westminster.4 The 
previous chapter showed that the London and North Western Railway (LNWR) was a powerful 
political force in North Wales, so this chapter explores whether that status attracted the attention 
of Welsh Liberal MPs alongside other issues that are covered in the historiography of nineteenth-
century North Wales – land, the established church, education and the Welsh language.5 Davies’ 
estimate of the extensive impact of railways in Wales suggests that politicians in North Wales 
would be concerned with the power of railways - or more precisely the LNWR.6  
Chapter 7 ended with the emergence of William Gladstone as a possible champion of 
Welsh political interests against the LNWR, both to boost his credentials among Welsh Liberals 
and further his personal interest in better railway connections to his estate. North Wales was the 
most distinct part of the LNWR network because of its language, religion and nationalist culture - 
so that issues such as fares, freight rates, monopoly and industrial relations that were present 
across the UK had extra political and cultural dimensions in the region. It was also a vital area for 
the LNWR as North Wales’ local holiday traffic began to rival receipts from Irish traffic by the 
1890s - over 20,000 people visited Llandudno on each day of August Bank Holiday weekend in 
1897, mostly from Liverpool and Manchester.7 The LNWR therefore planned to increase most of 
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its route from Chester to Llandudno Junction from two tracks to four from 1895 and effectively 
provided two railways – a fast through route to Ireland and a slower local stopping service.8 Its 
efforts to do so were hampered by its generally poor relationship with the people and politicians 
in North Wales that culminated in the dispute over dismissal of staff who spoke only Welsh. This 
chapter shows that the language issue was neither the beginning nor the end of the dispute 
between the LNWR and the people and politicians of North Wales. It probably marked the low 
point, after which all sides began to develop a more constructive relationship and the LNWR 
learned to work better with both national and local politicians. Throughout those changes the 
LNWR remained largely in control of events and by the end of the nineteenth century secured the 
extra lines it required in North Wales, and a more positive political environment in which to 
extract full value from its investment in North Wales. 
  
8.1 Gladstone, North Wales and railways 1880 – 1890 
 
William Gladstone’s most prominent connection with railway development is the Railway Act of 
1844 that presented a diluted form of many of the reforms suggested by the Irish Railway 
Commission expounded in chapter 3. However, Gladstone’s involvement with railways was a 
continuous feature of his political life, and had a practical value in serving his estate in north-east 
Wales. Gladstone’s views on the value of railways were similar to those expounded at railway 
opening ceremonies discussed in chapter 6, but with more of a sense that they would serve the 
personal needs of people rather than merely ‘civilising’ them. Gladstone espoused views that 
came close to those that Nye records from those believing in Manifest Destiny as analysed in 
chapter 1. Gladstone saw railways as a God-given benefit both to industry and human 
development that repaid any negative impact on the environment, as he told an audience in 
Bolton when he opened a public park: 
 
Wordsworth wrote strongly against the proposal to carry a railway into the lake districts [because] 
the visiting population would not care a pin about nature, and yet [through railways] these 
improved tastes and feelings had grown up. It was a great purpose, which Providence might well 
be supposed to have contemplated, that in proportion as commercial and industrial pursuits 
became more keen and more extended, other faculties and other capacities of human nature in 
the opposite direction should also be opened and developed, [so] the balance of man and man’s 
mind might be preserved.9 
 
He was also aware that railways mattered to people in a political sense of enabling them to 
achieve changes that impacted on their own lives and those of their communities. And this was 
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the case in North Wales, as shown in the previous chapters in which the importance of the LNWR 
in community life and politics grew progressively up to 1880. The process did not stop there as 
was clear when Gladstone concluded one of his regular holidays at Penmaenmawr, and spoke to 
the crowd at the LNWR station in the town. October 1882 was a time of personal distress to 
Gladstone because Frederick Cavendish, husband of Gladstone’s niece, had been murdered in 
Phoenix Park Dublin; and it was a time of great national crisis because of the war in Egypt. But the 
crowds at Penmaenmawr wanted his help with a bridge over the railway to connect the town with 
the beach. Gladstone addressed those concerns by heaping somewhat disingenuous praise on the 
LNWR for their ‘wisdom’ and ‘liberality’, and expressed the hope that they would grant the wishes 
of the local Liberal association. It was also an occasion to celebrate Gladstone’s intense 
satisfaction from the: ‘harmony in which I stand in my relation to the people of Wales’.10 Politics 
and railways were clearly part of the relationship between Gladstone and North Wales. 
Gladstone allied with Henry Robertson and Benjamin Piercy in order to develop his earlier 
personal and political ambitions in North Wales that were bolstered by railway developments in 
the region. They assisted in the challenge to the LNWR monopoly in North Wales that was helpful 
in Gladstone’s attempt to secure the support and votes of the new intake of Welsh L iberal MPs in 
1885 and gain a railway outlet from his Hawarden estate to Liverpool.11 Both Robertson and 
Piercy died in 1888 and Gladstone then turned to Sir Edward Watkin of the Manchester, Sheffield 
and Lincolnshire Railway (MSL)who was: ‘highly ambitious, flamboyant, and irascible, a railway 
imperialist, eager to extend his influence and control into new territories, at home and abroad’ – 
including Wales.12 Gladstone was careful to link his own interest in railway developments in north-
east Wales to wider benefits for North Wales.13 That was consistent with his stance that he would 
abstain in any political matter nationally if ‘private interests alone were involved’.14 The important 
word for Gladstone was ‘alone’. He apparently felt able to pursue private interests if there was 
also (in his mind) a public dimension, as he felt that there was in North Wales.  
He allied himself with Watkin as they both had ambitions in North Wales and particularly 
a common interest in challenging the LNWR and GWR. Watkin wished to establish a company to 
rival them at a national level, while Gladstone was frustrated by their intransigence in North 
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Wales. The issues for both of them crystallised into a single aim of completing the access for 
Welsh traffic to Liverpool and Manchester via a new line from Wrexham that crossed the River 
Dee north of Chester and accessed Liverpool through a tunnel under the Mersey. Both men rather 
exaggerated the wider benefits for North Wales by implying that such a line would challenge the 
LNWR monopoly in the region. That was attractive to politicians and the public in North Wales, for 
whom the LNWR posed an increasing problem because of its lack of response to local concerns 
and a perceived lack of sympathy with the population as analysed in the previous chapter.  
As Prime Minister, Gladstone had cut the first sod on the northern part of that Wirral 
route in 1884 and noted that Liverpool was the natural metropolis of North Wales that was 
isolated from the port by lack of railway connection. He thought the importance of the new 
railway was such that it was the difference: ‘between progress and standing where you are’ for 
North Wales.15 He dismissed companies such as the LNWR as being mostly concerned with long 
haul traffic and serving large cities. 16 As the scheme progressed from the Mersey towards Wales 
and the vital bridge of over the Dee, Watkin explained to the 1888 Eisteddfod that it was a: 
‘gateway to Wales and hereafter probably to Ireland’.17 Thus Watkin aimed to raise Welsh hopes 
of breaking the LNWR monopoly in North Wales without promising definitely to do so. Watkin 
also pointed out that railways in Wales were only 12 per cent of the total capital of the LNWR and 
GWR and clearly not their central concern. In future he hoped for Welsh railways paid for by 
Welsh finance and working for Welsh interests. At the same event, Gladstone articulated his 
support for Welsh nationality, language, religion and economic growth as the modern ‘wants of 
Wales’.18 The way that Gladstone and Watkin shared an Eisteddfod platform in 1888 cemented 
the connection between railways and politics in North Wales.  
Watkin’s efforts eventually produced the grand-sounding Welsh Railways Through Traffic 
Act 1889, which was an elaborate collaboration between many disparate small railways in Wales 
to create a through line that linked North and South Wales, and especially the coalfields, to large 
markets in Lancashire. At least one optimistic Welsh commentator saw benefits for coal, tourism, 
agriculture and even a revival of Porth Dinllaen to challenge Holyhead.19 It was a practical 
response to the manifesto for Welsh railways of 1864 described in chapter 6 that aimed to create 
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a distinctly Welsh railway system that matched the emerging sense of Welsh identity. It was also 
seen as having the potential to curb the power of large railway companies like the LNWR which: 
‘unlike ordinary cannibals […] starves the victims it intends to devour’.20 The collaboration in 
Wales on railway issues had political value to Watkin and Gladstone - and the latter got the link to 
Liverpool for the bricks and coal produced on his Aston Hall estate – but it did little to challenge 
the power of the larger companies, especially the LNWR.21 And Gladstone’s position was not 
substantially different from the earlier English railway promoters in Wales whose invasion 
rhetoric was analysed in chapter 6. That was clear when he opened the bridge over the Dee near 
his estate in 1889: ‘They were all there […] gathered from different parts of England and formed 
into an army, and they had invaded Wales’.22 His comments may have been jocular but there was 
sufficient similarity to Richard Moon’s 1870 reference to railways as a modern feudalism in North 
Wales, noted in chapter 6, to suggest that Gladstone was unlikely to deploy a truly Welsh policy 
on railways. His purposes for railways had more of a human face than Moon’s, but Gladstone was 
a Victorian improver rather than a Welsh nationalist. 
So by 1890 the LNWR still remained as strong in North Wales in the face of Gladstone and 
Watkin’s rhetoric as it was in 1881 when: 
 
 
There was not a single valley where a railway could go in this part of the country in which the trains 
of the [LNWR] were not running [and] each employee should never scruple to bear the mark of the 
[LNWR] on his collar when he knew it was a passport to society.23  
 
 
That statement about the position of the LNWR in North Wales by one of its solicitors was 
accurate in terms of its articulation of the company’s monopoly of rail traffic, but less so as a 
description of its social status. The catalogue of court cases and incidents detailed in the previous 
chapter covering the period up to 1880 showed there were tensions caused by the LNWR’s high-
handed behaviour towards the local population and its litigious attitude. The LNWR had been 
increasingly challenged by individuals and public bodies from around 1868 and that process 
continued into the 1880s. The jury at an inquest in Holyhead in 1882 indicted senior LNWR 
officials for the deaths of three passengers walking between ferry and train during reconstruction 
of the harbour after storm damage. The case showed tension between senior management and 
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junior staff in which the community supported the latter. The coroner at the subsequent inquest 
was concerned that local bias might affect the jury - and he was clearly surprised when the jury’s 
verdict required the prosecution of senior LNWR managers.24 The company was supported by 
officialdom and there was an attempt to get the subsequent trial moved to Chester through fear 
of local feeling prejudicing the result. 25 Although all the defendants were eventually acquitted, 
such incidents showed an increasing unwillingness by the local population to accept without 
question the LNWR’s actions and their consequences.26 
In a typical response, the LNWR resisted any suggestion of responsibility for events at 
Holyhead in 1882 and rather arrogantly considered that the long service of district superintendent 
Ephraim Wood meant that he was: ‘incapable of the culpable negligence of which he was so 
unjustly accused’.27 There was a spirit of triumphalism about his acquittal when the LNWR officers 
held their annual dinner in Chester in 1883. They presented Wood with an illuminated 
congratulatory scroll, commemorating his success in court, despite the ‘extraordinary efforts to 
the contrary’ – presumably meaning the efforts of the local populace.28 The notion that this case 
was part of a wider tension between railway and populace was reinforced by another incident at 
Holyhead in 1885 that was apparently unreported in North Wales but was publicised in Dublin. A 
‘Special Reporter’ recounted that the LNWR had sent fifteen staff from Chester to replace Welsh 
employees who were allegedly dismissed for pilfering - on the basis that: ‘one Welshman steals 
therefore all Welshmen are unreliable’.29 The paper alleged that the real reason for the dispute 
was that the LNWR was engaged in a political initiative and: ‘wished to “make a little English 
town” of Holyhead. ’30 It appeared to be a continuation of the tension between the LNWR and the 
people of Holyhead that had erupted over the visit of the Prince of Wales in 1880, as analysed in 
the last chapter. The LNWR was also accused in 1885 of under-selling local traders by favouring its 
own suppliers, who then put local people out of business. It was further reported in Manchester 
that the Chester employees who were sent to replace the Welshmen had been duped by a story 
that there were staff shortages at Holyhead. They had returned home when they found out the 
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facts - and after two of them were beaten ‘very severely’.31 That report made clear that local 
feeling against the LNWR was very intense.32 A further report in Ireland hinted at the emergence 
of a common feeling between Wales and Ireland in its suggestion that: ‘several of the Saxon 
invaders [were given] a sound thrashing’ and that a senior manager from London had attended 
Holyhead to attempt a resolution.33  
That tension at Holyhead may be explained in part by the evidence that the LNWR in 
North Wales had become part of the local establishment whose profile was generally more 
English than Welsh – hence the reference to Anglicising Holyhead. Such an attempt would be 
consistent with the presence of a powerful, English, resident elite in nineteenth century Wales 
suggested by Harris and Startup.34 There is some evidence that the LNWR had developed that 
status over many years. One of their solicitors was reported as having: ‘taken the mansion of 
Rhug, near Corwen, and the game above the estate’ in 1859.35 Eight years later another was 
involved in acquiring hotels in the region for the company.36 Senior LNWR officials were involved 
in official business in North Wales, such as when Bangor Town Council applied to become a 
corporation in 1883 and the support of the LWNR was seen as essential to its bid.37 When long-
serving engineer Hedworth Lee died in 1876, ‘a double-light stained glass window’ was put in the 
local Anglican Church in Bangor in his memory.38 Ephraim Wood, superintendent of the North 
Wales district, married the daughter of a local millionaire from Conwy, clearly having suffered no 
ill-effects from being blamed by the Holyhead jury for the accident in the town in 1882 as 
discussed above.39 Wood went on to become a prominent local establishment figure after 
retirement, a magistrate and High Sherriff of Caernarfonshire.40 These examples show that the 
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LNWR was an important element of the local establishment in North Wales and that its officials 
were recognised accordingly. The alignment of the LNWR and officialdom was also demonstrated 
in 1887 when the authorities struggled to contain a tithe riot in the Mochdre district of North 
Wales. Soldiers and police were carried to the site of the disturbance by rail but found it difficult 
to disembark without the help of the LNWR.41 One witness pointed out that: ‘the [LNWR] stopped 
a train for [troops and police] I never heard of them stopping for anybody else before’.42 In 1890, 
the company constructed a station at Mochdre, though the local traffic did not warrant it. 43 The 
new station was not even provided with a goods siding that would have assisted local traders.44 It 
is difficult not to conclude that it was constructed largely to aid local policing of the area during 
the Tithe Wars.  
Industrial and social tensions were not the only issues between company and region. 
There was also the LNWR’s monopoly and the rates it charged. In June 1887 there was a meeting 
in Rhyl to support a railway to by-pass the LNWR between Chester and Rhyl because the LNWR: 
‘had a system not so much to accommodate passengers, as a line of communication between 
England and Ireland to carry Irish traffic’.45 Issues such as rates, fares, monopoly, safety and 
industrial relations were sources of general tension between the railway companies and 
communities in Britain in this period.46 The extra ingredient in North Wales was Welsh nationality 
as demonstrated at Holyhead in 1885. As the franchise extended, it became more possible for the 
Welsh voice to be heard through an emerging group of radical Welsh Liberal MPs. Gladstone tried 
hard to appear to meet their demands, but the movement was strong and soon became a 
formidable force on the national stage when it combined with the Irish faction in Parliament. That 
reflected that fact that the connection between Ireland and Wales became stronger during the 
1880s – as seen in Irish coverage of the Holyhead riot above. The Welsh Liberal leader, Stuart 
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Rendel, suggested in 1888 that: ‘Ireland is the standard bearer of a universal crusade’.47 His own 
priorities for Wales were clear: 
 
 
By far the most important questions of the future for the happiness of our country are the 
abolition of monopolies in religion, in land, in railways in the liquor traffic. […] We want to reduce 
the railway rates which oppress and handicap our industries…48  
 
 
That manifesto for change went beyond that of 1864 as it was not just about which railways 
should be built, it was about how they should operate. That put the LNWR at the centre of the 
new political agenda in North Wales and marked a further shift towards a more distinctly Welsh 
response to the monopoly of the LNWR, which was seen as a being similar to other local English 
controlled monopolies described in Rendel’s comments above. That response, which developed 
through the 1880s as described above, reflected changes in the confidence and sense of national 
identity of the population of North Wales and was quickly translated into a tangible political 
response in Parliament.  
 
8.2  Confrontation in Parliament 1890 – 1900 
 
It appears that there was more to the relationship between Irish and Welsh MPs than the notion 
of the latter learning from the former as suggested by Morgan.49 There was active collaboration 
for a purpose – and at the centre of that purpose was the challenge the LNWR monopoly. The 
LNWR was already a target of Irish nationalists by 1890, as the company was regarded in its 
dealings with the Dublin Steam Packet Company (DSPC) as a ‘formidable antagonist’.50 After a 
debate about the Irish mail contract, Frank O’Donnell MP, begged: ‘to give Notice that […] 
legislation promoted by the [LNWR] will obtain the attention of Irish Members for the future’. 51 
The tactic appeared to work, as the contract to carry the mail from Holyhead to Dublin was 
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returned to the Irish company after the LNWR had apparently secured it and its chairman had 
argued for the Irish credentials of the LNWR.52  
Tom Ellis, a leading light in the new Welsh radicalism, evidently took notice and argued that 
the Irish tactics and nationalist agenda were a model for Wales.53 Ireland had aroused in Wales ‘a 
spirit that cannot be extinguished’.54 Ellis outlined the national agenda for Wales with railways 
clearly as prominent on his list of priorities as they had been on Rendel’s:  
 
 
A Welsh party has been formed in Parliament [that wanted] its railways unified and worked for the 
nation's good, its village industries fostered, and a network of village libraries and halls established. 
[…] above all we shall work for a Legislature elected by the manhood and the womanhood of 
Wales, and to them responsible…55 
 
 
This Cymru Fydd agenda found practical expression in a failed bill to establish a Secretary of State 
for Wales and a Council for Wales in 1891 with extensive powers, including the power to deal with 
all railway bills in the country.56 Ellis was inhibited from taking forward this radical vision by his 
acceptance of the Deputy Whip role in Gladstone’s 1892 Government, which divided Ellis from his 
Welsh colleagues and especially Lloyd George.57 Lloyd George showed no reluctance to promote 
Ellis’s agenda after his own election to Parliament in 1890 and railways were clearly a priority, as 
his interventions in Parliament included an early attack on the LNWR on the issue of rates and 
charges.58 That was evidently part of a wider campaign that reflected the concerns of his 
constituents. He wrote to them in July 1891, and urged them to create ‘a committee […] to watch 
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the doings of our railway companies [of which, the LNWR had] tremendous power and influence 
in the House [and the] Government’. The North Wales Express reported Lloyd George’s comments 
and rejoiced that: ‘at last we have men in the House of Commons thoroughly capable of guarding 
our interests…the great railway problem will have to be grappled with sooner or later’.59 The 
public clearly agreed, as Lloyd George considered that railway rates were among his most 
successful issues in 1891.60 Some of the elements of the ‘great railway problem’ were therefore 
apparent early in the 1890s. Ellis had identified the issue of control over railways as a priority for a 
Welsh legislature and that had been reflected in Lloyd George’s comments about the power of 
railways in Parliament. One of the results of that power was thought to be the high charges for 
freight and passengers that featured in chapter 7 as a priority for people and businesses in North 
Wales. That was a particular problem in North Wales because of the success of the LNWR in 
maintaining the higher rates charged by the CHR once the latter company was dissolved in 1879. 
The LNWR’s ability to charge higher rates was underpinned by its monopoly position in North 
Wales which was also a concern for Welsh politicians.  
Irish MPs had longer-standing grievances that were similar to those expressed by their Welsh 
colleagues, but had another element that was not present initially in Wales but emerged strongly 
by 1895. It was the sense that the LNWR was culturally identified with the UK state and inherently 
antagonistic to any movement that undermined the Union. The link between the Irish and Welsh 
Nationalists would not have impressed Lord Stalbridge, who took up his post as chairman of the 
LNWR in April 1891. In his former guise of Lord Richard Grosvenor, he was MP for Flintshire and 
had been a close friend and neighbour of Gladstone, and chief whip in his government but 
defected to the Liberal Unionists over Home Rule for Ireland in 1886.61 Given that background, his 
appointment to the top position in the LNWR was hardly conducive to better relations between 
the railway company and the nationalists of Wales and Ireland. Morgan showed that the period 
after 1886 was: ‘the high noon of Welsh radicalism [when] the virus of Home Rule was seen in the 
mildest of Welsh requests’62. Stalbridge was also on record as considering all Irishmen ‘without 
exception’ as corrupt.63 In respect of church disestablishment, an important issue for Welsh 
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Liberals, Stalbridge’s position was wholly unsympathetic - as shown in his subscription to a fund to 
‘defend the Church in Wales’. 64 The LNWR chairman was therefore not a popular figure with 
many Irish and Welsh MPs, as must have been obvious to the LNWR board that appointed him. 
That reinforces the sense that the LNWR was almost consciously Unionist in outlook. Tension was 
certainly apparent in exchanges between Irish MPs and the LNWR in 1891, when an Irish 
nationalist MP objected to an intervention by Stalbridge, who had frustrated an influential body 
that was established to review railway rates by securing the dismissal of one of its members.65 
Stalbridge was accused by Irish MPs of pursuing a personal interest.66 Thus, the people and 
politicians of North Wales on one side (combined with Irish MPs) and the LNWR on the other had 
taken up positions that had the potential to increase tensions between them in the 1890s.  
Given that context and the political importance of the Welsh language noted in the previous 
chapters, it was hardly surprising that the relationship between the LNWR and North Wales 
erupted when the LNWR dismissed some employees in North Wales who only spoke Welsh.67 
Jones explored that issue in some detail and showed that the LNWR had a long-standing policy 
against workers who only spoke Welsh. It is less clear from her analysis why this policy was only 
occasionally enforced and why there was no strong reaction to it until 1894.  68 It is difficult not to 
conclude that Stalbridge’s sensitivity to the ‘the virus of Home Rule’ at that time played some part 
in the process. That may not have been the only issue. By linking the work of Drummond on the 
behaviour of the LNWR towards Liberals in Crewe - ‘scandalously bad’ according to Gladstone - to 
the evidence from Jones on its treatment of employees in North Wales a common thread 
emerges.69 The profile of employees at Crewe – Liberal and non-conformist – was the same as for 
North Wales. Drummond noted a decline in deference from employees in Crewe, and that is 
apparent in this current study, for example in the events discussed above, where the LNWR was 
accused of trying to make a “little English town of Holyhead” and the employees reacted angrily. 
The difference in Crewe was that the LNWR wanted to make that a ‘Conservative town’ as 
compared to the priority in Holyhead. In both cases the LNWR objected to aspects of local 
communities that did not fit in with its own Conservative and Anglican profile.  
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Whatever motivated the LNWR in North Wales, its actions in dismissing Welsh-only speakers 
were offensive, poorly timed – and a perfect issue for a skilled and ambitious politician like Lloyd 
George. He did not miss his chance. The opportunity to create trouble for the LNWR arose when 
its private bill was presented on 5 April 1895 and included (among other things) higher rates on 
lines in North Wales, and two additional lines for much of the distance from Chester to Llandudno 
Junction. Lloyd George was not content to let it pass, even though the extra lines of railway suited 
local interests in North Wales. He wanted a full debate on the policies of the LNWR in North 
Wales. 70 That was not allowed, but Lloyd George succeeded in postponing the Bill. When the 
matter returned the LNWR was defended by David Plunket, a director and Dublin based Unionist 
MP, who struggled to contain a wide ranging attack but suggested that the loss of the Bill would 
damage North Wales more than the LNWR because it would limit trade. Bryn Roberts, a Welsh 
MP and LNWR shareholder, demonstrated the anger that he and his colleagues felt, as he was 
willing to risk any local disadvantage from frustrating the measure in order to obstruct the LNWR: 
‘a most arrogant company’.71 Lloyd George wrote to his brother William George and showed how 
strong the Welsh feelings were against the LNWR at this time: 
 
 
Of course we were beaten, but we made a pertinacious protest. I have put down a vote of censure. 
I got wind of the fact that the [indecipherable] that was down for discussion tomorrow night was 
going to be withdrawn, so I put down a vote of confidence in the Railway Coy. […] We will get our 
fling at them…72 
 
 
 
Arthur Balfour for the Conservatives thought that the LNWR had not: ‘broken either the letter or 
the spirit of the law’ and that the motion against it was invalid.73 That theme was taken up by 
Plunket, who continued to argue that the debate should not have been held as it challenged 
laissez-faire economics. He asserted that if the Welsh views were upheld: ‘it would be the right 
and the established practice, […] to call for an inquiry into the conduct of the private business of 
any private Company.74 He denied any antagonism towards Wales or the Welsh but he thought: 
‘that a railway company [or other employer] had a perfect right to employ whom he liked’.75 
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James Bryce, speaking for government, did not object to the matter being debated as he had 
received widespread complaints from Wales. He urged the LNWR to use its great powers in a 
‘conciliatory manner’. 76 With that, Lloyd George withdrew his motion. 77  
An indication of how the LNWR was viewed in North Wales emerged in a letter to Lloyd 
George from his uncle, after the latter had learned of the debate. Uncle Lloyd considered that the 
LNWR was as: ‘tyrannical as any Tory powers can be, and quite as dishonourable’.78 It is relevant 
to note here that these attacks from Welsh MPs challenged Liberal ministers on the issue of 
railways – showing the extent to which Gladstone’s efforts to engage them in support of his 
earlier government with a railway programme for North Wales had failed. The debate in May 
1895 was a few weeks before the fall of Lord Rosebery’s own Liberal government.79  
According to Jones, the Welsh language issue was dropped in May 1895 and Welsh MPs 
turned to other matters.80 In fact, the opposition to the LNWR actually intensified as Irish and 
Welsh MPs combined to attack other aspects of the operation of the LNWR. The prominent Irish 
Nationalist MP Timothy Healy made the position clear in February 1896. He suggested that Irish 
ideas: ‘had spread to this country, to Scotland, and to Wales. It [the Government was] paying a big 
price for keeping up the present system in Ireland’.81 And he warned that he and his colleagues 
would: ‘harass, attack, and thwart in every way the policy of those who refused to give Home Rule 
to Ireland’.82 Evidently, the LNWR was counted among them. That was hardly surprising, given the 
views of Lord Stalbridge about Irish nationalist MPs. He considered that: ‘their ultimate objective 
was the thorough dismemberment of the Empire and the separation of Ireland from England’. 83 
Irish Members continued to press him for a service from Holyhead to London that was more 
useful to ordinary people. They asked for the addition of third class carriages to Irish Mail trains 
and for a faster service. In response, Stalbridge told an LNWR meeting: ‘it has always been difficult 
for the Government to please them [the Irish MPs] and he supposed that [the LNWR] must give 
up the attempt’.84 His remarks are interesting in their alignment of company and government 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
76  HC Deb 10 May 1895 vol. 33 c990. 
 
77  HC Deb 10 May 1895 vol. 33 c996. 
 
78  Quoted in George, Lloyd George – Backbencher, 165. 
 
79  Morgan, Wales in British Politics, 156. 
 
80  Jones, Railways and Language Change, 144. 
 
81  HC Deb 13 February 1896 vol. 37 c263. 
 
82  HC Deb 13 February 1896 vol. 37 c260. 
 
83  “Important Speech by Lord Stalbridge” Western Gazette, 28 February 1890, 7. 
 
84  “The London and North Western Co. and the Irish Members”, Freeman’s Journal, 14 August 1897, 4. 
208 
 
activity in respect of Ireland. The Irish and Welsh Members had already made the connection and 
hence they directed strong attacks against the LNWR and the government in London that they 
considered to be a supporter of the railway company. 
Lloyd George spoke against another LNWR Bill in April 1896 that was a further attempt to 
add extra lines along the North Wales coast to accommodate the huge increase in traffic, without 
reducing its charges. One Irish MP reckoned that the injustices of the LNWR were so serious that 
he advised his Welsh colleagues: ‘to resist this unjust taxation and to oppose every Railway Bill 
that came before the House’85 Defence of the LNWR fell to Sir William Houldsworth, a 
Conservative cotton magnate from Manchester and an LNWR director.86 Lloyd George thought 
the position of Welsh traders was hopeless because the Board of Trade was unable to resist the 
LNWR.87 When the vote was lost by them, the Irish and Welsh MPs continued their disruptive 
tactics by attacking Houldsworth’s right to vote at all because of his personal financial interest in 
the matter. Lloyd George wrote to his brother and showed how important it was to attack the 
LNWR in pursuit of Welsh national aspirations: ‘No harm in proving that Nationalism involves 
something more substantial than ideals’88 His comment reinforces the status of railways as an 
important item on the Welsh nationalist political agenda. .  
By the time of Lloyd George’s attack, the issue of rates and charges on railways was 
diminished through much greater cooperation between the companies and government, so that 
the room for alteration of charges in particular cases was limited.89 The company maintained a 
generally more amenable stance under these attacks, perhaps because it knew that Lloyd George 
was using the issue for personal political reasons. It also thought (as its board minutes show) that 
he was wrong in fact, and he did not have the support of many Welsh traders.90 The LNWR was 
also rather arrogantly confident of success, as shown by the fact that it was buying up land to add 
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to its lines in North Wales some four years before its legislation was actually passed.91 That is 
testament to its immense political power in parliament and in North Wales. 
For Irish MPs, the periodic renewal of the LNWR’s power to operate steam vessels was an 
important issue. They wished to protect Irish capital from the perceived intention of the UK 
government to give the contract for the sea passage of the mail between Holyhead and Dublin to 
the LNWR. They also objected to the LNWR being allowed to escape periodic renewal of the 
power to operate steamships. One Irish MP believed that railways ruled the legislature, executive 
and civil service; while another considered that the LNWR had: ‘a perfect monopoly […] between 
London and Dublin’ and remained powerful despite its terrible accident record as a shipping 
company.92 He was correct in that assertion at least, according to Wynn’s analysis.93 Nonetheless, 
Chairman Lord Stalbridge expressed a continuing wish to use the LNWR’s trains and ships to serve 
the ‘pacification of Ireland’ by attracting English tourists to visit the country in 1897.94 Irish MPs, 
backed by their Welsh colleagues, showed little appreciation for that rather optimistic solution to 
Ireland’s political and social problems by voting against the renewal of the company’s power to 
operate steamships in the following year.95 There seemed almost nothing the LNWR could do in 
parliament that related to Ireland or Wales in the 1890s that did not attract a hostile political 
reaction from the MPs of both those countries. 
Direct cooperation between Welsh and Irish MPs was evident again when the LNWR 
(Wales) Bill was introduced in 1900 and Welsh MPs pointed out that traffic on the CHR was so 
high that two tracks were not enough and four were proposed to boost LNWR profits. 96 They did 
not object to that but rather to the fact that: 
 
 
No reduction whatever was made in the maximum rates for carrying goods traffic […] the [LNWR] 
got it [the CHR] cheap. No one else could have bought it, and now, with the ruthlessness which 
pertains to all monopolies, they take advantage of the position and charge exorbitant rates…97  
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By 1900, the LNWR was beginning to learn the value of a less confrontational approach so it 
selected the genial Colonel Lockwood to defend its position – a popular figure among MPs and 
one with Welsh connections.98 He hoped that the Bill would not be delayed and assured MPs that 
he would: ‘always endeavour to bring before the board of directors any question affecting the 
interests of Wales’.99 Nonetheless, an Irish MP advised his Welsh colleagues to: ‘take a leaf out of 
our book, and [delay the matter] until a satisfactory assurance is given’.100 Swift McNeill MP 
confirmed the collaboration between Welsh and Irish MPs against the LNWR when he urged 
support for: ‘the Welsh Members, inasmuch as they have supported the Irish Members again and 
again in their disputations with [the LNWR]’.101 The attempt to force an adjournment failed, the 
Bill passed, and left Lloyd George lamenting: ‘a most monstrous system by which a ring of railway 
directors are enabled to prove themselves more powerful than the Government of the day, and 
render it absolutely impotent in the face of the great railroad monopoly’.102 As he told his brother 
William in a private letter: ‘we went for them hot and strong’.103 
At the end of the nineteenth century it proved more difficult to attack the LNWR over the 
rates issue than it had been in 1879. The Land Commission in Wales reported in 1896 and 
concluded that railway rates were not a factor in the agricultural depression in Wales despite that 
being a widely-held view among witnesses it had examined.104 It went further in suggesting that 
higher railway rates in Wales acted as an import protection to Welsh producers because English 
competitors faced higher charges to access Welsh markets.105 They considered that the producers 
themselves could cut their costs through combining to get lower rates by filling a whole train 
rather than one or two trucks.106 The issue of railway rates continued to rumble along but much of 
the heat had gone from it in North Wales by the end of the century, as it had in the UK as a whole 
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as the railway companies cooperated more closely with government.107 The LNWR adopted that 
approach rather than engaging separately with Welsh politicians. It also weakened the position of 
those politicians by withdrawing potential benefits, such as more railway lines, in response to 
political attacks -thereby separating the MPs to some extent from local opinion in North Wales.  
The cooperation of Welsh and Irish MPs Parliament analysed above demonstrates that 
they had a joint agenda, rather than collaboration being just a matter of the Welsh learning from 
the Irish how to work the parliamentary system to their own advantage. It is important for this 
study to see that the LNWR was a prime target for that cooperation. It underlines a theme 
throughout the thesis that the LNWR had an identity with the state, especially when it operated in 
“alien” environments such as North Wales and Ireland. It was clearly viewed by nationalists in 
North Wales and Ireland as not serving the interests of either country in its attitude to their 
respective cultures, in the rates it charged and the facilities that it offered. Its monopoly of traffic 
was resented, as was the manner in which government either supported or failed to challenge 
that monopoly. Those issues were not only contested at national level by North Wales MPs in 
parliament, they were also matters that interested local politicians. They increasingly represented 
those views in local government as the franchise extended and new local authorities were created 
that replaced the former power of landowners and the established church in North Wales. 
 
8.3 Local politics and the LNWR in North Wales 1890-1900 
 
Opposition to the LNWR in North Wales was inhibited before 1880 by the lack of democratic 
machinery, especially at the regional level, as noted previously. However, by 1890 the growth of 
strong local representation in the form of County Councils (CC) in England and Wales: ‘created a 
social transformation more striking even than the extension of democracy at the national level’ 
according to a contemporary view.108 That view was expressed in a rather critical commentary 
from Liverpool that suggested that the CCs in North Wales consisted of: ‘non-conformists in 
religion, Radicals in politics, and communistic agitators in social affairs […] the Conservatives, the 
Church, and the landlords have little influence’.109 Those last three elements were the ‘consuming 
antipathies’ of the Welsh Radicals.110 The CCs enabled those radicals to express such views in 
practical measures as: ‘1 April 1889 was the day when control of county affairs passed to the 
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elected representatives of the people’.111 That control was in the hands of Welsh radicals after the 
Liberal landslide at local elections in 1890.112 As the LNWR’s profile contained the three elements 
that apparently motivated the emerging politics in North Wales, it might be expected that the 
company was a target for radical politicians in North Wales. The LNWR did not welcome this 
extension of local democracy – Chairman Sir Richard Moon (he was knighted in 1887) thought 
these new local authorities: ‘apparently with little or nothing to do’ might add to the burden of 
local rates on railways – a major preoccupation of the LNWR as noted in chapter 7.113 Moon’s 
rather grudging statement was not entirely accurate. CCs had a range of powers. They assumed 
the administrative business of quarter sessions; had certain powers under local Acts; appointed 
coroners and a medical officer; created byelaws and managed roads, bridges and the police. 
Significantly the CCs had power to oppose bills in parliament, which was important in their later 
opposition to the LNWR in North Wales.114 There is little reference to the struggle between 
County Councils and the LNWR in North Wales in existing scholarship, apart from Jones’s analysis 
of the language dispute of 1895 discussed above. But an examination of newspapers and local 
democratic proceedings shows that the LNWR monopoly in North Wales was a prominent issue 
locally just as it was nationally.  115 
As early as February 1890, the Caernarvonshire County Council (CCC) supported a request 
from Denbighshire County Council (DCC) to form a committee of councils to argue for ‘extended 
railway communication’ and the CCC were also frustrated by the response of the UK Railway 
Rates Commission, which thought the case of Wales was ‘trifling’.116 However, the monopoly of 
the LNWR was the local councils’ main preoccupation. Several local authorities met at Mold in 
November 1891 to argue for a railway from Mold to Prestatyn, by-passing the LNWR, so that the 
LNWR could not ‘perpetuate their present monopoly’. Herbert Lewis, chairman of Flintshire 
County Council (FCC) and also the local MP insisted on the: ‘absolute necessity of having an 
independent railway’.117 Such proposals flowed from the earlier Watkin and Gladstone railway 
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initiative to secure a railway between Wrexham and Liverpool but there was no evidence of their 
support in the reports.118 Again, while scholars such as Rowland Williams acknowledge that Lewis 
was a prominent Welsh politician on a range of issues, Lewis’s strong position on railways in North 
Wales does not feature in the analysis of his life.119 Local authorities also used the court to 
challenge the LNWR, as in the case of the Carnarvon Corporation, which unsuccessfully 
summonsed the LNWR for smoke pollution in the town.120 A local paper noted that: ‘towns the 
size of Carnarvon cannot afford to quarrel with large railway companies which enjoy a 
monopoly’.121 The fact that they did so indicated the rising confidence that communities had in 
dealing with the LNWR. That confidence was shown in another local paper that suggested that:  
 
 
We are not to be put off by pleasant words, vague promises, and a polite bowing out […] we will go 
to London and insist upon the directors listening to our complaints. [It was the job of elected 
representatives] to rouse public feeling and make it too strong for even “the great London and 
North Western Railway” to disregard.122 
 
 
CCC members attended the committee stage of the LNWR Bill in London in 1896 and found that 
the company had abandoned plans to widen the line along the coast in order to get other clauses 
through unopposed - and to avoid public discussion of railway rates.123 The LNWR then tried a 
different approach by reintroducing its proposals piecemeal, starting with Flintshire.124 Again it 
faced calls for opposition from combined local authorities including Holywell, where Herbert 
Lewis urged continued action against the LNWR’s ‘giant’s strength’.125 In February 1897 the FCC 
and CCC agreed a joint resolution opposing the new Bill.126 In the same month, a UK wide article 
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appeared in the Daily Telegraph that was virtually an advertisement for the LNWR widening 
scheme in North Wales, showing how the LNWR were attempting to challenge local opposition by 
asserting the national significance of the line through sympathetic journals: 
 
 
The principal results to accrue from this great enterprise are the improvement of the through 
traffic to Holyhead for the Irish Mail [and] the acceleration of the gigantic holiday traffic to the 
pleasure resorts. […] These developments are only to be gained by the separation of the express 
trains from those that may be termed local, and hence the inevitable demand for four roads 
instead of two.127 
 
 
 By the late 1890s, the LNWR was beginning to learn how to work in the local political 
environment and appeared to have come to a separate agreement with Rhyl Town Council that 
met its demands and allowed an extra £1000 per year of rates to be charged against the railway. 
The result was regarded with ‘unmixed satisfaction’ by the local authority.128 The opposition from 
Anglesey was weakened by the offer of a new line to the resort of Benllech in October 1898. 129 In 
December 1898, Lord Stalbridge visited Bangor in order to open a Railway Institute for the 
employees.130 He also met a deputation of the Town Council. 131 The relationship between 
company and community appeared to be more cooperative and Welsh unity in local government 
was breaking down as each authority reached a separate settlement with the LNWR, which 
granted individual concessions rather than negotiating collectively with local authorities. 
There were other factors at work. By 1898 the Welsh nationalist movement was losing its 
momentum, as a split between South and North Wales’ politicians came to a head at Newport in 
1895 and left the Welsh national Cymru Fydd group moribund.132 In 1898 Lloyd George, a leading 
light in Cymru Fydd, did not stand for leadership of the Welsh MPs since he considered that Wales 
could not provide him with a power base that matched his ambition to become a political leader 
at the UK level.133 The link with the Irish nationalists was also rather brittle because the Irish MPs 
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did not see Welsh nationalism as in any way comparable to their own case. As their leader John 
Redmond commented in Parliament: ‘Home Rule for Ireland was alone and beyond and before 
every other question—not merely every domestic question but every question of great 
Constitutional reform affecting every portion of the Empire’.134 There were changes too in the 
political world of railway companies, as seen by the softening responses of the LNWR in 
Parliament and in its relations with local authorities in Wales. That reflected what was happening 
nationally in 1899-1900. Alderman’s 1975 analysis shows that by then: ‘little time was wasted [by 
railway companies] on arguments, now seen as anachronistic and artificial, which centred on [old] 
laissez-faire doctrines of political economy’.135 That did not mean that the LNWR was not just as 
intent on dominating North Wales as it had been since 1850. One commentator was clear that the 
LNWR track widening proposal in North Wales was: ‘intended to maintain their supremacy [in 
North Wales] for all time’.136 The only likely opponent was Watkin’s Great Central Railway which, 
as demonstrated in the last chapter, had: ‘already got its outworks firmly laid down in the 
country’137 That competition simply did not materialise as Watkin turned his attention to creating 
a rival line to the other great rail companies between London and Manchester that opened in 
1899, when his company changed from its earlier title of the Manchester, Sheffield and 
Lincolnshire Railway to become the Great Central.138 The LNWR quest for continued supremacy in 
North Wales was helped by the temptation for local councils to make separate settlements with 
them - as Rhyl Town Council had done - and thereby weaken any notion of Welsh solidarity. As 
Herbert Lewis observed:  
 
 
The public in North Wales had no large and comprehensive organisation to protect their interests 
in matters of this kind. The railway company, a wealthy and powerful corporation, could fight in 
detail local bodies. […] They even went to the length of approaching the witnesses brought to 
London to give evidence against them, finding out their individual grievances and settling with 
them. […] The interests involved were so great that no effort or expense was spared to make the 
case of the company as complete as possible.139 
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His comments made clear that the task facing the newly enfranchised public of North Wales in 
dealing with the largest industrial enterprise in the world was an unequal one. There were some 
exceptions. Colwyn Bay continued its struggle with the LNWR into 1900 because its council was 
concerned that to add to the tracks in front of Colwyn Bay would separate the town completely 
from the beach and damage the tourist industry.140 However, by May 1900 the town reported 
that it had got ‘all that they asked for’ by adopting its tough stance.141 The council was 
congratulated on its success by Venables Williams, an old antagonist who extracted increases in 
the local rates charged to the LNWR in 1871 as seen in chapter 7. He considered that it was: 
‘perfectly useless to treat with [the LNWR] amicably. [He] really had to bully them’ in order to 
raise the contribution from £125 per mile to the 1900 figure of £2090 per mile.142 However, local 
resistance was weakening to the point where the unity of the councils appeared to have crumbled 
completely. For example, Flintshire complained of the high charges on the LNWR in 1900, but 
pointed out that as its stretch of line was cheaper to maintain than the line west of Conwy, the 
LNWR might: ‘see their way to reducing maximum rates for Flintshire’ separately.143 By June 1900, 
the Council had decided that continued opposition to the LNWR risked ‘throwing away 
ratepayers’ money’.144 If the LNWR tactic was “divide and rule”, it seemed to have worked. 
Among these many developments of the relationship between North Wales and the 
LNWR there was a little noticed incident that marked the formal end of any notion of a rival line 
to the CHR. In contrast to the 1846 broad gauge main line with its promise of rapid access to 
London and Dublin, a short light railway was proposed to serve Porth Dinllaen in 1900. Some still 
argued that a light railway should be resisted because it would prevent the chance of a standard 
gauge railway to the port. Lloyd George dismissed such arguments and urged support for the light 
railway, and he reflected on the dismal history of the attempts to challenge the LNWR and reach 
Porth Dinllaen: 
 
 
 [Lloyd George] had heard since the days of his childhood [that] there was a scheme on hand for 
the development of Lleyn by means of railways. One day, it was the [GWR], and the next the 
[LNWR], and the next day somebody else. They were told that bills and plans “had been prepared” 
                                                             
140  “Colwyn Bay”, Rhyl Journal, 3 February 1900, 4. 
 
141  “The Railway Question”, Carnarvon and Denbigh Herald, 18 May 1900, 2. 
 
142  “Correspondence”, Welsh Coast Pioneer, 1 June 1900, 5. 
 
143  Flintshire Record Office [FRO], Hawarden, MS FC/3/4, Minutes of the Railway Committee of Flintshire 
County Council, 8 January 1900.  
 
144  “Flintshire County Council – The Railway Bill - Opposition Dropped”, Liverpool Mercury, 14 June 1900, 8. 
 
217 
 
and go on, right on to Porthdinlleyn, and that a steamship company was going to run thence to 
Ireland. Everybody had heard that during the past 30 or 40 years…145 
 
 
The nature of the scheme proposed in 1900 showed that the high hopes of 1836 for Porth 
Dinllaen were finally extinguished. Nonetheless, the County Council passed the resolution to 
support the light railway to Porth Dinllaen. The LNWR doubled its route to four lines on the north 
coast of Wales from 1900 but not even a light railway was ever built to Porth Dinllaen. That was 
the final measure of the complete victory of the Chester and Holyhead Railway between 1836 and 
1900. 
8.4  The railway in North Wales 1881-1900 
 
It is clear from the examination in this chapter that the lines operated by the LNWR and the 
company itself were major factors to be taken into account by local politicians and their 
communities in North Wales. From the early impact of railways and the ambitions of those who 
constructed them discussed in chapter 6, to the disputes and incidents in chapter 7 and the 
intense political exchanges in this chapter, there is a sense of the growing political struggle 
between the LNWR and local people to deploy railways to their own advantage. Welsh politicians 
did not act alone, but used the experience and expertise of Irish colleagues who had also battled 
with the LNWR for many years and knew how to disrupt parliamentary procedure to further their 
cause. The study shows that the LNWR’s anti-Liberal profile, as described by Drummond in Crewe, 
extended to North Wales. This was highlighted by the tensions between the LNWR, its employees 
and the local population in North Wales in the dispute over the Welsh language that began in 
1894. But there were abundant signs of tension before and after the language issue, in which the 
most prominent Welsh politician of the age – Lloyd George – featured strongly.  
 This chapter has also shown that railway development was an important item on the 
agenda of the new local authorities that emerged after 1890, and were influential on the political 
scene in North Wales. Those local authorities worked closely with their Westminster MPs, but also 
challenged the LNWR in their own right on issues such as monopoly, freight charges, passenger 
fares, levels of service and the English culture of the railway. Welsh politicians were not alone in 
learning how to use political processes effectively. This chapter has provided a case study in how 
the LNWR worked with local political forces in an increasingly subtle manner in order to secure its 
twin objectives of accessing Ireland quickly and extracting value from the holiday traffic and 
mineral deposits of North Wales.  
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Is it possible to analyse the relationship of the people of North Wales and the LNWR 
within a concept taken from the theoretical framework in chapter 1? One possibility is the rather 
inelegant 1966 notion of railwayisation, as expounded by Harvard economists Baran and Sweezy 
in their examination of monopoly capital and large corporations, including major railway 
companies, in the United States of America.  146 For them, railways in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries passed the test of an ‘epoch–making’ technology that was characterised by a: 
‘radical alteration of economic geography, with attendant internal migration, and the building of 
new communities [that] required or made possible the production of many new goods and 
services’.147 That is a description that can be recognised in Dodd’s account of internal migration to  
new towns on the coast of North Wales in the wake of the railways.148 Railwayisation may also be 
seen in Simmons’ suggestion of the new range of goods and services required to meet the needs 
of the ‘shops and boarding houses’ in those new communities towards the end of the period 
covered in this study.149 The weakness of the concept of ‘railwayisation’ in respect of North 
Wales, and more generally, is its focus on the impact of technology on economics and society, 
with too little attention to its interface with politics. The evidence from this study is that the 
LNWR did tend to dominate the techno-political discourse in North Wales, but that it also had to 
finesse the approach that it adopted because of the strength of political responses to it, especially 
once the franchise was extended and new democratic institutions were established in the period 
from 1880 to 1900. Railways were a significant force for change in North Wales and that change 
included a marked impact on the politics of the region, such that railways should be added to the 
list of prominent issues with which politicians were concerned in North Wales in the period 1850 
to 1900 - church disestablishment, education and the Welsh language. As this chapter has shown 
clearly, the issue of railways in North Wales – ‘the great railway problem’ -was especially marked 
in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.
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9 Conclusion : The Chester and Holyhead Railway in Britain’s Irish policy and the politics of 
North Wales 1850-1900 
 
‘Our inventions are wont to be pretty toys, which distract our attention from serious things. They 
are but improved means to an unimproved end’.1 
 
By addressing the three research questions this thesis has shown that technology is often used to 
assist in the achievement of political ends, and that technology can achieve those ends even when 
that is not the intention. It has demonstrated that the Chester and Holyhead Railway (CHR) was 
unique in the UK; a line that emerged from successive governments’ determination to use 
railways in their Irish policies from 1836 to 1850, and one that was specifically backed by Sir 
Robert Peel in the face of a powerful rival route. Ireland was a major issue in nineteenth-century 
UK politics, and railways were the century’s predominant technology. But a communication 
technology such as a railway is not easily confined, and the thesis also shows that the CHR had 
profound implications for the politics of North Wales as a by-product of the London and North 
Western Railway’s (LNWR) determined effort to protect its route to Ireland by establishing a 
monopoly in the four most northerly counties of Wales. The thesis is a case study of the interface 
of two great elements of nineteenth-century British politics - Ireland and railways - and the 
unexpected and even unintended political consequences that flowed from that encounter, 
understood within the context of the framework for analysing the relationship between 
technology and politics presented in the introduction.  
 Railways were the most extraordinary technological development, the ‘Napoleon’ of 
nineteenth century history for Schivelbusch; ‘epoch-making’ according to Baran and Sweezy, and 
‘a synonym for “civilization”’ in the opinion of many Victorian social improvers as argued by 
Fischer-Tiné and Mann.2 The railway disturbed communities, shocked individuals and confounded 
politicians, all of whom struggled to respond to the changes that it unleased in society - including 
the operation of its politics. Railways provided relatively cheap mobility in the United Kingdom 
(UK), particularly after Gladstone’s Railway Act of 1844, and created a more mobile population 
that increasingly severed its links with the old feudal order that had survived the first wave of 
industrialization in places like North Wales. As Winner has argued, such powerful technologies can 
be political in themselves because they cause profound changes such as extending the regulatory 
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power of the clock from the factory to the whole population – Schivelbusch’s ‘industrialization of 
time and space’ - a change that was beyond the power of ordinary politics to control.3 Such 
changes are made because technology requires a different organisation of society to enable it to 
operate effectively, a more orderly society that worked to “railway time” - to use a common 
phrase from Victorian Britain. 
 But as Kaiserfeld and Street have argued, the results of the application of technology are 
not the same in all contexts. This study underlines that point by examining that interaction in the 
two countries affected by the operation of the CHR and by providing abundant evidence of the 
complex relationship between politics and technology. The study began with an apparent 
example of ‘technological determinism’ - as it was the availability of the power of railways to 
entrepreneurs that created the call for a shorter route from London to Dublin rather than a 
political initiative. But politicians quickly understood the implications for their policy in Ireland. 
Under the terms of the 1835 Lichfield House Compact government challenged the ‘unimproved 
end’ of quasi-colonial control of Ireland by aiming to give it equality with the rest of the UK. It did 
so by a range of political, economic, legal and social initiatives, including the creation of the Irish 
Railway Commission (IRC) that is analysed in chapter 3. The work of the IRC addressed Thoreau’s 
concerns about the deployment of technology for an unimproved end through a thorough 
analysis of Irish society and its economy. It considered how railways could best address Ireland’s 
political alienation from the rest of the UK by tackling underdevelopment, population congestion 
and mass underemployment. The IRC proposed a whole system of railways within Ireland, focused 
on Dublin and connected to London via steamships over the Irish Sea and a line through North 
Wales that was designed to serve the Welsh people and their economy as a secondary benefit. 
The IRC proposed that railways should be constructed in an economical manner in order to 
minimise the advantages to lawyers, landowners, engineers and politicians and deliver major 
benefits instead to the whole population of Ireland. That was truly the use of an improved means 
to an improved end. It answered in 1838 the questions about politics and technology that Leo 
Marx posed in 1984 - how and by whom technology is controlled, the form of social organization 
that determines the use of the apparatus and its product, and the ends for which that control is 
exercised.  
 The answer to Leo Marx’s further question about what system of belief characteristically 
shapes the goals to which the apparatus is directed did much to create the opposition that 
ultimately defeated the IRC’s proposals.4 For, in contrast to the way railways had been established 
                                                             
3  Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology   (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 21. 
 
4  Marx, Leo. "On Heidegger's Conception of "Technology" and Its Historical Validity." The Massachusetts 
Review 25, no. 4 (1984): 638-52.  
 
221 
 
in England, the IRC position on ownership and philosophy was extraordinarily radical for the 
1830s – replacing laissez-faire economics with state ownership of railways for the public good in 
its proposals for Ireland, and a form of regional political engagement in how they operated in that 
country. The IRC proposals aimed to deliver a stronger union between Britain and Ireland, but it 
did so by supporting the indigenous nationalism of Ireland and intended to make that country an 
equal partner within the UK, and one with a thriving economy, a developing industrial base and 
more efficient agriculture. The IRC model was founded on the approach that had helped to create 
Belgium in 1830, and the nation-building potential of that method was not lost on those 
politicians who were anxious to maintain the union of Ireland and Britain in a form that favoured 
the latter. Nonetheless, if the IRC had confined to Ireland the advocacy of its approach to railway 
development it would have been a challenge to the political and railway establishments of the UK 
– but one that Melbourne’s Whig government might have been able to overcome. But the IRC 
insisted that all new UK railways should be built and managed differently, and that proved too 
much for the IRC’s political opponents. 
 Sir Robert Peel led the fierce attack on the IRC that resulted in its defeat in 1838. He was a 
powerful advocate for laissez-faire economics, and by the 1840s also had a difficult relationship 
with nationalist Ireland. He had clear ideas about the ownership, philosophy and objectives that 
the Irish railway system should embrace – and they were almost diametrically opposed to those 
of the IRC. Peel felt that railways in Ireland should develop piecemeal, as they had in England, and 
so wanted to leave the choice of routes and the manner of construction to private investors. He 
ensured that the rail link from London towards Ireland met his own political priorities by linking it 
to the Trent Valley Railway through his constituency, and by setting a policy priority for the UK 
government to use the railway route to Dublin to control Ireland rather than to improve it. This 
was much closer to Thoreau’s ‘improved means to an unimproved end’, at least from an Irish 
perspective such as that of Daniel O’Connell; and it was O’Connell’s attempt to revive the repeal 
of the union as a political issue that energised Peel to support the rapid construction of the CHR in 
1843-6. While the balance of benefits from the IRC’s proposals favoured Ireland, Peel’s refusal to 
advocate any structured approach to the issue, beyond insisting on Holyhead (via  his Tamworth 
constituency)as the destination of the line from London, clearly favoured those who considered 
that Ireland’s economy should remain predominantly agricultural and subservient to the needs of 
the rest of the UK. The difference between Peel’s approach and that of the IRC lies at the heart of 
the relationship between politics and technology – the results of its use being largely determined 
by who owns and directs it. The IRC and Peel both wanted to use railways to reinforce the union 
between Britain and Ireland, but the IRC use of public ownership would have delivered a different 
and more equal political relationship between them than the private enterprise model that Peel 
advocated.  
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It was Peel who prevailed, but his approach to railway development proved unequal to 
the task of absorbing Ireland into the UK, particularly after the humanitarian catastrophe of the 
Great Famine of 1845-47. It was not for the want of trying. When the CHR was completed in 1850, 
Lord John Russell’s Whig government did not revive their commitment to the IRC approach and 
instead continued Peel’s policy by attempting the clearest possible application of technology to a 
political issue – an early example of Hecht’s ‘technopolitics’ defined in chapter 1.5 It proposed that 
the Dublin Castle regime should be abolished and replaced by direct rule from London, solely 
because of the assumed increase in the speed of communication provided by the CHR. This was 
an example of the problem of not knowing the value of a technological solution to a political 
problem until the ‘results are in’, to use Street’s phrase.6 As amply demonstrated by the statistical 
analysis in chapter 5, the CHR did not deliver any improvement at all in the overall journey time. 
That had been predicted by those who offered the faster broad gauge railway alternative in 1846, 
the demise of which provided evidence of the ability of politicians to defeat a superior but 
politically inconvenient technology. The failure of the CHR to speed up communication also meant 
that Peel’s “softer” aims, such as increased Anglicization, could not be realized. Such aims were 
based on a rather optimistic assessment of what technology could achieve in the face of a 
powerful sense of Irish nationality that was reinforced by the horrors of the Great Famine. In 
Ireland railways were, as Divall has argued more generally: ‘necessary if not sufficient in building 
centralised state control’ and so the quasi-colonial machinery of Dublin Castle survived Russell’s 
attempt to replace it with direct rule of Ireland from London and thereby unify the United 
Kingdom.7 
It was not just railways that were deployed in 1850 to strengthen Ireland’s relationship 
with the UK - it was railways, steamships and the electric telegraph. This study has shown that this 
trinity of imperial technologies was used in Ireland before it was deployed in India, and so can be 
added to other examples in which Ireland was the model for later imperial practice. But did that 
make the CHR an “imperial railway”? The findings of this study are consistent with the CHR 
serving ‘the infrastructure of political rule’, which was an element of railway imperialism 
according to Robinson.8 When compared to the Semmering Pass railway that Lee claimed as the 
‘first imperial railway’ in 1854, the CHR appears to a have a greater claim than that line because 
                                                             
5  Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and national identity after World War II (London: 
MIT Press, 2009), 91. 
 
6  James Street, Politics and Technology (Guildford: Guildford Press, 1992), 118. 
 
7  Colin Divall, “Railway imperialisms, railway nationalisms” in Monika Burri; Kilian T. Elsasser; David Gugerli. 
(Eds) Die Internationalität der Eisenbahn 1850-1970  (Zurich : Chronos, 2003), 197. 
 
8  Kenneth Wilburn in Thomas Benjamin  (editor) Encyclopedia of Western Colonialism since 1450. Vol. 3. 
Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007. 943-945.  
 
223 
 
its purpose was similar to its aim to: ‘integrate the provinces of Italy into Austro-Hungarian 
Empire’ and it predated it.9 But the CHR’s claim to being an “imperial railway”, comparable to 
railways in India, is weakened because Russell’s aim to rule Ireland directly from London in 1850, 
based on the completion of the CHR, was not realised. The CHR strengthened the imperial 
purpose of maintaining the administration of the union with Ireland, but only in an enhanced 
form of that which had existed since the Act of Union in 1801. There was no step change in the 
way Ireland was governed, such as direct rule from London, as a result of the construction of the 
CHR, and there is little evidence that the CHR, and the Irish railway system to which it was linked, 
exercised the homogenising effect that was identified by Adams in North America.  Ireland was 
more of an example of how politics can interact negatively with technology; and it did so after 
1847 to produce something close to one of Nye’s ‘counter narratives’ in the US.10 The Young 
Ireland movement’s political manifesto advocated a return to the land rather than a future built 
around the liberal politics of “improvement” and the economics of laissez-faire. As Quinn 
demonstrated, John Mitchel, one its leaders, specifically attacked Britain’s economic system, 
liberal values and modern technology that he considered to be destructive of Ireland’s essentially 
rural nature. The chance to use railways to effect social, economic and political change for the 
benefit of Ireland’s population, and the union with Britain, had been lost by 1847 with the 
collapse of the IRC nine years earlier.  
It is beyond the scope of this study to establish whether or not the IRC would have 
changed the course of Irish history by mitigating the effects of the Great Famine. But the analysis 
of Peel’s role in destroying the work of the IRC might well, on further examination, rebalance the 
generally positive view of his government’s management of the Great Famine compared with the 
later efforts of Russell’s government. The evidence of this study makes it hard not to conclude 
that Peel’s treatment of the IRC was an example of reckless political action to support free market 
economics in the management of both railways and Ireland - when a more technically proficient 
and socially progressive alternative was available. The analysis in chapter 3 supports Vaughan’s 
assessment of the IRC report as a ‘stupendous attainment’ and one worthy of further examination 
in respect of both Irish history and the history of railways and government.11 The IRC was the first 
to propose many of the reforms of railway regulation that were contained in legislation such as 
the 1844 Railway Act, and it used the mathematical methods employed by Casson for his 
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counterfactual British railway system of 2009 some 170 years before him. Its work provides an 
excellent model for the rational use of technology by political leaders, but it is significant also that 
it failed because it was a relentlessly logical assessment of Irish needs that offered a technological 
solution but ignored political realities. Lord John Russell‘s assessment of the report author 
Thomas Drummond that his: ‘scientific attainments, whatever might be his politics, would not be 
denied’- was accurate, and it was Drummond’s politics that mattered more than his technological 
proficiency in the failure of the IRC report.12 In the choice of route for the London to Dublin 
railway link; by supporting the narrow gauge over the broad gauge; by choosing Holyhead instead 
of Porth Dinllaen as the port and refuge harbour, and especially in the failure to support the IRC, 
politicians provided the examples that showed the limits of technological determinism - and that 
good technical advice was much less powerful than political ideology – an important finding from 
this study. 
The example of North Wales is more difficult to analyse in terms of the relationship 
between politics and technology because there was no clear political purpose in North Wales 
from the construction of the CHR, as there was for Ireland. While the CHR’s role in the British 
policy towards Ireland was explicit and largely ineffective, its relationship to the politics of North 
Wales was subtle, subversive - and ultimately transformational. There was no overtly imperial or 
colonial dimension to railway construction in North Wales. The absorption of Wales by England in 
1536 was too long-standing to bear comparison with the union of Ireland and Great Britain - as 
Williams among others has argued. But in some respects, such as its language, Wales was more 
different from England than either Scotland or Ireland. This study is therefore an example of how 
the issues of who controls a technology, the form of social organization from which it emerges 
and the priorities for its use can impact on cultural and linguistic differences with political results. 
The research in chapter 6 shows that English construction of the branch lines that connected to 
the CHR brought with it the assumptions of moral superiority that scholars such as Headrick, 
Adas, Lee and Kerr had found in more distant parts of empire; and which the Welsh people had 
also experienced at the hands of the Education Commissioners in 1847. But unlike the Education 
Commission, the railway builders articulated an unofficial mission to improve the local population 
by giving them access to modern technology in the manner suggested by den Otter in Canada – 
but a mission that was also consistent with their personal financial gain. 
Once those branch lines had been built and acquired by the LNWR, the differences 
between the railway owners and the local people became more pronounced. The LNWR was a 
creation of parliament and was strongly aligned with the state through the vital connections it 
made between London and the largest and most important cities in the UK such as Manchester, 
Liverpool, Glasgow and Dublin. Because it was English, Conservative and Anglican, the LNWR’s 
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relationship with North Wales was destined to be a difficult one. Local people were 
predominantly Welsh speaking, nonconformist in religion and Liberal in politics once the franchise 
was extended. The fact that the LNWR was the only railway in the four most northerly counties of 
Wales added to its power and to the frustration of the local population, whose needs it largely 
ignored. The issue of the distribution of the benefits of technology was as important in North 
Wales as it had been in work of the IRC in Ireland. The LNWR aimed to make large profits from its 
Irish traffic, but not to contribute to the local economy to any extent. It lost the battle over paying 
more poor rates in the 1870s, but by the end of the decade had won back its advantage through 
its high charges for passengers and freight. In short, the LNWR in North Wales used its 
monopolistic power primarily for its own benefit and to fulfil its commitments to the state to 
deliver the mail between Britain and Ireland. It was disdainful of the local population and their 
language and entirely aligned with informal politics of Victorian English “improvement”.  
But as most analysts concede, the relationship between politics and technology is an 
interactive one with unpredictable results. So the Welsh people benefited from railways, even if 
that was not the intention of the owners. That was consistent with the findings from studies of 
railway imperialism in which the railway served indigenous groups as well as imperial powers in 
places like India and South Africa. Politicians such as William Gladstone, whose family home was 
in North Wales, were much more sensitive to the changes that were taking place when the 
franchise was extended after 1868, and Gladstone also had a personal interest in challenging the 
poor service that large companies like the LNWR provided to local land and mine owners like him. 
He could also see that, in Street’s terms, railways were creating ‘new forms of participation’ by 
enabling large religious, cultural and political gatherings in North Wales and exposing the 
population to more newsprint and opportunities to travel and experience new places and 
perspectives.13 In particular, the railways supported the growth of a greater sense of Welsh 
national identity, which Gladstone had to harness if he was to retain the support of the new 
group Liberal MPs that replaced the landed elite of Wales in parliament from 1868 onwards. So 
railways may have contributed in North Wales to the kind of reaction that is suggested in 
Hechter’s notion of ‘Internal Colonialism’, in which strong influences from a metropolitan culture 
actually reinforce local identity rather than destroying it. However, there is no suggestion in this 
study that railways created a colonial style connection between North Wales and the metropole.14 
But Kubicek’s analysis across the British Empire that technology strengthened both the metropole 
and the periphery appears to apply to the much smaller example of North Wales.  
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 More Welsh people articulated their concerns about the LNWR monopoly as the 
franchise extended, and railways became an important item on the agenda of indigenous political 
groups such as Cymru Fydd that offered a more radical and nationalist approach in North Wales 
than Gladstone had done. The importance of railways as part of the new Welsh nationalism 
articulated in chapter 8 is so marked that an important addition to knowledge of this research is 
that the issue should be added to English dominance in official religion, land and education, which 
are the current focus of Welsh historians of the period. The stance of the radical Welsh politicians 
did not impress the LNWR, which chose in 1894 to dismiss employees in North Wales who could 
only speak Welsh. That action was entirely consistent with the LNWR’s imperious approach to 
North Wales, its impatience with Welsh complaints and its attitude to its employees and local 
people, for example in Holyhead in the 1880s. The evidence of this study is that the LNWR treated 
its staff (and the local population) in Holyhead in a manner similar to that found by Diane 
Drummond in her study.  In Crewe it was the Liberalism of the staff that was the focus of the 
company’s attention, while in Holyhead it was their nationality – in both cases it was highly 
political. The LNWR was metropolitan to its core and could neither understand nor tolerate any 
lack of commitment to its Anglican conservatism. It was a large railway corporation with the 
tendency, as noted by Marsden and Smith of such corporations generally, to erode local 
difference in favour of national homogeneity. After the crisis over the dismissal of its Welsh-
speaking employees in 1894, the LNWR was severely challenged in North Wales by an increasingly 
nationalistic group of MPs from both Wales and Ireland that embarrassed the company nationally 
and locally. That led indirectly to a more conciliatory approach from the LNWR, since the furore 
created by their action delayed their plans to add extra lines in tourist areas in order to capture 
the rapidly expanding market. But there had been a ferocious political battle between nationalism 
and the LNWR before that position was reached. Ultimately, the interaction of politics and 
technology had impacted on both the railway company and politicians in North Wales, and by the 
end of the nineteenth century there was a greater sense of harmony between the LNWR and the 
Welsh population than at any time in the previous thirty years – a demonstration of the 
interactive nature of the relationship between politics, technology and its owners described by 
Street. That paved the way for the LNWR to expand its capacity and profit from the coastal areas, 
but also gave people in North Wales the local service they had been denied to some extent 
because of the focus on Irish traffic by the LNWR. Railways had enabled Welsh nationalism to 
thrive and had been an important item on the nationalist agenda in North Wales, though they 
were never within the control of Welsh nationalist politicians and could not be defined as being 
involved in nation-building in Wales in any formal sense – even though that ambition was part of 
the Cymru Fydd agenda. As the example of Belgium showed, for technology to be effective in 
nation building the improved means provided by railways had to be directed to an improved end, 
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and one which was supported by a political and popular consensus. This study only concerned 
North Wales, but even in that area there was no agreement between nationalists, the owners of 
the railway and the UK state that could have generated a successful nationalist agenda. But 
railways could be said to have contributed to weakening Welsh national identity in North Wales 
by fusing the region to its more powerful neighbour country of England in the manner described 
by den Otter in respect of Canada and the United States. The LNWR’s close relationship with 
state, supported through its directors in parliament, had been enough to resist the politics of the 
periphery and to secure an increased dominance for the company in North Wales. By the end of 
the century the LNWR had doubled its capacity along the North Wales coast and thereby 
increased the ‘English tide’ that had been identified as an irresistible force in 1879.15 Did that 
impact on North Wales amount to an ‘improved end’ in contrast to Thoreau’s suggested impact of 
nineteenth-century technology? Simmons concluded that the LNWR monopoly in North Wales 
was beneficial, while Dodd, who wrote the only detailed economic history of the region, 
suggested that railways depressed economic development.  Dodd’s analysis underlined the point 
that it was not railways themselves that determined the outcomes for North Wales, it was the 
political decisions about the route, the operator and the priorities for the line that ensured that 
line followed the north coast, missed the emerging centre of the industry of North Wales at 
Porthmadog and created the tension between the railway and the local population. The analysis 
in this thesis, being focused on politics rather than economics, cannot resolve the difference 
between the conclusions of Dodd and Simmons – beyond noting that it has shown conclusively 
and uniquely that, from the 1870 to the end of the century, there was a sustained and 
occasionally furious political response to the LNWR monopoly from Liberal politicians in North 
Wales. It is difficult not to conclude that the opposition of those politicians emanated from very 
negative views from local people about aspects of the attitude and behaviour of the LNWR in 
North Wales, and the consequences of its operations for the region. That suggests that Simmons 
conclusion about the benefits of the LNWR monopoly in North Wales warrants further analysis 
before it can be accepted fully. The notion of railwayisation that was raised in chapter 8 as a 
possible means of understanding what happened in North Wales in the second half of the 
nineteenth century cannot be accepted without modification. It is too close to being an example 
of technological determinism, as it takes insufficient account of the political decisions that created 
the particular form of railway impact in the region.  
The momentous impact of railways on politics, economics and society in the nineteenth 
century ensured that senior politicians such as Peel, O’Connell, Russell, Gladstone, Lloyd George 
and others could not afford to ignore them – any more than a politician today can ignore the 
power of the internet. So politicians did not just react to railways, they actively used them to 
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further government policy, their own political ends and the interests of their constituents - as this 
study has shown. It is surprising that this is not reflected more in the biographies of these 
prominent figures. No biographies consulted for the figures named above recognised the extent 
of their engagement with railways, particularly in respect of the politics of Wales and Ireland. 
Some of the issues that those politicians considered remain relevant today as we begin a new 
railway age. Arguments about the route of the high speed line from London to the north-west of 
England proceed much as they did in the 1840s. Politicians still: ‘make poor choices on large 
projects’, often through a lack of clarity on overall objectives such as cutting journey time.16  
Similar failings led to Peel’s persistence with the CHR, when it was clear that the rival project 
could deliver the faster journey time between London and Dublin that was its single most 
important purpose. Technology and technological expertise cannot succeed without informed 
political support, just as politicians cannot deliver the outcomes they desire without technology 
and the people who understand it. Irish nationalism ultimately prevailed over the ambitions of 
British politicians to use roads, railways and steamships in their Irish policies in the first half of the 
nineteenth century to assimilate Ireland. In North Wales, the LNWR was able to resist the much 
weaker Welsh nationalism in the second half of the century, when it maintained its monopoly and 
captured the region’s tourist trade. In Ireland it was an “official” encounter between politics and 
technology, while in North Wales it was “unofficial”, showing the different ways in which politics 
and technology interact. This study suggests that a major technology needs to be deployed with a 
careful appreciation of its likely impact, while understanding that there will be unexpected 
outcomes. Those can be managed best by politicians and the owners of technology engaging with 
each other and with those most affected by their plans, recognising that the application of 
technology to achieve social and economic results is a complex political exercise that should be 
negotiated rather than enforced. 
The old CHR remains a significant link between Ireland and a larger union today – though 
now it is the European Union rather than the UK. The line is shown as part of a European network 
but now: ‘we need an underwater train to Ireland’ rather than the steamships of the 1850s.17 And 
when the UK ceases to be a part of the European Union that link between the Republic of Ireland 
and Brussels may be just as vital as once was the link between Dublin and London. Even in the 
modern era of motor car, airplane and internet, the railway survives as a powerful technology 
that can serve political ends.
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Appendix A: Land ownership in North Wales showing area and value of land owned by large landowners featured in North Wales by County area 
D = Denbighshire; F = Flintshire; A = Anglesey; C = Caernarfonshire 
OWNER D acres D value F acres F value (£) A acres A value (£) C acres C value (£) TOTAL 
acres 
TOTAL 
value (£) 
Value per acre (£) 
LNWR 232 10396 382 56014 130 7372 523 23866 1267 97648 77.1 
GWR 522 4676 32 522     554 5198 9.4 
Glynne   4773 12636     4773 12636 2.6 
Gladstone W.E.   2135 4929     2135 4929 2.3 
Church of England 421 853 575 1113 596 575 203 762 1795 3303 1.8 
Mostyn 1938 1508 5460 10467   2025 4053 9423 16028 1.7 
Westminster 855 1837 3335 4924     4190 6761 1.6 
Pennant   1450 1813   41348 62622 42798 64435 1.5 
Assheton Smith     730 767 33752 42255 34482 43022 1.2 
Hesketh 3086 3654       3086 3654 1.2 
W. O. Stanley MP     4697 5086   4697 5086 1.1 
Lord Anglesey     8485 9132   8485 9132 1.1 
Mainwaring 1816 1822       1816 1822 1.0 
Meyrick     16918 13283   16918 13283 0.8 
Wynn 33998 25741 299 378     34297 26119 0.8 
Newborough     1745 1141 22063 16234 23808 17375 0.7 
Lord Stanley     5960 4238   5960 4238 0.7 
Bulkeley     16516 17997 13362 3141 29878 21138 0.7 
Gore J R O       8570 2769 8570 2769 0.3 
 
Figures taken from “Landowners in North Wales”, North Wales Chronicle, 26 February 1876, 6, and 4 March 187
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Abbreviations 
 
Anglesey Central Railway (ACR) 
Anglesey County Council (ACC) 
Britannia Tubular Bridge (BTB) 
Carnarvonshire County Council (CCC) 
Carnarvonshire Railway (CR) 
Chester and Birkenhead Railway (CBR) 
Chester and Crewe Railway (CCR) 
Chester and Holyhead Railway (CHR) 
Conway and Llanrwst Railway (CLR) 
County Council (CC) 
Denbighshire County Council (DCC) 
Dublin and Kingstown Railway (DKR) 
Ffestiniog Railway (FR) 
Flintshire County Council (FCC) 
Gauge Commission (GC) 
General Railway Committee (GRC) 
George’s Harbour Railway (GHR) 
Grand Junction Railway (GJR) 
Great Western Railway (GWR) 
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) 
House of Commons (HC) 
Irish Railway Commission (IRC) 
Liverpool and Manchester Railway (LMR) 
London and Birmingham Railway (LBR) 
London and North Western Railway (LNWR) 
Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway (MSL) 
Member of Parliament (MP) 
Mold Railway (MR) 
North Wales Mineral Railway (NWMR) 
Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton Railway (OWW) 
Porth Dinllaen Railway (PDR) 
Rental Value (RV) 
Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway (SBR) 
Shrewsbury and Chester Railway (SCR) 
Trent Valley Railway (TVR) 
United Kingdom (UK) 
Vale of Clwyd Railway (VCR) 
Wrexham, Mold and Connah’s Quay Railway (WMCQR) 
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